Great-power competition in Latin America and Chile: analysis of 17 November 2026

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Photo from Iran designates Argentine navy and air force as terrorist organizations, Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)

Analysis

Washington is converting economic and coercive leverage into open pressure across the hemisphere—tariff threats against Mexico, lethal maritime strikes contested in Ecuadorian courts, a stated timeline on Cuba—while Beijing deepens commercial penetration through APEC diplomacy, battery and mineral i

The fortnight shows a hemisphere in which the United States is behaving as a sphere-of-influence power: Trump threatened to double tariffs on Mexico over a 1,500-person caravan 228, floated a 'short military operation' against Cuba before 2029 6, and continued strikes on vessels that have killed nearly 250 people and are now being litigated by surviving Ecuadorian fishermen 1226. China's approach is predominantly commercial and institutional: hosting APEC in Shenzhen with Sheinbaum pitching Plan México to over 1,000 business leaders 816, CATL opening an Argentine office 4, and Latin America positioning itself as an alternative critical-minerals source as Chinese rare earth curbs bite 3. Latin American governments respond with varied hedging strategies—Milei courting a US trade deal while Washington scrutinises Chinese content in supply chains 21, Mexico simultaneously absorbing US tariff threats and courting Chinese investment 1625, Ecuador denying a US base while hosting 'temporary' US personnel 14. The US midterms, which handed Democrats both chambers 42, raise the question of whether a domestically weakened Trump intensifies or dilutes external pressure 36; Russia is notably absent from the items, underscoring that the real contest is bilateral, US–China, with Europe attempting a late return via Mercosur .

Key developments

  • Lethal maritime campaign meets legal accountability. US forces destroyed eight Ecuadorian vessels between 28 August and 16 September, part of a campaign that has killed nearly 250 people under a 'narco-terrorism' framing; Ecuadorian courts have exposed flaws in the arrests and sixteen surviving fishermen are suing the Trump administration over a 17 March drone strike [12][26]. Ecuador's president Noboa simultaneously denies a US military base exists, describing US personnel as present for 'temporary activities' [14]. The pattern connects to Washington's expanding use of terrorist designations as a legal instrument—three Guatemalan gangs were branded terrorists on 13 November [29]—and shows how a partner government's alignment can become a dome 12261429
  • Cuba: coercion with a deadline. Trump said he wants to 'get Cuba done' before 2029 and would consider a short military operation, though no US decision has been announced [6]; Cuba has revived military exercises after the midterms, with a Havana source noting surprise given the Democratic sweep [24]. Fuel restrictions are already deepening an energy crisis with humanitarian costs [40], and the annual UN vote on the embargo highlights tension between unilateral sanctions and international law [38]. Read alongside the Atlantic Council's call for 'targeted economic pressure' on Nicaragua after its rulers abandoned elections [32], this signals a return to explicit Monroe-Doctrine logic toward the hemisphere's remaining authori 624403832
  • Critical minerals: supply-chain decoupling reaches the region. China holds 70 per cent or more market share for 19 of 20 critical minerals segments, and its rare earth curbs are pushing Western governments to court Latin American alternatives [3]. In parallel, CATL—squeezed in the US—has opened an Argentine office to expand from grid batteries into storage for mines, data centres and Patagonian wind farms [4], while Washington scrutinises product traceability and Chinese involvement in supply chains before approving Milei's fast-tracked trade deal [21]. The region is thus both the prize of decoupling and a site where Chinese firms relocate to escape it, a contradiction that economic statecraft on both sides has not resolved. 3421
  • Argentina's alignment and its costs. Milei's government wants a US trade agreement submitted to Congress before year-end, but faces US demands on Chinese content and unresolved steel and aluminium tariffs [21]; Argentina's designation of the IRGC as terrorist prompted Iran to reciprocally label the Argentine Navy and Air Force terrorist organisations [1]. The CATL office [4] shows Argentina nonetheless remains open to Chinese capital in energy. Argentina illustrates that overt alignment with Washington yields diplomatic friction with US adversaries without eliminating dependence on Chinese investment—bandwagoning on security while hedging commercially. 2114
  • Brazil after dual elections: contested exfiltration claims. Jacobin, a socialist outlet, reports that Flávio Bolsonaro fled Brazil after losing the presidential election with help from a Trump operative and a former Mossad agent, and calls for a congressional investigation; these claims are not independently confirmed in the items and should be treated as contested [10]. Post-election assessments of Brazil–US relations [33] and Canada's US$392M pledge to Brazil's forest fund [17] suggest other Western actors are investing in Lula's Brazil even as Lula attends the Asean summit alongside Trump and Li Qiang in Manila [19]. 10331719

