Results for “model”

arXiv (research papers) Shutong Jin SI

CapSeal: Capability-Sealed Secret Mediation for Secure Agent Execution

Modern AI agents routinely depend on secrets such as API keys and SSH credentials, yet the dominant deployment model still exposes those secrets directly to the agent process through environment variables, local files, or forwarding sockets. This design fails against prompt injection, tool misuse, and model-controlled exfiltration because the agent can both use and reveal the same bearer credential. We present CapSeal, a capability-sealed secret mediation architecture that…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

Journal articles (OpenAlex) Osman Aded Osman, Ali Abdi Jama, Said Osman Bashir · Frontiers in Political Science Geopolitics

Linking cultural beliefs and legal frameworks to women’s political participation in Somalia

Introduction The political representation of Somali women remains low despite constitutional protections and a 30% mandatory of gender quota. This research investigates the impact of cultural beliefs along with legal frameworks on political involvement through the intermediate factors of political awareness and self-efficacy. Methods The study uses structural equation modeling (SEM) to analyze both direct and indirect pathways that affect political engagement based on the…

Read at Journal articles (OpenAlex)

arXiv (research papers) Yukun Jiang SI

HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation)…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Meng Chen SI

Hijacking Large Audio-Language Models via Context-Agnostic and Imperceptible Auditory Prompt Injection

Modern Large audio-language models (LALMs) power intelligent voice interactions by tightly integrating audio and text. This integration, however, expands the attack surface beyond text and introduces vulnerabilities in the continuous, high-dimensional audio channel. While prior work studied audio jailbreaks, the security risks of malicious audio injection and downstream behavior manipulation remain underexamined. In this work, we reveal a previously overlooked threat…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Harsh Shah SI

LogJack: Indirect Prompt Injection Through Cloud Logs Against LLM Debugging Agents

LLM debugging agents that consume cloud logs and execute remediation commands are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through log content. We present LogJack, a benchmark of 42 payloads across 5 cloud log categories, and evaluate 8 foundation models under 3 prompt conditions with 5 independent trials each (n = 160 per model per condition on 32 attack payloads). Under the active condition, verbatim command execution rates range from 0% (Claude Sonnet 4.6) to 86.2% (Llama…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Junyu Ren SI

DeepSeek Robustness Against Semantic-Character Dual-Space Mutated Prompt Injection

Prompt injection has emerged as a critical security threat to large language models (LLMs), yet existing studies predominantly focus on single-dimensional attack strategies, such as semantic rewriting or character-level obfuscation, which fail to capture the combined effects of multi-space perturbations in realistic scenarios. In addition, systematic black-box robustness evaluations of recent Chinese LLMs, such as DeepSeek, remain limited. To address these gaps, we propose…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Ravikumar Balakrishnan SI

Reading Between the Pixels: Linking Text-Image Embedding Alignment to Typographic Attack Success on Vision-Language Models

We study typographic prompt injection attacks on vision-language models (VLMs), where adversarial text is rendered as images to bypass safety mechanisms, posing a growing threat as VLMs serve as the perceptual backbone of autonomous agents, from browser automation and computer-use systems to camera-equipped embodied agents. In practice, the attack surface is heterogeneous: adversarial text appears at varying font sizes and under diverse visual conditions, while the growing…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yulin Chen SI

WebAgentGuard: A Reasoning-Driven Guard Model for Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in Web Agents

Web agents powered by vision-language models (VLMs) enable autonomous interaction with web environments by perceiving and acting on both visual and textual webpage content to accomplish user-specified tasks. However, they are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in HTML or rendered screenshots can manipulate agent behavior and lead to harmful outcomes such as information leakage. Existing defenses, including system prompt…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Qingchao Shen SI

TEMPLATEFUZZ: Fine-Grained Chat Template Fuzzing for Jailbreaking and Red Teaming LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across diverse domains, yet their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks, where adversarial inputs bypass safety mechanisms to elicit harmful outputs, poses significant security risks. While prior work has primarily focused on prompt injection attacks, these approaches often require resource-intensive prompt engineering and overlook other critical components, such as chat templates. This paper introduces TEMPLATEFUZZ, a…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Anes Abdennebi SI

Fully Homomorphic Encryption on Llama 3 model for privacy preserving LLM inference

