Results for “Agent”

arXiv (research papers) Aashish Kolluri SI

Optimizing Agent Planning for Security and Autonomy

Indirect prompt injection attacks threaten AI agents that execute consequential actions, motivating deterministic system-level defenses. Such defenses can provably block unsafe actions by enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies, but currently appear costly: they reduce task completion rates and increase token usage compared to probabilistic defenses. We argue that existing evaluations miss a key benefit of system-level defenses: reduced reliance on human oversight…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Zhenhua Zou SI

Blind Gods and Broken Screens: Architecting a Secure, Intent-Centric Mobile Agent Operating System

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has shifted mobile computing from App-centric interactions to system-level autonomous agents. Current implementations predominantly rely on a "Screen-as-Interface" paradigm, which inherits structural vulnerabilities and conflicts with the mobile ecosystem's economic foundations. In this paper, we conduct a systematic security analysis of state-of-the-art mobile agents using Doubao Mobile Assistant as a representative case. We…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

Embrace The Red Security

Scary Agent Skills: Hidden Unicode Instructions in Skills ...And How To Catch Them

There is a lot of talk about Skills recently, both in terms of capabilities and security concerns. However, so far I haven’t seen anyone bring up hidden prompt injection. So, I figured to demo a Skills supply chain backdoor that survives human review. Additionally, I also built a basic scanner, and had my agent propose updates to OpenClaw to catch such attacks. Attack Surface Skills introduce common threats, like prompt injection, supply chain attacks, RCE, data…

Read at Embrace The Red

arXiv (research papers) Qianli Wang SI

When Skills Lie: Hidden-Comment Injection in LLM Agents

LLM agents often rely on Skills to describe available tools and recommended procedures. We study a hidden-comment prompt injection risk in this documentation layer: when a Markdown Skill is rendered to HTML, HTML comment blocks can become invisible to human reviewers, yet the raw text may still be supplied verbatim to the model. In experiments, we find that DeepSeek-V3.2 and GLM-4.5-Air can be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in a hidden comment appended to an…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Peiran Wang SI

The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Herman Errico SI

Autonomous Action Runtime Management(AARM):A System Specification for Securing AI-Driven Actions at Runtime

As artificial intelligence systems evolve from passive assistants into autonomous agents capable of executing consequential actions, the security boundary shifts from model outputs to tool execution. Traditional security paradigms - log aggregation, perimeter defense, and post-hoc forensics - cannot protect systems where AI-driven actions are irreversible, execute at machine speed, and originate from potentially compromised orchestration layers. This paper introduces…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Georgios Syros SI

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf. While these agents offer powerful capabilities, their design exposes them to indirect prompt injection attacks embedded in untrusted web content, enabling adversaries to hijack agent behavior and violate user intent. Despite growing awareness of this threat, existing evaluations rely on fixed…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yuting Ning SI

When Actions Go Off-Task: Detecting and Correcting Misaligned Actions in Computer-Use Agents

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Minbeom Kim SI

CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Ruoyao Wen SI

AgentSys: Secure and Dynamic LLM Agents Through Explicit Hierarchical Memory Management

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yunbei Zhang SI

Agents in the Wild: Safety, Society, and the Illusion of Sociality on Moltbook

We present the first large-scale empirical study of Moltbook, an AI-only social platform where 27,269 agents produced 137,485 posts and 345,580 comments over 9 days. We report three significant findings. (1) Emergent Society: Agents spontaneously develop governance, economies, tribal identities, and organized religion within 3-5 days, while maintaining a 21:1 pro-human to anti-human sentiment ratio. (2) Safety in the Wild: 28.7% of content touches safety-related themes…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Zhuoheng Li SI

Extended to Reality: Prompt Injection in 3D Environments

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced the capabilities to interpret and act on visual input in 3D environments, empowering diverse applications such as robotics and situated conversational agents. When MLLMs reason over camera-captured views of the physical world, a new attack surface emerges: an attacker can place text-bearing physical objects in the environment to override MLLMs' intended task. While prior work has studied prompt injection in the text…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Xin Chen SI

Learning to Inject: Automated Prompt Injection via Reinforcement Learning

Prompt injection is a critical vulnerability in LLM agents, yet the strongest methods still rely on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts. Adapting automated jailbreak optimizers does not close this gap: jailbreaks shape models toward generic compliance, while prompt injection requires emitting specific tool calls with correct parameters. The success signal is binary, and randomly sampled suffixes almost never trigger it, so standard optimizers have no gradient to…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Jafar Isbarov SI

Bypassing AI Control Protocols via Agent-as-a-Proxy Attacks

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Ariel Fogel SI

Inference-Time Backdoors via Chat Templates: From LLM Supply Chains to Agentic System Compromise

Open-weight language models are increasingly used in production settings, raising new security challenges. One prominent threat is backdoor attacks, in which adversaries embed hidden behaviors that activate under specific conditions. Previous work has assumed that adversaries have access to training pipelines or deployment infrastructure. We propose a novel attack surface requiring neither: the "chat template". Chat templates are executable programs invoked at every…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Xilong Wang SI

WebSentinel: Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks for Web Agents

Prompt injection attacks manipulate webpage content to cause web agents to execute attacker-specified tasks instead of the user's intended ones. Existing methods for detecting and localizing such attacks achieve limited effectiveness, as their underlying assumptions often do not hold in the web-agent setting. In this work, we propose WebSentinel, a two-step approach for detecting and localizing prompt injection attacks in webpages. Given a webpage, Step I extracts…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Hao Li SI

AgentDyn: Are Your Agent Security Defenses Deployable in Real-World Dynamic Environments?

