Results for “Agent”

Simon Willison SI

My fireside chat about agentic engineering at the Pragmatic Summit

I was a speaker last month at the Pragmatic Summit in San Francisco, where I participated in a fireside chat session about Agentic Engineering hosted by Eric Lui from Statsig. The video is available on YouTube. Here are my highlights from the conversation. Stages of AI adoption We started by talking about the different phases a software developer goes through in adopting AI coding tools. 02:45 I feel like there are different stages of AI adoption as a programmer. You start…

Read at Simon Willison

arXiv (research papers) Chenlong Yin SI

PISmith: Reinforcement Learning-based Red Teaming for Prompt Injection Defenses

Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents. Although many defenses have been proposed, their robustness against adaptive attacks remains insufficiently evaluated, potentially creating a false sense of security. In this work, we propose PISmith, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based red-teaming framework that systematically assesses existing prompt-injection defenses by training an attack LLM to optimize injected…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Zonghao Ying SI

Uncovering Security Threats and Architecting Defenses in Autonomous Agents: A Case Study of OpenClaw

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Darren Cheng SI

Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection

Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense combines two mechanisms: agent isolation, implemented as a privilege separated two-agent pipeline with tool partitioning, and JSON formatting, which produces structured output that…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Ninghui Li SI

Security Considerations for Artificial Intelligence Agents

This article, a lightly adapted version of Perplexity's response to NIST/CAISI Request for Information 2025-0035, details our observations and recommendations concerning the security of frontier AI agents. These insights are informed by Perplexity's experience operating general-purpose agentic systems used by millions of users and thousands of enterprises in both controlled and open-world environments. Agent architectures change core assumptions around code-data separation…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Frank Li SI

OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-in-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We present OpenClaw PRISM, a zero-fork runtime security layer for OpenClaw-based agent gateways. PRISM combines an in-process plugin with optional sidecar services and distributes enforcement across ten lifecycle hooks spanning message…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Xinhao Deng SI

Taming OpenClaw: Security Analysis and Mitigation of Autonomous LLM Agent Threats

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege execution capabilities substantially expand the system attack surface. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security threat analysis of OpenClaw. To structure our analysis, we introduce a five-layer lifecycle-oriented security framework…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yu He SI

AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocations

LLM agents are highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), where adversaries embed malicious directives in untrusted tool outputs to hijack execution. Most existing defenses treat IPI as an input-level semantic discrimination problem, which often fails to generalize to unseen payloads. We propose a new paradigm, action-level causal attribution, which secures agents by asking why a particular tool call is produced. The central goal is to distinguish tool calls…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Chuan Guo Michael Pokorny SI

IH-Challenge: A Training Dataset to Improve Instruction Hierarchy on Frontier LLMs

Instruction hierarchy (IH) defines how LLMs prioritize system, developer, user, and tool instructions under conflict, providing a concrete, trust-ordered policy for resolving instruction conflicts. IH is key to defending against jailbreaks, system prompt extractions, and agentic prompt injections. However, robust IH behavior is difficult to train: IH failures can be confounded with instruction-following failures, conflicts can be nuanced, and models can learn shortcuts such…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Nanzi Yang SI

Compatibility at a Cost: Systematic Discovery and Exploitation of MCP Clause-Compliance Vulnerabilities

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a recently proposed interoperability standard that unifies how AI agents connect with external tools and data sources. By defining a set of common client-server message exchange clauses, MCP replaces fragmented integrations with a standardized, plug-and-play framework. However, to be compatible with diverse AI agents, the MCP specification relaxes many behavioral constraints into optional clauses, leading to misuse-prone SDK…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yuxu Ge SI

Governance Architecture for Autonomous Agent Systems: Threats, Framework, and Engineering Practice

Autonomous agents powered by large language models introduce a class of execution-layer vulnerabilities -- prompt injection, retrieval poisoning, and uncontrolled tool invocation -- that existing guardrails fail to address systematically. In this work, we propose the Layered Governance Architecture (LGA), a four-layer framework comprising execution sandboxing (L1), intent verification (L2), zero-trust inter-agent authorization (L3), and immutable audit logging (L4). To…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Guoyi Li SI