Themes

  • Securitisation as the US instrument of choice. Washington's leverage is increasingly exercised through security framings—terrorist designations [29], lethal interdictions [12][26], tariff threats tied to migration [2], and intelligence operations such as the CIA-linked Mexican prosecutor case that has become a sovereignty flashpoint [13]. This fuses economic statecraft with coercive force, making partner governments' cooperation politically costly at home, as the Greenland comparison invoked by Latinoamérica21 illustrates [31]. 291226213
  • Commercial presence versus strategic leverage. China's footprint is overwhelmingly commercial—APEC hosting [8][16], CATL [4], a dominant mineral supply chain [3], but also illicit financial networks laundering cartel money [23] and a Panama port figure now wanted by Beijing itself [27]. The Panama case shows Chinese commercial presence can be reversed when political winds shift, which is why it does not automatically translate into strategic leverage comparable to US coercive capacity. 8164323
  • A divided region with no unified response. Latinoamérica21 argues that Trump's domestic defeat may intensify external pressure on a region with little capacity for coordinated reply [36], and the items bear this out: Argentina aligns [21], Mexico hedges [16][25], Ecuador dissembles [14], Brazil pursues Europe and Canada [17][34]. Sovereignism in South America, as recent scholarship notes, does not necessarily oppose regional integration [37]—yet integration as a shield against great-power pressure is absent from this fortnight's news. 3621162514

What it means for Chile

  • Copper dependence transmitted through the peso. The peso briefly breached 1,000 per dollar as copper fell and traders priced a US rate rise [7], a direct illustration of commodity dependence: Chile's currency is simultaneously a copper price and a US monetary policy derivative. The US$500M truck-strike settlement cutting diesel prices [20] adds fiscal strain at a moment when terms of trade are deteriorating. 720
  • Critical minerals and the decoupling dilemma. As Western governments seek alternatives to China's 70-per-cent-plus dominance in critical minerals [3], Chile—the world's largest copper producer and a leading lithium source—is a natural target, but the Argentine precedent shows Washington will scrutinise Chinese involvement in supply chains before granting trade concessions [21]. Chile's existing free-trade agreements with both the US and China, and the heavy Chinese role in its lithium and copper sectors, mean any US-led decoupling demand would test Santiago's long-standing posture of commercial openness to all partners. 3214
  • Hedging space under pressure. Chile has historically practised active non-alignment, maintaining trade agreements across the Pacific while avoiding security entanglement; the fortnight's coercive US behaviour toward Mexico, Ecuador and Cuba [2][12][6] shows the costs that even aligned or neutral neighbours can incur. Chile's strategic assets—ports on Pacific routes, Antarctic gateway status, and astronomy infrastructure hosting foreign observatories—are the kind of dual-use positions where commercial presence can be reinterpreted by Washington as strategic leverage, as the Panama port saga suggests [27]. 212627

Analytical lenses

  • Asymmetric interdependence. The concept explains why Trump can credibly threaten to double tariffs over a caravan [2][28] and why Mexican steelmakers invest defensively against both Chinese competition and US tariffs [9]: the actor less dependent on the relationship extracts concessions. It also explains Chile's peso vulnerability to copper and US rates [7]. What it misses is the domestic politics that makes Sheinbaum's open rebuttal and Shenzhen trip [8][16] rational despite the asymmetry. 228978
  • Spheres of influence and the Monroe Doctrine. Trump's Cuba timeline [6], the Nicaragua pressure prescription [32], lethal interdictions off Ecuador [12][26] and the Greenland analogy [31] fit a revived sphere-of-influence logic in which security trumps partner sovereignty. The lens captures US intent but not capacity: nothing in the items shows Washington displacing China's commercial position [3][4], and the Panama case [27] suggests Chinese retreat is driven as much by Chinese domestic politics as US pressure. 632122631
  • Hedging and active non-alignment. Mexico's simultaneous APEC outreach and tariff resistance [16][25], Ecuador's denial of a base while hosting US personnel [14], and Argentina's CATL opening alongside a US deal [4][21] are hedging behaviours—retaining options with both powers. Active non-alignment as a doctrine assumes a region able to set terms collectively; the items show fragmented, bilateral hedges with no coordinated stance [36], which is the concept's practical limit. 162514421

