Great-power competition in Latin America and Chile: analysis of 13 November 2026

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Photo from Iran designates Argentine navy and air force as terrorist organizations, Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)

Analysis

Washington is coupling coercive economic statecraft (Cuba sanctions, tariff threats on Mexico, a Venezuela oil deal) with targeted counter-infrastructure such as Callao, while China answers with diplomatic backing for Havana and a rival bid against Chile for the High Seas Treaty secretariat, and reg

The fortnight shows a hemisphere in which the United States is acting as a sphere-of-influence power: it sanctions Chinese firms supplying Cuba's military 1722, congratulates the Dominican Republic for closing a Chinese-run factory 27, funds port design at Callao to rival China's Chancay 4, threatens to double tariffs on Mexico over migration 2, and claims a US$200 billion oil bonanza in Venezuela 21. China responds mainly with declaratory support and institutional competition rather than hard power: Wang Yi pledged to stand by Cuba 17, Beijing's embassy mocked Washington in Santo Domingo 27, and China attacked the Chile-Belgium bid to host the High Seas Treaty body in favour of Xiamen 9. Latin American governments are neither bandwagoning nor balancing: Mexico buys Black Hawks and cooperates on cartels while Sheinbaum prepares to address APEC in Shenzhen and weigh a Xi meeting against US trade talks 3528; Peru hosts US money at Callao while its Senate sends Fujimori to China and Japan 415. The US midterm loss of both chambers 293339 and the near-impeachment of Hegseth over operations in Iran, Yemen, Venezuela and the Caribbean 24 add uncertainty about whether domestic constraint will moderate or intensify pressure southward 33.

Key developments

  • Cuba becomes the US-China flashpoint. Washington penalised two Chinese state-linked firms for allegedly supplying the Cuban military; Cuba's foreign minister then flew to Beijing, where Wang Yi pledged to resist sanctions and 'foreign interference' [17][22]. Trump simultaneously declared Cuba 'falling' and tied it rhetorically to US Democrats, while a Florida subpoena probes alleged Chinese and Cuban funding of the DSA [18][29]. The humanitarian dimension of fuel restrictions [37] and the annual UN embargo vote [35] mean the pressure campaign is contested on legal and human-rights grounds, not just geopolitically. 1722291837
  • Callao versus Chancay: ports as strategic terrain. The State Department paid US$4.5 million to design a port programme at Callao as Peru relocates its naval base to expand its busiest port, less than 80km from the Chinese-controlled Chancay megaport [4]. The sum is small against Chancay's scale, which signals a symbolic and planning foothold rather than a commercial counterweight; its value lies in anchoring Peruvian naval and customs infrastructure to a US design. Peru's Senate approving President Fujimori's APEC trip to China and a Tokyo summit shows Lima intends to take investment from all sides [15]. 4156
  • Mexico: coercion and cooperation in the same week. Trump threatened to double tariffs over a migrant caravan, which Sheinbaum disputed on the facts [2], while Mexico agreed to buy 11 Black Hawks for US$1.07 billion, framed domestically as disaster-response rather than military alignment [3]. US-backed intelligence cooperation against the CJNG continues [28], yet commentary warns that a White House acting alone, possibly against Congress, will test Mexican red lines on security [19]. Sheinbaum's Shenzhen APEC appearance and a possible Xi meeting are being openly weighed against the risk to US trade negotiations—hedging conducted in public [5]. 2328195
  • Venezuela oil deal: who captures the rent?. The interim president claims Venezuela will earn US$200 billion from its deal with the US, while critics argue billions are being left on the table and environmental damage is unaddressed [21]. The claim is unverified and contested; the deal sits alongside congressional anger at military hostilities in Venezuela and the Caribbean that fed the Hegseth impeachment attempt [24][23]. This is resource-based statecraft reshaping a former Chinese and Russian partner into a US-aligned supplier. 212423
  • Post-midterm US: constrained at home, assertive abroad?. Democrats retook the House and Senate [29][39], and the House only narrowly blocked Hegseth's impeachment 211-204 [23][24]. Analysts argue a weakened Trump may compensate by intensifying pressure on a divided region with little capacity for a unified response [33][38]; the Dominican factory episode and Cuba rhetoric fit that reading [27][29]. 2939232433
  • Secondary players: Iran, Russia and Europe. Iran designated Argentina's navy and air force as terrorist organisations in reciprocity for Milei's IRGC listing [1][20], while courting Brazil's Lula and Uruguay [8][30]—a wedge strategy exploiting regional divergence. Russia's leverage is thin: Brazilian traders balked at Russian diesel priced above US fuel, showing commodity flows follow price not politics [10]. Europe's Mercosur rapprochement is framed as a belated attempt to recover ground lost to China [31]. 12083010