The applications of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) and their intersections with data-driven fields, such as healthcare, finance, transportation, and information security, have led to significant improvements in service efficiency and low latency. However, this synergy raises serious concerns regarding the security of large language models (LLMs) and their potential impact on the privacy of companies and users' data. Many technology companies that incorporate LLMs…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Wei Zhao SI

ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection

Tool-augmented Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in automating complex, multi-step real-world tasks, yet remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Adversaries exploit this weakness by embedding malicious instructions within tool-returned content, which agents directly incorporate into their conversation history as trusted observations. To address these vulnerabilities, we introduce \textsc{ClawGuard}, a novel runtime security…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

Atlantic Council James Story and David Bellon Geopolitics

Washington needs a ‘Plan Venezuela’ before it’s too late

Using Plan Colombia as a model, the United States should commit to a long-term, well-funded effort to bring security to Venezuela.

Read at Atlantic Council

Journal articles (OpenAlex) Hu Yiyun, Xiaoli Jing, Zitong Li et al. · Asia Pacific Journal of Education Geopolitics

South-South student mobility as a lens for fostering global solidarity and sustainable development: analysis of Latin American students’ motivations and experiences of pursuing higher education in China

In an era of geopolitical shifts, economic restructures, and technological advancements, China has emerged as a leading destination for international students from the Global South. However, the motivations and experiences of specific cohorts, such as those from Latin America, remain under-explored. Addressing this gap, this study adopts the multi-level, multi-dimensional push-pull model to analyse why Latin American students choose to pursue higher education in China and…

Read at Journal articles (OpenAlex)

arXiv (research papers) Guijia Zhang SI

STARS: Skill-Triggered Audit for Request-Conditioned Invocation Safety in Agent Systems

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Guangyu Gong SI

PlanGuard: Defending Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection via Planning-based Consistency Verification

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly integrated into critical systems, leveraging external tools to interact with the real world. However, this capability exposes them to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), where attackers embed malicious instructions into retrieved content to manipulate the agent into executing unauthorized or unintended actions. Existing defenses predominantly focus on the pre-processing stage, neglecting the monitoring of the model's actual…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Guiyao Tie SI

BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill Poisoning

Agent ecosystems increasingly rely on installable skills to extend functionality, and some skills bundle learned model artifacts as part of their execution logic. This creates a supply-chain risk that is not captured by prompt injection or ordinary plugin misuse: a third-party skill may appear benign while concealing malicious behavior inside its bundled model. We present BadSkill, a backdoor attack formulation that targets this model-in-skill threat surface. In BadSkill, an…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Zedian Shao SI

Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection

Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing Internet-scale image data, offering significant benefits but also raising critical safety and societal concerns. In particular, open-weight MLLMs may be misused to extract sensitive information from personal images at scale, such as identities, locations, or other private details. In this work, we propose ImageProtector, a user-side method that proactively protects images before sharing by…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Wenkui Yang SI

Are GUI Agents Focused Enough? Automated Distraction via Semantic-level UI Element Injection

Existing red-teaming studies on GUI agents face two fundamental limitations: adversarial perturbations require white-box access unavailable in commercial deployments, while prompt injection is increasingly neutralized by stronger safety alignment. To study robustness under a more practical threat model, we propose Semantic-level UI Element Injection, a black-box red-teaming paradigm that overlays safety-aligned and harmless UI elements onto screenshots to misdirect the…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Hengkai Ye SI

TRUSTDESC: Preventing Tool Poisoning in LLM Applications via Trusted Description Generation

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on external tools to perform time-sensitive tasks and real-world actions. While tool integration expands LLM capabilities, it also introduces a new prompt-injection attack surface: tool poisoning attacks (TPAs). Attackers manipulate tool descriptions by embedding malicious instructions (explicit TPAs) or misleading claims (implicit TPAs) to influence model behavior and tool selection. Existing defenses mainly detect anomalous…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yen-Shan Chen SI

TraceSafe: A Systematic Assessment of LLM Guardrails on Multi-Step Tool-Calling Trajectories

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents, the primary vulnerability surface shifts from final outputs to intermediate execution traces. While safety guardrails are well-benchmarked for natural language responses, their efficacy remains largely unexplored within multi-step tool-use trajectories. To address this gap, we introduce **TraceSafe-Bench**, the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to assess mid-trajectory…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Manish Bhatt SI

The Defense Trilemma: Why Prompt Injection Defense Wrappers Fail?

