Results for “Prompt”

arXiv (research papers) Roy Betser SI

AgenTRIM: Tool Risk Mitigation for Agentic AI

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We…

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arXiv (research papers) Anirudh Sekar SI

Zero-Shot Embedding Drift Detection: A Lightweight Defense Against Prompt Injections in LLMs

Prompt injection attacks have become an increasing vulnerability for LLM applications, where adversarial prompts exploit indirect input channels such as emails or user-generated content to circumvent alignment safeguards and induce harmful or unintended outputs. Despite advances in alignment, even state-of-the-art LLMs remain broadly vulnerable to adversarial prompts, underscoring the urgent need for robust, productive, and generalizable detection mechanisms beyond…

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arXiv (research papers) Aiman Al Masoud SI

SD-RAG: A Prompt-Injection-Resilient Framework for Selective Disclosure in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has attracted significant attention due to its ability to combine the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with knowledge obtained through efficient retrieval mechanisms over large-scale data collections. Currently, the majority of existing approaches overlook the risks associated with exposing sensitive or access-controlled information directly to the generation model. Only a few approaches propose techniques to…

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arXiv (research papers) Haoze Guo SI

Hidden-in-Plain-Text: A Benchmark for Social-Web Indirect Prompt Injection in RAG

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems put more and more emphasis on grounding their responses in user-generated content found on the Web, amplifying both their usefulness and their attack surface. Most notably, indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning attack the web-native carriers that survive ingestion pipelines and are very concerning. We provide OpenRAG-Soc, a compact, reproducible benchmark-and-harness for web-facing RAG evaluation under these threats…

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arXiv (research papers) Hao Li SI

ReasAlign: Reasoning Enhanced Safety Alignment against Prompt Injection Attack

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to…

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arXiv (research papers) Hanna Foerster SI

CaMeLs Can Use Computers Too: System-level Security for Computer Use Agents

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior. Among proposed defenses, architectural isolation provides the strongest guarantees by strictly separating trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs), which automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions, presents a fundamental challenge. Current agents require continuous observation of…

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Simon Willison SI

Claude Cowork Exfiltrates Files

Claude Cowork Exfiltrates Files Claude Cowork defaults to allowing outbound HTTP traffic to only a specific list of domains, to help protect the user against prompt injection attacks that exfiltrate their data. Prompt Armor found a creative workaround: Anthropic's API domain is on that list, so they constructed an attack that includes an attacker's own Anthropic API key and has the agent upload any files it can see to the https://api.anthropic.com/v1/files endpoint, allowing…

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arXiv (research papers) Oleg Brodt SI

The Promptware Kill Chain: How Prompt Injections Gradually Evolved Into a Multistep Malware Delivery Mechanism

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce…

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arXiv (research papers) Erin Feiglin SI

BenchOverflow: Measuring Overflow in Large Language Models via Plain-Text Prompts

We investigate a failure mode of large language models (LLMs) in which plain-text prompts elicit excessive outputs, a phenomenon we term Overflow. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injection, Overflow arises under ordinary interaction settings and can lead to elevated serving cost, latency, and cross-user performance degradation, particularly when scaled across many requests. Beyond usability, the stakes are economic and environmental: unnecessary tokens increase per-request cost…

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Simon Willison SI

Superhuman AI Exfiltrates Emails

Superhuman AI Exfiltrates Emails Classic prompt injection attack: When asked to summarize the user’s recent mail, a prompt injection in an untrusted email manipulated Superhuman AI to submit content from dozens of other sensitive emails (including financial, legal, and medical information) in the user’s inbox to an attacker’s Google Form. To Superhuman's credit they treated this as the high priority incident it is and issued a fix. The root cause was a CSP rule that allowed…

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arXiv (research papers) Mohammed Himayath Ali SI

SecureCAI: Injection-Resilient LLM Assistants for Cybersecurity Operations

Large Language Models have emerged as transformative tools for Security Operations Centers, enabling automated log analysis, phishing triage, and malware explanation; however, deployment in adversarial cybersecurity environments exposes critical vulnerabilities to prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions embedded in security artifacts manipulate model behavior. This paper introduces SecureCAI, a novel defense framework extending Constitutional AI principles with…