What to watch

  • Whether a Democratic-controlled Congress constrains Trump's coercive options on Cuba and the boat-strike campaign, or whether he escalates precisely because domestic room narrows [42][36][6]. 42366
  • Outcomes of Sheinbaum's Xi meeting and whether Chinese commitments to Plan México trigger US retaliation under the tariff and supply-chain scrutiny already applied to Mexican steel [8][16][9]. 8169
  • Whether the US–Argentina trade deal's Chinese-content conditions set a template that other regional governments, including Chile, will face [21][3]. 213
  • Progress of the Ecuadorian fishermen's lawsuit and domestic court rulings, which could establish legal limits on US high-seas operations [26][12]. 2612
Stories this analysis is based on (31)
  1. Iran designates Argentine navy and air force as terrorist organizations Tehran Times (Iranian state-aligned)
  2. Trump threatens to double tariffs on Mexico as a new migrant caravan heads north Mexico News Daily
  3. China's rare earth curbs put new emphasis on Latin American investment The National (UAE)
  4. Squeezed in the US, China’s CATL bets on Argentina’s battery storage boom South China Morning Post
  5. Trump Puts a Timeline on Cuba Action The Rio Times
  6. Chile Peso Slips Past 1,000 Per Dollar The Rio Times
  7. Sheinbaum lands in Shenzhen on a commercial flight, then heads straight to tacos with Mexicans living in China Mexico News Daily
  8. Steel firms look to bolster investment in Mexico to fend off Chinese competition and US tariffs Mexico News Daily
  9. The Scandal of Flávio Bolsonaro’s Escape Won’t Fade Away Jacobin (socialist)
  10. Ecuadorian Courts Expose Flaws in US High-Seas Arrests Human Rights Watch
  11. How a fugitive Mexican prosecutor became a flashpoint in US-Mexico relations El País English
  12. Ecuador’s president denies existence of US military base Al Jazeera
  13. Mexico’s Sheinbaum Heads to China for Summit The Rio Times
  14. Canada Pledges US$392M to Brazil Forest Fund The Rio Times
  15. Chinese Premier Li Qiang addresses Asean summit in Manila South China Morning Post
  16. Chile Defends Costly Truck Strike Deal The Rio Times
  17. Milei government wants to fast-track US trade deal before year-end Buenos Aires Times
  18. Narco brokers in Mexico, a booming business thriving alongside Chinese money-laundering networks El País English
  19. Cuba Revives Military Exercises after the US Elections Havana Times
  20. Mexico’s week in review: Trump renews tariff threats as Sheinbaum prepares for China Mexico News Daily
  21. Ecuadorian fishermen who survived US boat strikes sue Trump administration The Guardian US
  22. He Was China’s Man in Panama. Then He Became a Wanted Man. The New York Times Asia
  23. The migrant caravan crossing Mexico that has triggered Trump’s new tariff threat: ‘Our fear is that the Mexican president will send us back’ El País English
  24. US Brands Three Guatemalan Gangs Terrorists The Rio Times
  25. A banana republic in the Arctic Latinoamérica21
  26. The election that never happened, and why Washington needs a new strategy toward Nicaragua Atlantic Council
  27. After the 2026 Elections: What’s Next for Brazil–U.S. Relations? Inter-American Dialogue
  28. Trump defeated: Is he weaker or more dangerous to Latin America? Latinoamérica21
  29. The UN Annually Votes on Ending the US Embargo on Cuba. What Does it Mean for Unilateral Sanctions and Their Impact on Human Rights? Stimson Center
  30. Cuba’s energy isolation: The humanitarian cost of a new sanctions strategy Latinoamérica21
  31. Experts React: The Midterms and America’s Place in the World Stimson Center

Written by Claude Fable 5.1 (Anthropic), based on 43 recent headlines and excerpts in this section, 3d ago. AI analysis can misread or miss things: the numbers link to the original reporting, which is the authority.