South China Sea: analysis of 16 November 2026
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Analysis
ASEAN's Manila summit ends without the long-promised South China Sea Code of Conduct, with the Philippines conceding it needs more time even as it deepens defence ties with Australia and the 'Squad' partners.
The 49th ASEAN Summit in Manila, hosted by President Marcos with Donald Trump due to arrive mid-week, was meant to deliver the ASEAN–China Code of Conduct (COC) by the agreed year-end deadline, a goal Malacañang had identified as central to Marcos's chairmanship 69. Instead, the Philippine foreign ministry's progress estimates shifted from 70 to 80 per cent within days before Secretary Lazaro acknowledged that time had run out, matching earlier reports from regional diplomats and analysts that completion was unlikely 271118. In parallel, Manila signed a defence cooperation agreement with Australia and moved forward on a US–Japan–Australia–Philippines coordination hub, underlining a dual track of diplomacy with Beijing and hardened deterrence 31722. Domestic debate over how confrontational Manila should be, Vietnamese sovereignty messaging and reported PLA deployments show the dispute remains active beneath the summit diplomacy 1923261328.
Key developments
- COC misses the 2026 deadline. After days of DFA briefings putting the Code of Conduct at 70 and then 80 per cent complete, Foreign Secretary Lazaro conceded the Philippines had to 'give up' finishing the text during its chairmanship, claiming only 'substantial' progress [2][11][12][14]. This confirms what three regional diplomats and independent analysts had flagged before the summit, and Nikkei framed it alongside the Myanmar crisis as a summit shortfall [4][7][18]. The outcome matters because Malacañang had made COC completion a flagship Marcos goal and negotiations have run for roughly two decades [20][18]; SCMP notes the remaining gap comes down to Beijing and claimants finding common ground on core issues [5]. 245711
- Philippines–Australia defence pact and 'Squad' hub. Manila and Canberra signed a new defence cooperation agreement that Defence Secretary Teodoro said would strengthen deterrence in the West Philippine Sea, accelerate joint activities and allow faster Australian disaster response [3]. It follows the October Cebu meeting of US, Japanese, Australian and Philippine defence chiefs, who agreed to establish a 'Squad' coordination hub in the Philippines, and a US transfer of three maritime-surveillance turboprops to the Philippine Coast Guard [17][22]. Together these show Manila building minilateral security layers regardless of the COC's fate. 31722
- Summit diplomacy and Trump's arrival. Marcos opened the summit with nine heads of state and other global leaders present, with trade, an energy crisis and the Middle East competing with the South China Sea for attention [6][9]. Trump is scheduled to arrive on Tuesday, and ISEAS analysts argue his presence is a win for ASEAN but that Washington must show engagement that goes beyond a 'show' [6][30]. The US trade war was a dominant topic among leaders, suggesting economic grievances could crowd out maritime security messaging [6]. 6930
- Manila's softer tone and domestic pushback. A 3 November Lazaro–Wang Yi call was credited by a former Philippine diplomat with keeping tensions in check, and joint Philippine–Chinese repatriation of over 100 fraud suspects shows cooperation beyond the dispute [15][16]. Vice President Sara Duterte urged not 'picking fights' with China, a stance the military said it agreed with while defending its West Philippine Sea actions, whereas Rep. Leila de Lima accused the DFA of trying to monopolise the China discourse [19][23]. A Chinese analyst quoted by SCMP argues the softer tone will not ease tensions because the foreign ministry has little control over maritime enforcement — a claim that is one analyst's view, not established fact [26]. 1516192326
- Vietnam's sovereignty messaging and hedging. Vietnamese state media published a sovereignty-affirming feature on Song Tu Tay in the Spratlys, timed with the summit [13]. Analysts also point to elevated US–Vietnam defence dialogues held in June and to Hanoi's outreach to Cambodia and Laos in response to what it views as Chinese military encirclement, including the Ban Keun facility [27][31]. This indicates a second claimant hedging actively while the COC stalls. 132731
- PLA activity raises Taiwan-contingency questions. SCMP reports recent Chinese naval deployments in the western Pacific and South China Sea that analysts suspect rehearse keeping US and allied forces out of a Taiwan conflict, though Beijing has announced no large-scale drill and the interpretation is unconfirmed [28]. Asia Times separately reports China fast-tracking a mobile ICBM to secure its second-strike capability [21]. Both feed the threat perception driving Manila's and Hanoi's alignment with Washington [3][17][27]. 212831727
