Great-power competition in Latin America and Chile: analysis of 15 November 2026

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Photo from Iran designates Argentine navy and air force as terrorist organizations, Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)

Analysis

Washington is converting the Western Hemisphere into an explicit sphere-of-influence contest—military threats against Cuba, tariff coercion of Mexico, port investment in Peru against China's Chancay—while a Democratic midterm sweep raises the question of whether a domestically weakened Trump becomes

The fortnight's reporting shows the United States deploying the full range of economic and coercive statecraft in its near abroad: tariff threats tied to migration 2718, terrorist designations of Guatemalan gangs 811, lethal maritime strikes now the subject of litigation by Ecuadorian survivors 5, and an openly floated military option against Cuba 16. China's presence appears less as new initiative than as contested infrastructure and institutional footholds—Chancay versus a US-funded Callao programme 20, a Panamanian port sold by a now-wanted Chinese businessman 6, and a rival bid to Chile and Belgium for the High Seas Treaty secretariat 25. Latin American governments are hedging rather than aligning: Sheinbaum buys US Black Hawks while travelling to Shenzhen for APEC 1921, Lula courts Iran at COP31 1224, and Brazilian buyers decline Russian diesel on price rather than politics 26. The post-midterm context—Democratic control of Congress 41—frames the central analytical uncertainty: whether executive-led hemispheric pressure intensifies precisely because domestic room for manoeuvre has narrowed 35.

Key developments

  • Cuba moves from sanctions pressure to military signalling. Trump told an interviewer he wants to 'get Cuba done' and could use military force before leaving office [16], against a backdrop of fuel restrictions that analysts describe as a new sanctions strategy with severe humanitarian costs [39]. Havana has revived military exercises after the US elections, with local observers noting the paradox that the threat has sharpened despite a Democratic sweep [3]; the annual UN embargo vote underscores the tension between unilateral sanctions and international law that any escalation would deepen [37]. 1633937
  • Tariffs as migration leverage against Mexico. Trump threatened to double tariffs on Mexico as a caravan of roughly 1,500 people moved north, and Sheinbaum countered that no caravan has reached the border during his second term [2][7]. The threat hangs over the Buen Fin retail season and supply chains feeding US shelves [18], while Mexico's water-delivery shortfall—less than 1% of what it owes—offers Washington a second pressure point [10]; this is economic statecraft exploiting asymmetric interdependence, since Mexico cannot credibly retaliate in kind. 271810
  • Port rivalry on the Pacific: Callao versus Chancay. The US State Department disclosed a US$4.5 million payment to design a port infrastructure programme at Callao, as Peru relocates its main naval base to expand the port that sits under 80 km from the Chinese-controlled Chancay megaport [20]. The sum is small relative to Chancay, which illustrates the distinction between commercial presence and strategic leverage: Washington's aim is less to out-build China than to anchor Peru's logistics and naval geography to a US-aligned node, and the Panama case shows how Chinese port holdings can unravel when their owners lose political cover [6]. 206
  • Securitisation of the counter-narcotics agenda. Washington designated three Guatemalan gangs as terrorist organisations and imposed sanctions, linking them to the Sinaloa and CJNG cartels [8][11], while US boat strikes said to have killed nearly 250 people have produced a lawsuit by Ecuadorian fishermen who survived one attack [5]. Bolivia's arrest of a former judge is tied to a US-backed security alliance [29], and a US court sentenced a cartel leader's brother [13]; together these show the terrorism frame extending US jurisdiction and lethal force across the region, with legal accountability now being tested in US courts. 81152913
  • Mexico's dual-track hedging. Mexico agreed to buy 11 Black Hawk helicopters for US$1.07 billion, which Sheinbaum framed as a disaster-response need rather than a security alignment [19], days before she travels to Shenzhen for APEC and has acknowledged that talks with Xi could complicate US trade negotiations [21][4]. A former official accused of aiding the CIA fled to the US [4], adding an intelligence-politics layer; the pattern is classic hedging—purchasing US goodwill with defence procurement while keeping the China channel open. 19214
  • Brazil's active non-alignment under a new US Congress. Lula met Iran's Pezeshkian at COP31 to expand cooperation [12][24], Brazilian buyers rejected Russian diesel shunned by US importers purely on price [26], and the Inter-American Dialogue is reassessing Brazil–US relations after both countries' 2026 elections [32]. This is active non-alignment in practice—engaging all poles on Brazil's terms—but the diesel episode shows that commercial logic, not ideological solidarity, governs much of the actual trade with Russia. 12242632