MIND: Unified Inquiry and Diagnosis RL with Criteria Grounded Clinical Supports for Psychiatric Consultation

Psychiatric consultation requires agents to elicit discriminative evidence, map uncertain narratives to diagnostic criteria, and decide when evidence suffices. Existing dialogue and retrieval-augmented systems condition policies on raw histories or appended passages, leaving observed evidence, missing checks, differentials, and support reliability entangled. We introduce MIND, a criteria-grounded evidence-state decision interface. At each turn, MIND constructs a typed state…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Aradhye Agarwal SI

Learning When to Act or Refuse: Guarding Agentic Reasoning Models for Safe Multi-Step Tool Use

Agentic language models operate in a fundamentally different safety regime than chat models: they must plan, call tools, and execute long-horizon actions where a single misstep, such as accessing files or entering credentials, can cause irreversible harm. Existing alignment methods, largely optimized for static generation and task completion, break down in these settings due to sequential decision-making, adversarial tool feedback, and overconfident intermediate reasoning…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Martin Odersky SI

Tracking Capabilities for Safer Agents

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yijun Yu SI

From Goals to Aspects, Revisited: An NFR Pattern Language for Agentic AI Systems

Agentic AI systems exhibit numerous crosscutting concerns -- security, observability, cost management, fault tolerance -- that are poorly modularized in current implementations, contributing to the high failure rate of AI projects in reaching production. The goals-to-aspects methodology proposed at RE 2004 demonstrated that aspects can be systematically discovered from i* goal models by identifying non-functional soft-goals that crosscut functional goals. This paper revisits…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Chuanming Tang SI

LiaisonAgent: An Multi-Agent Framework for Autonomous Risk Investigation and Governance

The rapid evolution of sophisticated cyberattacks has strained modern Security Operations Centers (SOC), which traditionally rely on rule-based or signature-driven detection systems. These legacy frameworks often generate high volumes of technical alerts that lack organizational context, leading to analyst fatigue and delayed incident responses. This paper presents LiaisonAgent, an autonomous multi-agent system designed to bridge the gap between technical risk detection and…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Tian Zhang SI

AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification

Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents aggregate dialogue history, tool outputs, and retrieved content into an accumulated runtime state to complete multi-step tasks. This execution model exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, in which attacker-controlled instructions embedded in external artifacts enter the agent state and later influence tool use. Multi-turn IPI is especially challenging because injected content can persist across steps and…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Qianlong Lan SI

Silent Egress: When Implicit Prompt Injection Makes LLM Agents Leak Without a Trace

Agentic large language model systems increasingly automate tasks by retrieving URLs and calling external tools. We show that this workflow gives rise to implicit prompt injection: adversarial instructions embedded in automatically generated URL previews, including titles, metadata, and snippets, can introduce a system-level risk that we refer to as silent egress. Using a fully local and reproducible testbed, we demonstrate that a malicious web page can induce an agent to…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yanna Jiang SI

SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agents

Agentic systems increasingly rely on reusable procedural capabilities, \textit{a.k.a., agentic skills}, to execute long-horizon workflows reliably. These capabilities are callable modules that package procedural knowledge with explicit applicability conditions, execution policies, termination criteria, and reusable interfaces. Unlike one-off plans or atomic tool calls, skills operate (and often do well) across tasks. This paper maps the skill layer across the full lifecycle…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Che Wang SI

AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs

The integration of external data services (e.g., Model Context Protocol, MCP) has made large language model-based agents increasingly powerful for complex task execution. However, this advancement introduces critical security vulnerabilities, particularly indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Existing attack methods are limited by their reliance on static patterns and evaluation on simple language models, failing to address the fast-evolving nature of modern AI agents. We…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Che Wang SI

ICON: Indirect Prompt Injection Defense for Agents based on Inference-Time Correction

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions in retrieved content hijack the agent's execution. Existing defenses typically rely on strict filtering or refusal mechanisms, which suffer from a critical limitation: over-refusal, prematurely terminating valid agentic workflows. We propose ICON, a probing-to-mitigation framework that neutralizes attacks while preserving task continuity. Our key insight…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) David Schmotz SI

Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Zac Garby SI

The LLMbda Calculus: AI Agents, Conversations, and Information Flow

Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents: they plan, call tools, read untrusted data, and act on the results. This exposes them to prompt injection: data meant only to be read is obeyed as an instruction. The most principled defences replace content inspection with provenance: classifying data by source and keeping trusted and untrusted apart through a separation of duty (the dual-LLM pattern) and information-flow control. Yet the leading systems are hard to…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Lei Ba SI

CIBER: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Security Evaluation of Code Interpreter Agents

LLM-based code interpreter agents are increasingly deployed in critical workflows, yet their robustness against risks introduced by their code execution capabilities remains underexplored. Existing benchmarks are limited to static datasets or simulated environments, failing to capture the security risks arising from dynamic code execution, tool interactions, and multi-turn context. To bridge this gap, we introduce CIBER, an automated benchmark that combines dynamic attack…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Charles Ye SI

Prompt Injection as Role Confusion

LLMs see the world as a single stream of text, partitioned into roles like or . We trace prompt injection to role confusion: models perceive the source of text from how it sounds, not its labeled role. A command hidden in a webpage hijacks an agent simply because it sounds like text, despite its label. We design role probes to measure how LLMs internally perceive "who is speaking," and find that injected text occupies the same representational space as the trusted role it…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Kiarash Ahi SI

Trustworthy AI LLM Scalability Risk Index (LSRI): A Cybersecurity Framework Assessing Agentic-AI Security & Software Model Supply Chain Safety Boosting AI-Generated Malware Defense & Explainability Mitigating Emerging Risks of Generative AI

As AI shifts from human-in-the-loop interfaces to autonomous multi-agent systems capable of real-time code execution and tool integration through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP), traditional SAST, DAST, and legacy AI safety methods fail to detect modern agentic-AI threats. This paper introduces the LLM Scalability Risk Index (LSRI), a parametric framework and cybersecurity standard for stress-testing autonomous orchestration pipelines. LSRI measures the…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Emmanuel Bamidele SI

AMV-L: Lifecycle-Managed Agent Memory for Tail-Latency Control in Long-Running LLM Systems

Long-running LLM agents require persistent memory to preserve state across interactions, yet most deployed systems manage memory with age-based retention (e.g., TTL). While TTL bounds item lifetime, it does not bound the computational footprint of memory on the request path: as retained items accumulate, retrieval candidate sets and vector similarity scans can grow unpredictably, yielding heavy-tailed latency and unstable throughput. We present AMV-L (Adaptive Memory Value…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Xiaojun Jia SI

SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents

Agent skills extend LLM agents with task-specific instructions, executable scripts, and auxiliary resources, improving reusability but creating a new supply-chain attack surface. A malicious or compromised skill can be repeatedly loaded as trusted guidance and steer downstream tool use. Existing skill-based prompt-injection attacks are often manual and brittle, because explicit malicious instructions are rejected or ignored when they are not aligned with the original…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Max Fomin SI

When Benchmarks Lie: Evaluating Malicious Prompt Classifiers Under True Distribution Shift

Detecting prompt injection, jailbreak attacks, and harmful requests is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely, yet current evaluation practices in this literature overestimate generalization. We train activation-based classifiers (linear probes on LLM hidden states) on a benchmark of 18 datasets (prompt attacks plus benign sources) and propose Leave-One-Dataset-Out (LODO) evaluation, where the held-out dataset is never seen during training. Across four LLMs from…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Akshat Naik SI

OMNI-LEAK: Orchestrator Multi-Agent Network Induced Data Leakage

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more capable, their coordinated use in the form of multi-agent systems is anticipated to emerge as a practical paradigm. Prior work has examined the safety and misuse risks associated with agents. However, much of this has focused on the single-agent case and/or setups missing basic engineering safeguards such as access control, revealing a scarcity of threat modeling in multi-agent systems. We investigate the security…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

Older stories