Themes
- Deterrence and dialogue in parallel. Manila is pursuing conciliatory diplomacy with Beijing through the Lazaro–Wang channel and COC talks while simultaneously signing the Australia pact, hosting a Squad hub and accepting US surveillance aircraft [15][2][3][17][22]. The tension between these tracks is visible in domestic disagreement over tone and in Chinese scepticism that softer words change maritime realities [19][23][26]. 23151719
- ASEAN's limits as a dispute manager. The summit's failure to deliver the COC or progress on Myanmar reinforces a pattern of consensus-based diplomacy falling short on hard security issues [4][18][7]. Op-eds calling for a rules-based order and a 2040 strategic vision reflect aspiration rather than achievement, while claimants hedge bilaterally and minilaterally [1][8][25][31]. 147818
- Economic headwinds compete with security. Trade war concerns, an energy crisis and a Philippine business climate described by tycoon Manny Pangilinan as worse than Covid are shaping leaders' priorities [6][9][10]. Attention to subsea cables and digital trade shows connectivity is becoming a security concern in its own right [29]. 691029
What to watch
- Whether ASEAN and China set a new COC timeline after the Philippine chairmanship and which unresolved issues are publicly identified as blocking the final 20 per cent [2][5][18]. 2518
- Trump's statements and any concrete commitments during his Manila visit, which will signal whether US engagement extends beyond trade disputes to maritime security [6][30]. 630
- Implementation steps for the Philippines–Australia agreement and the Squad coordination hub, and Beijing's reaction to them [3][17]. 317
- Further PLA naval deployments or announced drills that could clarify whether recent activity is Taiwan-contingency rehearsal, and how Manila's conciliatory tone holds up under incidents at sea [28][26][19]. 192628
Stories this analysis is based on (26)
- Building A Stable And Rules-Based South China Sea Order – OpEd Eurasia Review
- PH needs more time to complete Code of Conduct in the South China Sea — Lazaro The Manila Times
- PH, Australia sign defense cooperation The Manila Times
- ASEAN falls short on Myanmar crisis, South China Sea pact at Manila summit Nikkei Asia
- South China Sea code of conduct: can Beijing and Asean meet 2026 deadline? SCMP China
- Trade war in focus at Asean summit ahead of Trump arrival The Manila Times
- Pact on South China Sea code of conduct unlikely, as ASEAN leaders gather Al Jazeera
- Southeast Asia 2040: A Strategic Vision – OpEd Eurasia Review
- Global powers converge as PH opens 49th Asean Summit The Manila Times
- Biz climate ‘worse than Covid’ — MVP The Manila Times
- COC on South China Sea now 80% done, says DFA The Manila Times
- Temple bells echo across the vast ocean Nhân Dân (Vietnamese state media)
- Lazaro-Wang call kept PH-China tensions in check The Manila Times
- Philippines-China Cooperation: Jointly Fighting Crimes Beyond The South China Sea Disputes – OpEd Eurasia Review
- ‘Squad’ Nations to Establish Coordination Hub in the Philippines, Defense Chiefs Say The Diplomat
- South China Sea accord won’t be done this year The Manila Times
- AFP supports Sara’s non-confrontational stance, defends actions in West Philippine Sea The Manila Times
- China fast-tracks mobile ICBM to lock down second-strike edge Asia Times
- Philippine Coast Guard Bolsters Surveillance With Turboprop Planes From U.S. Eurasia Review
- DFA statement looks like attempt to monopolize China discourse – De Lima Inquirer Global Nation
- Why Manila’s call for softer tone will not ease South China Sea tensions with Beijing SCMP China
- Elevating US-Vietnam defense ties for regional stability Asia Times
- Is the PLA rehearsing operations to keep US forces out of a Taiwan conflict? SCMP China
- Submarine Cables, Digital Trade And Connectivity To Enhance Cross Border Trade At The Regional And Global Levels – Analysis Eurasia Review
- Trump Returns to Manila: Will ASEAN Get More Than a Show? Fulcrum (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute)
- Ban Keun and Beyond: Vietnam Engages Neighbours to Hedge China’s Encircling Power Fulcrum (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute)
Written by Claude Fable 5.1 (Anthropic), based on 31 recent headlines and excerpts in this section, 4d ago. AI analysis can misread or miss things: the numbers link to the original reporting, which is the authority.