Themes

  • Coercion escalates as domestic constraints tighten. A Democratic sweep of Congress [41] has not restrained hemispheric pressure; the Cuba threat [16], Mexico tariffs [2], and terrorist designations [8] all post-date it, consistent with the argument that a weakened president intensifies action in the one arena where executive discretion remains broad [35]. Nicaragua's abandonment of elections invites further targeted pressure [31], suggesting the region faces an expanded rather than narrowed sanctions perimeter. 41162835
  • China contested on infrastructure and institutions, not goods. Chinese influence is being challenged where it is most visible and most vulnerable—ports in Peru and Panama [20][6] and the seat of a new ocean-governance body [25]—rather than in the commodity trade that underpins regional dependence. Europe's Mercosur rapprochement is explicitly framed as a late attempt to recover ground lost to China [33], reinforcing that the competition is now about who controls nodes and rules. 2062533
  • A region hedging without coordination. Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Peru each pursue bilateral balancing—US helicopters and Chinese summits [19][21], Iranian engagement [24], a Western ocean-secretariat bid [25], and dual-port development [20]—but there is no collective response, which commentators identify as the region's structural weakness [35]. Fragmentation is itself a condition that the United States' bilateral statecraft exploits. 1921242520

What it means for Chile

  • Open confrontation with Beijing over ocean governance. China publicly accused Chile and Belgium of 'politicising' the High Seas Treaty secretariat bid and dividing members into camps, pushing its own Xiamen proposal [25]. For Chile this is unusual: a country whose export economy depends heavily on Chinese demand for copper and lithium is now in a direct institutional contest with its largest customer, testing whether commodity dependence constrains its diplomatic autonomy in multilateral settings [25]. 25
  • Sovereignty assertion in the South Atlantic and Antarctic approaches. Foreign Minister Pérez Mackenna refused to seek Argentine authorisation for the Danstar's voyage reopening the Punta Arenas–Falklands route, invoking innocent passage under UNCLOS [14]. This signals a government willing to prioritise legal principle and Magallanes' commercial and Antarctic gateway role over regional deference to Argentina, at a moment when Buenos Aires is itself entangled with Iran over IRGC designations [1]. 141
  • Exposure to the Pacific port and sanctions environment. The Callao–Chancay rivalry [20] matters for Chile because its own ports compete for the same trans-Pacific logistics flows, and the Panama case [6] shows how Chinese-linked infrastructure can become a geopolitical liability. Chile's broad trade-agreement network has historically allowed it to avoid choosing sides, but the ocean-secretariat dispute suggests Beijing is now willing to treat Chile as an adversary in specific arenas [25]. 20625

Analytical lenses

  • Monroe Doctrine and spheres of influence. The Cuba threat [16], Mexico tariffs [2], Guatemalan designations [11] and the Callao investment [20] cohere as an explicit reassertion of a US sphere in which external presence is treated as intrusion. The lens explains the pattern of coercion but misses that the targets are often domestic or non-Chinese—migration, cartels, Cuban governance—and that the US is contesting China's nodes with modest sums rather than displacing its commodity trade. 1621120
  • Hedging and active non-alignment. Mexico's Black Hawks plus APEC trip [19][21], Brazil's Iran engagement [24] and Chile's Western-aligned ocean bid [25] all exemplify states diversifying partners to limit dependence on any single pole. The concept explains the behaviour but understates how asymmetric interdependence with the US—visible in water debt and tariff exposure [10][18]—narrows the real menu of choices. 1921242510
  • Commercial presence versus strategic leverage. China's Panama port holder is now a fugitive [6] and Brazilian buyers rejected Russian diesel on price [26], showing that market presence does not automatically convert into durable political leverage. Conversely, the US's small Callao payment [20] and sanctions designations [8] buy leverage disproportionate to their cost; the lens clarifies why Washington targets infrastructure and rules, but it does not explain how commodity dependence on China will shape Chile's or Peru's choices if Beijing retaliates economically. 62620825