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arXiv (research papers) William Walden SI

Reasoning Models Will Sometimes Lie About Their Reasoning

Hint-based faithfulness evaluations have established that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not say what they think: they do not always volunteer information about how key parts of the input (e.g. answer hints) influence their reasoning. Yet, these evaluations also fail to specify what models should do when confronted with hints or other unusual prompt content -- even though versions of such instructions are standard security measures (e.g. for countering prompt injections)…

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arXiv (research papers) Xinyi Wu SI

When Bots Take the Bait: Exposing and Mitigating the Emerging Social Engineering Attack in Web Automation Agent

Web agents, powered by large language models (LLMs), are increasingly deployed to automate complex web interactions. The rise of open-source frameworks (e.g., Browser Use, Skyvern-AI) has accelerated adoption, but also broadened the attack surface. While prior research has focused on model threats such as prompt injection and backdoors, the risks of social engineering remain largely unexplored. We present the first systematic study of social engineering attacks against web…

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arXiv (research papers) Shawn Li SI

Defenses Against Prompt Attacks Learn Surface Heuristics

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in security-sensitive applications, where they must follow system- or developer-specified instructions that define the intended task behavior, while completing benign user requests. When adversarial instructions appear in user queries or externally retrieved content, models may override intended logic. Recent defenses rely on supervised fine-tuning with benign and malicious labels. Although these methods achieve high…

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arXiv (research papers) Hongyan Chang SI

Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves…

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arXiv (research papers) Masahiro Kaneko SI

Paraphrasing Adversarial Attack on LLM-as-a-Reviewer

The use of large language models (LLMs) in peer review systems has attracted growing attention, making it essential to examine their potential vulnerabilities. Prior attacks rely on prompt injection, which alters manuscript content and conflates injection susceptibility with evaluation robustness. We propose the Paraphrasing Adversarial Attack (PAA), a black-box optimization method that searches for paraphrased sequences yielding higher review scores while preserving…

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arXiv (research papers) Junda Lin SI

VIGIL: Defending LLM Agents Against Tool Stream Injection via Verify-Before-Commit

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose \textbf{VIGIL}, a framework…

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arXiv (research papers) Qiang Yu SI

Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection via Tool Result Parsing

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhiyuan Chang SI

Know Thy Enemy: Securing LLMs Against Prompt Injection via Diverse Data Synthesis and Instruction-Level Chain-of-Thought Learning

Large language model (LLM)-integrated applications have become increasingly prevalent, yet face critical security vulnerabilities from prompt injection (PI) attacks. Defending against PI attacks faces two major issues: malicious instructions can be injected through diverse vectors, and injected instructions often lack clear semantic boundaries from the surrounding context, making them difficult to identify. To address these issues, we propose InstruCoT, a model enhancement…

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Journal articles (OpenAlex) Nouha Chirouf · Lex localis - Journal of Local Self-Government Geopolitics

GOVERNANCE OF INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE ENERGY BETWEEN ENERGY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND BUSINESS LAW CONSIDERATIONS: A STUDY IN LIGHT OF ALGERIAN LEGISLATION

The shift towards renewable energy is one of the most prominent challenges facing the contemporary world, amid rising energy demand and growing environmental risks linked to fossil fuels. This has prompted many countries to adopt renewable energy sources to ensure a sustainable future. Like other countries, Algeria aims to integrate into the global circle of sustainable development by adopting robust legal and economic policies. Through this policy, Algeria seeks to…

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arXiv (research papers) Jingyu Zhang SI

Language Model Agents Under Attack: A Cross Model-Benchmark of Profit-Seeking Behaviors in Customer Service

Customer-service LLM agents increasingly make policy-bound decisions (refunds, rebooking, billing disputes), but the same ``helpful'' interaction style can be exploited: a small fraction of users can induce unauthorized concessions, shifting costs to others and eroding trust in agentic workflows. We present a cross-domain benchmark of profit-seeking direct prompt injection in customer-service interactions, spanning 10 service domains and 100 realistic attack scripts grouped…

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arXiv (research papers) Giuseppe Canale SI