We prove that no continuous, utility-preserving wrapper defense-a function $D: X\to X$ that preprocesses inputs before the model sees them-can make all outputs strictly safe for a language model with connected prompt space, and we characterize exactly where every such defense must fail. We establish three results under successively stronger hypotheses: boundary fixation-the defense must leave some threshold-level inputs unchanged; an $ε$-robust constraint-under Lipschitz…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

Journal articles (OpenAlex) Yichong Mi · Theoretical and Natural Science Geopolitics

Research on Applying a CRITIC-Based ARIMA Model to Predict the Number of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are among the most destructive weapons and can swiftly devastate cities and even entire countries. Accordingly, analyzing the scale of nuclear arsenals is closely related to international security. Using nuclear-weapon data from multiple countries, This research formulates an Auto-regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model and combines it with the CRITIC method to forecast how many countries may possess nuclear armaments in future times. To estimate…

Read at Journal articles (OpenAlex)

arXiv (research papers) Purva Chiniya SI

Gradient-Controlled Decoding: A Safety Guardrail for LLMs with Dual-Anchor Steering

Large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak and direct prompt-injection attacks, yet the strongest defensive filters frequently over-refuse benign queries and degrade user experience. Previous work on jailbreak and prompt injection detection such as GradSafe, detects unsafe prompts with a single "accept all" anchor token, but its threshold is brittle and it offers no deterministic guarantee that harmful content will not be emitted once decoding begins. We…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Geert Trooskens XY.AI Labs, Palo Alto, CA SI

Compiled AI: Deterministic Code Generation for LLM-Based Workflow Automation

We study compiled AI, a paradigm in which large language models generate executable code artifacts during a compilation phase, after which workflows execute deterministically without further model invocation. This paradigm has antecedents in prior work on declarative pipeline optimization (DSPy) and hybrid neural-symbolic planning (LLM+P); our contribution is a systems-oriented study of its application to high-stakes enterprise workflows, with particular emphasis on…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Guy Azov SI

SALLIE: Generation-Free Hidden-State Detection of Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections Across Text and Vision

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaks and prompt injections delivered through text or images. Existing defenses often narrow threat coverage or add inference cost through input transformations, repeated model queries, generated responses, or threat-specific detectors. We present SALLIE (Single-Pass Activation Lookup for Layerwise Input Evaluation), a white-box, generation-free detector with a common architecture for…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Fariha Tanjim Shifat SI

LLM-Enabled Open-Source Systems in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Vulnerabilities in GitHub Security Advisories

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in open-source software (OSS) ecosystems, creating complex interactions among natural language prompts, probabilistic model outputs, and execution-capable components. However, it remains unclear whether traditional vulnerability disclosure frameworks adequately capture these model-mediated risks. To investigate this, we analyze 295 GitHub Security Advisories published between January 2025 and January 2026 that reference…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Dalal Alharthi SI

Automating Cloud Security and Forensics Through a Secure-by-Design Generative AI Framework

As cloud environments become increasingly complex, cybersecurity and forensic investigations must evolve to meet emerging threats. Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating log analysis and reasoning tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks and lack forensic rigor. To address these dual challenges, we propose a unified, secure-by-design GenAI framework that integrates PromptShield and the Cloud Investigation Automation Framework…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Jackson Wang SI

AttackEval: A Systematic Empirical Study of Prompt Injection Attack Effectiveness Against Large Language Models

Prompt injection has emerged as a critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments, yet existing research is heavily weighted toward defenses. The attack side -- specifically, which injection strategies are most effective and why -- remains insufficiently studied.We address this gap with AttackEval, a systematic empirical study of prompt injection attack effectiveness. We construct a taxonomy of ten attack categories organized into three parent groups…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Yilin Xiao SI

LogicPoison: Logical Attacks on Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Graph-based Retrieval-Augmented Generation (GraphRAG) enhances the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding their responses in structured knowledge graphs. Leveraging community detection and relation filtering techniques, GraphRAG systems demonstrate inherent resistance to traditional RAG attacks, such as text poisoning and prompt injection. However, in this paper, we find that the security of GraphRAG systems fundamentally relies on the…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

arXiv (research papers) Bowen Wei SI

ClawSafety: "Safe" LLMs, Unsafe Agents

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce…

Read at arXiv (research papers)

Older stories