What to watch

  • Whether Trump's Cuba remarks translate into concrete military planning or further fuel restrictions, and how Congress responds, since Havana's exercises indicate it treats the threat as real [16][3][39][41]. 1633941
  • Sheinbaum's Shenzhen meetings and any Trump encounter, which will test whether Washington punishes or tolerates Mexican engagement with China while tariff threats remain live [21][4][2]. 2142
  • The High Seas Treaty secretariat decision, where a Chile-Belgium win would be a rare institutional defeat for China in a Chile-anchored forum, and a Xiamen win would signal Beijing's growing hold on maritime governance [25]. 25
  • Progress of the Ecuadorian fishermen's lawsuit as the first legal test of the 'narco-terrorism' strike campaign, with implications for every coastal state in the region [5]. 5
Stories this analysis is based on (28)
  1. Iran designates Argentine navy and air force as terrorist organizations Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)
  2. Trump threatens to double tariffs on Mexico as a new migrant caravan heads north Mexico News Daily
  3. Cuba Revives Military Exercises after the US Elections Havana Times
  4. Mexico’s week in review: Trump renews tariff threats as Sheinbaum prepares for China Mexico News Daily
  5. Ecuadorian fishermen who survived US boat strikes sue Trump administration The Guardian US
  6. He Was China’s Man in Panama. Then He Became a Wanted Man. The New York Times Asia
  7. The migrant caravan crossing Mexico that has triggered Trump’s new tariff threat: ‘Our fear is that the Mexican president will send us back’ El País English
  8. US Brands Three Guatemalan Gangs Terrorists The Rio Times
  9. Mexico has delivered less than 1% of the water it owes to the US as border dams run low Mexico News Daily
  10. US declares three Guatemalan gangs to be terrorist groups, imposes sanctions ABC News
  11. Pezeshkian holds talks with Turkish, Brazilian and Kurdish leaders at COP31 Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)
  12. Brother of Mexican cartel leader sentenced to 22 years for drug trafficking plot ABC News
  13. Chile tells Argentina “countries do not ask permission” for its ship bound for the Falklands MercoPress
  14. Trump says he wants to ‘get Cuba done’ when asked about use of military force NBC News
  15. Trump Tariff Threat Meets Mexico’s Buen Fin The Rio Times
  16. Mexico agrees to buy 11 Black Hawk helicopters from the United States for US $1.07 billion Mexico News Daily
  17. US invests in Peru’s Callao as port battle with China’s Chancay megaport continues SCMP China
  18. Sheinbaum to address APEC business leaders in China: Thursday’s mañanera recapped Mexico News Daily
  19. Iranian, Brazilian presidents emphasize strengthening bilateral cooperation IRNA (Iranian state media)
  20. China slams Chile-Belgium bid to host High Seas Treaty body, pushes rival Xiamen proposal SCMP China
  21. Brazilian Buyers Balk at Price of Russian Diesel Shunned by U.S. Importers – Bloomberg The Moscow Times
  22. Bolivia arrests former judge on suspicion of drug trafficking Al Jazeera
  23. After the 2026 Elections: What’s Next for Brazil–U.S. Relations? Inter-American Dialogue
  24. Europe returns to Latin America: Is it too late? Latinoamérica21
  25. Trump defeated: Is he weaker or more dangerous to Latin America? Latinoamérica21
  26. The UN Annually Votes on Ending the US Embargo on Cuba. What Does it Mean for Unilateral Sanctions and Their Impact on Human Rights? Stimson Center
  27. Cuba’s energy isolation: The humanitarian cost of a new sanctions strategy Latinoamérica21
  28. Experts React: The Midterms and America’s Place in the World Stimson Center

Written by Claude Fable 5.1 (Anthropic), based on 43 recent headlines and excerpts in this section, 5d ago. AI analysis can misread or miss things: the numbers link to the original reporting, which is the authority.