The Silicon Psyche: Anthropomorphic Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly transitioning from conversational assistants to autonomous agents embedded in critical organizational functions, including Security Operations Centers (SOCs), financial systems, and infrastructure management. Current adversarial testing paradigms focus predominantly on technical attack vectors: prompt injection, jailbreaking, and data exfiltration. We argue this focus is catastrophically incomplete. LLMs, trained on vast corpora of…

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arXiv (research papers) Panagiotis Theocharopoulos SI

Multilingual Hidden Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM-Based Academic Reviewing

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly considered for use in high-impact workflows, including academic peer review. However, LLMs are vulnerable to document-level hidden prompt injection attacks. In this work, we construct a dataset of approximately 500 real academic papers accepted to ICML and evaluate the effect of embedding hidden adversarial prompts within these documents. Each paper is injected with semantically equivalent instructions in four different languages…

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arXiv (research papers) Toqeer Ali Syed SI

Toward Trustworthy Agentic AI: A Multimodal Framework for Preventing Prompt Injection Attacks

Powerful autonomous systems, which reason, plan, and converse using and between numerous tools and agents, are made possible by Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Models (VLMs), and new agentic AI systems, like LangChain and GraphChain. Nevertheless, this agentic environment increases the probability of the occurrence of multimodal prompt injection (PI) attacks, in which concealed or malicious instructions carried in text, pictures, metadata, or agent-to-agent…

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arXiv (research papers) Armstrong Foundjem SI

Multi-Agent Framework for Threat Mitigation and Resilience in AI-Based Systems

Machine learning (ML) underpins foundation models in finance, healthcare, and critical infrastructure, making them targets for data poisoning, model extraction, prompt injection, automated jailbreaking, and preference-guided black-box attacks that exploit model comparisons. Larger models can be more vulnerable to introspection-driven jailbreaks and cross-modal manipulation. Traditional cybersecurity lacks ML-specific threat modeling for foundation, multimodal, and RAG…

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arXiv (research papers) Karolina Korgul SI

It's a TRAP! Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark for Web Agents

Web-based agents powered by large language models are increasingly used for tasks such as email management or professional networking. Their reliance on dynamic web content, however, makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: adversarial instructions hidden in interface elements that persuade the agent to divert from its original task. We introduce the Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark (TRAP), a benchmark for studying how persuasion techniques misguide…

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arXiv (research papers) Kerem Zaman SI

Is Chain-of-Thought Really Not Explainability? Chain-of-Thought Can Be Faithful without Hint Verbalization

Recent work, using the Biasing Features metric, labels a CoT as unfaithful if it omits a prompt-injected hint that affected the prediction. We argue this metric adopts a narrow notion of faithfulness and confuses unfaithfulness with incompleteness, the lossy compression needed to turn distributed transformer computation into a linear natural language narrative. On multi-hop reasoning tasks with instruct-tuned and reasoning models, many CoTs flagged as unfaithful by Biasing…

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arXiv (research papers) Yihan Wang SI

AegisAgent: An Autonomous Defense Agent Against Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-HARs

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into wearable sensing is creating a new class of mobile applications capable of nuanced human activity understanding. However, the reliability of these systems is critically undermined by their vulnerability to prompt injection attacks, where attackers deliberately input deceptive instructions into LLMs. Traditional defenses, based on static filters and rigid rules, are insufficient to address the semantic complexity of these…

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arXiv (research papers) Jaykumar Kasundra SI

AprielGuard

Safeguarding large language models (LLMs) against unsafe or adversarial behavior is critical as they are increasingly deployed in conversational and agentic settings. Existing moderation tools often treat safety risks (e.g. toxicity, bias) and adversarial threats (e.g. prompt injections, jailbreaks) as separate problems, limiting their robustness and generalizability. We introduce AprielGuard, an 8B parameter safeguard model that unify these dimensions within a single…

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arXiv (research papers) Safwan Shaheer SI

Beyond the Benchmark: Innovative Defenses Against Prompt Injection Attacks

In this fast-evolving area of LLMs, our paper discusses the significant security risk presented by prompt injection attacks. It focuses on small open-sourced models, specifically the LLaMA family of models. We introduce novel defense mechanisms capable of generating automatic defenses and systematically evaluate said generated defenses against a comprehensive set of benchmarked attacks. Thus, we empirically demonstrated the improvement proposed by our approach in mitigating…

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