Themes

  • Hedging as the regional default. Mexico, Peru and Brazil each take US security or economic goods while keeping China channels open—Black Hawks and cartel intelligence alongside Shenzhen [3][5][28]; Callao money alongside an APEC trip to China [4][15]; a Mexico-China archaeology project [26]; Lula receiving Iranian outreach after re-election [8][45]. This is active non-alignment in practice: governments price US coercion as a cost to manage, not an alliance to join. 3528415
  • Washington's instruments are coercive; Beijing's are declaratory. The US acts through sanctions, tariffs, port finance and security partnerships [17][2][4][13], whereas China responds with pledges to Cuba, embassy rhetoric and institutional bids [17][27][9]. The asymmetry suggests China's commercial presence has not yet converted into the capacity to protect partners from US pressure. 17241327
  • Domestic politics driving foreign policy on all sides. The Cuba campaign is framed in US partisan terms [29][18], Sheinbaum links helicopters to flood rescue [3], and Peru's Senate had to authorise Fujimori's trip [15]. Sovereignist discourse in South America, as the comparative manifesto study notes, does not necessarily oppose regional integration [34]. 291831534

What it means for Chile

  • High Seas Treaty bid: a multilateral collision with Beijing. China publicly accused Chile and Belgium of 'politicising' the bid to host the High Seas Treaty secretariat and pushed Xiamen instead [9]. For Chile this is unusual: a country that relies on China as its dominant copper and lithium buyer is now in open institutional rivalry with it over ocean governance, an area linked to Chile's Antarctic and Southern Ocean interests. How Santiago manages the dispute without damaging commodity ties will reveal whether its non-alignment extends to contesting Beijing directly. 9
  • Pacific port competition reaches Chile's doorstep. The Callao-Chancay contest [4] matters for Chilean ports competing for South American Pacific cargo and for the Asia-bound mineral exports on which Chile depends. If US-designed Callao infrastructure and Chinese-run Chancay both expand, Chile faces a choice over whether its own port and transport projects attract investment that Washington treats as benign or as strategic leverage, as the Dominican factory closure shows even small Chinese assets can become targets [27]. 427
  • Trade architecture and regional alignment. Peru and Mexico heading to APEC in China [5][15] and Europe's renewed Mercosur push [31] frame Chile's position as a country with agreements across all three blocs, able to diversify but exposed if US-China trade coercion spreads. Lula's re-election [45] and Iran's reciprocal action against Argentina [1][20] show neighbours taking divergent paths, leaving Chile to decide how much regional coordination is worth against the cost of being drawn into others' disputes. 51531451

Analytical lenses

  • Hedging and active non-alignment. The concept explains why Mexico and Peru accept US security and port goods while attending APEC in China [3][4][5][15], and why Lula engages Iran [8]: they maximise options under uncertainty rather than choosing sides. It misses the limits imposed by asymmetric dependence—Sheinbaum openly worries a Xi meeting could complicate US trade talks [5], and Argentina's IRGC listing shows some governments do align [20]. 345158
  • Monroe Doctrine and spheres of influence. US actions—sanctioning Chinese suppliers to Cuba, congratulating the Dominican Republic for closing a Chinese factory, financing Callao, claiming Venezuelan oil—read as reasserting exclusive hemispheric prerogatives [17][27][4][21], and China's accusation of 'sinister intentions' frames it that way [27]. The lens explains the pattern of pressure but not the domestic constraint: a Democratic Congress and a near-impeachment over Caribbean operations show the sphere is contested in Washington itself [24][39]. 172742124
  • Commercial presence versus strategic leverage. China's Chancay port, factories and Cuban supply contracts are substantial commercial footprints [4][27][22], but when Washington targets them Beijing responds with statements and an institutional bid against Chile [17][9], while Russia cannot even sell discounted diesel in Brazil on price [10]. The distinction explains the US capacity to coerce and China's reluctance to escalate; it misses that for commodity-dependent exporters like Chile and Peru, Chinese demand itself is leverage that Washington cannot replace [4][15]. 42722179