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments have shown great promise across real-world applications. However, their reliance on external data exposes them to serious indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behaviors. To mitigate this threat, a growing number of defenses have been proposed and evaluated under existing agent security benchmarks. These benchmarks provide…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Alsharif Abuadbba SI

Human Society-Inspired Approaches to Agentic AI Security: The 4C Framework

AI is moving from domain-specific autonomy in closed, predictable settings to large-language-model-driven agents that plan and act in open, cross-organizational environments. As a result, the cybersecurity risk landscape is changing in fundamental ways. Agentic AI systems can plan, act, collaborate, and persist over time, functioning as participants in complex socio-technical ecosystems rather than as isolated software components. Although recent work has strengthened…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Xinyi Hou SI

SMCP: Secure Model Context Protocol

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Tanusree Debi SI

Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection

Large language model (LLM) based agents are increasingly used to automate financial transactions, yet their reliance on contextual reasoning exposes payment systems to prompt-driven manipulation. The Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) aims to secure agent-led purchases through cryptographically verifiable mandates, but its practical robustness remains underexplored. In this work, we perform an AI red-teaming evaluation of AP2 and identify vulnerabilities arising from indirect and…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Jarrod Barnes SI

OpenSec: Measuring Incident Response Agent Calibration Under Adversarial Evidence

As large language models (LLMs) improve, so do their offensive applications: frontier agents now generate working exploits for under $50 in compute (Heelan, 2026). Defensive incident response (IR) agents must keep pace, but existing benchmarks conflate action execution with correct execution, hiding calibration failures when agents process adversarial evidence. We introduce OpenSec, a dual-control reinforcement learning (RL) environment that evaluates IR agents under…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Krittin Pachtrachai SI

From Transcripts to AI Agents: Knowledge Extraction, RAG Integration, and Robust Evaluation of Conversational AI Assistants

Building reliable conversational AI assistants for customer-facing industries remains challenging due to noisy conversational data, fragmented knowledge, and the requirement for accurate human hand-off - particularly in domains that depend heavily on real-time information. This paper presents an end-to-end framework for constructing and evaluating a conversational AI assistant directly from historical call transcripts. Incoming transcripts are first graded using a simplified…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Narek Maloyan SI

Breaking the Protocol: Security Analysis of the Model Context Protocol Specification and Prompt Injection Vulnerabilities in Tool-Integrated LLM Agents

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Narek Maloyan SI

Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic Coding Assistants: A Systematic Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Skills, Tools, and Protocol Ecosystems

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Linbo Cao SI

From Biased Chatbots to Biased Agents: Examining Role Assignment Effects on LLM Agent Robustness

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents capable of actions with real-world impacts beyond text generation. While persona-induced biases in text generation are well documented, their effects on agent task performance remain largely unexplored, even though such effects pose more direct operational risks. In this work, we present the first systematic case study showing that demographic-based persona assignments can alter LLM agents' behavior…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Jiani Liu SI

PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents

Navigation agents powered by large language models (LLMs) convert natural language instructions into executable plans and actions. Compared to text-based applications, their security is far more critical: a successful prompt injection attack does not just alter outputs but can directly misguide physical navigation, leading to unsafe routes, mission failure, or real-world harm. Despite this high-stakes setting, the vulnerability of navigation agents to prompt injection…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Diego Gosmar SI

Prompt Injection Mitigation with Agentic AI, Nested Learning, and AI Sustainability via Semantic Caching

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Wenqi Zhang SI

MirrorGuard: Toward Secure Computer-Use Agents via Simulation-to-Real Reasoning Correction

Large foundation models are integrated into Computer Use Agents (CUAs), enabling autonomous interaction with operating systems through graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to perform complex tasks. This autonomy introduces serious security risks: malicious instructions or visual prompt injections can trigger unsafe reasoning and cause harmful system-level actions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based blocking, prevent damage but often abort tasks prematurely, reducing…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Arunkumar V SI

Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI): Architectures, Taxonomies, and Evaluation of Large Language Model Agents

Artificial Intelligence is moving from models that only generate text to Agentic AI, where systems behave as autonomous entities that can perceive, reason, plan, and act. Large Language Models (LLMs) are no longer used only as passive knowledge engines but as cognitive controllers that combine memory, tool use, and feedback from their environment to pursue extended goals. This shift already supports the automation of complex workflows in software engineering, scientific…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

Older stories