What to watch

  • Whether Sheinbaum meets Xi in Shenzhen and whether Washington links that to tariff or USMCA talks, which would test how much hedging the US will tolerate from its closest trading partner [5][2]. 52
  • The outcome of the High Seas Treaty secretariat contest between Chile-Belgium and Xiamen, a direct test of whether China can outbid a middle power in multilateral institution-siting [9]. 9
  • Further US sanctions on Chinese firms over Cuba and any material Chinese fuel or financial support, which would show whether Beijing's pledge is more than words [17][22][37]. 172237
  • How the Democratic Congress uses oversight of operations in Venezuela and the Caribbean after the Hegseth vote, and whether that constrains or merely redirects executive pressure on the region [24][39][33]. 243933
Stories this analysis is based on (29)
  1. Iran designates Argentine navy and air force as terrorist organizations Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)
  2. Trump threatens to double tariffs on Mexico as a new migrant caravan heads north Mexico News Daily
  3. Mexico agrees to buy 11 Black Hawk helicopters from the United States for US $1.07 billion Mexico News Daily
  4. US invests in Peru’s Callao as port battle with China’s Chancay megaport continues SCMP China
  5. Sheinbaum to address APEC business leaders in China: Thursday’s mañanera recapped Mexico News Daily
  6. Ransa Buys Out Astara in Peru Car Logistics The Rio Times
  7. Iranian, Brazilian presidents emphasize strengthening bilateral cooperation IRNA (Iranian state media)
  8. China slams Chile-Belgium bid to host High Seas Treaty body, pushes rival Xiamen proposal SCMP China
  9. Brazilian Buyers Balk at Price of Russian Diesel Shunned by U.S. Importers – Bloomberg The Moscow Times
  10. Bolivia arrests former judge on suspicion of drug trafficking Al Jazeera
  11. Peru Senate Backs Fujimori China Japan Trip The Rio Times
  12. China backs Cuba as Havana raises US fuel pressure in Beijing South China Morning Post
  13. Did China and Cuba fund US socialists? Florida’s attorney general demands answers SCMP China
  14. Stephen Miller's White House will test Mexico's red lines The Hill
  15. Iran lists Argentina’s Navy, Air Force as terrorist organisations Buenos Aires Times
  16. Trump promises an oil bonanza in Venezuela, but critics question who will benefit Dialogue Earth (formerly Diálogo Chino)
  17. Cuba Minister in China After US Sanctions The Rio Times
  18. Hegseth dodges bullet but wants troops to believe they did, too Responsible Statecraft
  19. House votes to block motion to impeach Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth NBC News
  20. China mocks US ‘congratulations’ over Dominican closure of Chinese-run factory South China Morning Post
  21. From El Mencho to R2: Mexico’s offensive against the Jalisco New Generation Cartel El País English
  22. After midterm disaster, can Rubio still get Cuba regime change? Responsible Statecraft
  23. Iran chamber, Uruguayan envoy discuss joint committee, market opportunities, private-sector co-op Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)
  24. Europe returns to Latin America: Is it too late? Latinoamérica21
  25. Trump defeated: Is he weaker or more dangerous to Latin America? Latinoamérica21
  26. Sovereignty for and against what? Varieties of sovereignist claims in Mediterranean Europe and South America Journal articles (OpenAlex)
  27. Cuba’s energy isolation: The humanitarian cost of a new sanctions strategy Latinoamérica21
  28. Experts React: The Midterms and America’s Place in the World Stimson Center
  29. What Fueled Lula’s Unprecedented Victory in Brazil? Inter-American Dialogue

Written by Claude Fable 5.1 (Anthropic), based on 45 recent headlines and excerpts in this section, Nov 13. AI analysis can misread or miss things: the numbers link to the original reporting, which is the authority.