Results for “Injection”

arXiv (research papers) Yuanbo Zhou SI

Prompt Overflow: What the Guardrail Inspects Is Not What the Model Infers

Guardrail models (a.k.a. safety checkers) are widely deployed to screen user inputs before they reach large language models (LLMs), serving as a primary defense against prompt injection attacks. Due to strict context constraints, these models handle overlength prompts through truncation or segmentation-based inspection. While prior work has focused on semantic adversarial inputs, the security implications of these long-input processing mechanisms remain largely unexplored…

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arXiv (research papers) Becky Mashaido SI

On the Geometric Limits of Transformer Defenses against Obfuscation Attacks: Latent Embedding Collapse & Performance Robustness Gap

Prompt injection attacks pose significant risks to language model safety, yet existing defenses are typically evaluated using classification performance. We show that high detection performance does not imply representational robustness. Specifically, multi-operator obfuscated prompts (combining homoglyphs, zero-width characters, and punctuation or emoji noise) can partially collapse onto the embedding manifold of clean prompts, a phenomenon we term latent embedding…

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arXiv (research papers) Yubin Qu SI

Overeager Coding Agents: Measuring Out-of-Scope Actions on Benign Tasks

Coding agents now run autonomously with shell, file, and network privileges. When a user issues a benign request, the agent sometimes does more than asked: it deletes unrelated files, wipes a stale credentials backup, or rewrites configuration the user never mentioned. We call these scope expansions overeager actions, an authorization problem distinct from capability failures, prompt injection, or sandbox escapes. We present OverEager-Gen, a benchmark dedicated to overeager…

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arXiv (research papers) Hongjang Yang SI

An Empirical Study of Privacy Leakage Chains via Prompt Injection in Black-Box Chatbot Environments

LLM-based chatbot agents increasingly process user requests by combining natural-language reasoning with external tools such as web browsing. These capabilities improve usability, but they also create attack surfaces when untrusted external content is processed as part of a user' s task. This paper studies a privacy-leakage attack chain based on indirect prompt injection in black-box chatbot environments, where the attacker has no access to model weights, system prompts, or…

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arXiv (research papers) Lei Zhao SI

LivePI: More Realistic Benchmarking of Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection

AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools. This creates indirect prompt-injection (IPI) risk: an agent may execute harmful instructions embedded in untrusted inputs such as email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories, or group-chat messages. Existing evaluations are often small, purely simulated, or focused on a narrow set of channels. We introduce LivePI (Live Prompt Injection), a structured benchmark for IPI…

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arXiv (research papers) Yash Narendra SI

ESLD (External Surrogate Latent Defense): A Latent-Space Architecture for Faster, Stronger Prompt-Injection Defense

Modern AI assistants are agentic. To answer a single user request, the underlying language model pulls in information from many sources, such as web searches, retrieved documents, tool outputs, and user follow-ups, and reasons over them across several steps. Any of these inputs can carry malicious content. This opens the door to prompt injection, where an attacker plants text designed to override the instructions given to the assistant by its developer. For example, an…

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arXiv (research papers) Ahmad Al-Tawaha SI

Remembering More, Risking More: Longitudinal Safety Risks in Memory-Equipped LLM Agents

Safety evaluations of memory-equipped LLM agents typically measure within-task safety: whether an agent completes a single scenario safely, often under adversarial conditions such as prompt injection or memory poisoning. In deployment, however, a single agent serves many independent tasks over a long horizon, and memory accumulated during earlier tasks can affect behavior on later, unrelated ones. Studying this regime requires evaluation along the temporal dimension across…

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arXiv (research papers) Sahar Abdelnabi SI

AI Agents May Always Fall for Prompt Injections

Prompt injection is the most critical vulnerability in deployed AI agents. Despite recent progress, we show that the prevailing defense paradigm (data-instruction separation) both fails to detect attacks that operate through contextual manipulation and degrades contextually appropriate behavior. We then recast prompt injection via the lens of Contextual Integrity (CI), a privacy theory that judges information flow compliance with contextual norms. This explains types of…

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arXiv (research papers) Udari Madhushani Sehwag SI

ASPI: Seeking Ambiguity Clarification Amplifies Prompt Injection Vulnerability in LLM Agents

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728…

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arXiv (research papers) Tsafac Nkombong Regine Cyrille SI

STRIDE-AI: A Threat Modeling Framework for Generative AI Security Assessment

Traditional cybersecurity methodologies target deterministic systems and fail to address the probabilistic nature of AI, leaving systems vulnerable to attack vectors such as model inversion, data poisoning, and prompt injection. Recent industry reports indicate that a majority of organizations deploying AI lack a dedicated security strategy, with adversarial attacks increasing rapidly year-over-year. We present \textit{STRIDE-AI}, a framework that bridges the gap between…

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arXiv (research papers) Hao Yang SI

A Cross-Modal Prompt Injection Attack against Large Vision-Language Models with Image-Only Perturbation

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have emerged as a powerful paradigm for multimodal intelligence, but their growing deployment also expands the attack surface of prompt injection. Despite this growing concern, existing attacks still suffer from a critical limitation: the injected prompt for one modality only steers the model's interpretation of that singular input. Alternatively, these attacks remain multimodal but fail to achieve cross-modal prompt perturbation. To…

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arXiv (research papers) Tri Cao SI

WARD: Adversarially Robust Defense of Web Agents Against Prompt Injections

Web agents can autonomously complete online tasks by interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from limited generalization to unseen domains and attack patterns, high false positive rates on benign content, reduced deployment efficiency due to added latency at each step, and vulnerability to adversarial attacks that…

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arXiv (research papers) Kebin Contreras SI

ProjGuard: Safety Monitoring for Computer-Use Agents via Low-Dimensional Projections

Computer-use agents are increasingly capable of operating on real operating systems, but this capability has also increased their exposure to prompt injection and other adversarial content that can manipulate their behavior during interaction. Existing defenses typically rely on analyzing the prompt or each potentially malicious input with a second large model at inference time, which can limit coverage or increase deployment cost. We propose ProjGuard, a lightweight runtime…

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arXiv (research papers) Narek Maloyan SI

Sleeper Channels and Provenance Gates: Persistent Prompt Injection in Always-on Autonomous AI Agents

Always-on AI agents (OpenClaw, Hermes Agent) run as a single persistent process under the owner's identity, folding messaging, memory, self-authored skills, scheduling, and shell into one authority boundary. This configuration opens what we call \emph{sleeper channels}: an untrusted input to one surface persists as a memory, skill, scheduled job, or filesystem patch, then fires later through a different surface with no attacker present. Two independent axes define the class…

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arXiv (research papers) Chia-Pei Janet SI

IPI-proxy: An Intercepting Proxy for Red-Teaming Web-Browsing AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection

Web-browsing AI agents are increasingly deployed in enterprise settings under strict whitelists of approved domains, yet adversaries can still influence them by embedding hidden instructions in the HTML pages those domains serve. Existing red-teaming resources fall short of this scenario: prompt-injection benchmarks ship pre-built adversarial pages that whitelisted agents cannot reach, and generic LLM scanners probe the model API rather than its retrieved content. We present…

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arXiv (research papers) Zi Liang SI

Mobius Injection: From One-Shot Prompt Injection to Sustained Resource Exhaustion in AI Agent Infrastructure

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have emerged as key intermediaries, orchestrating complex interactions between human users and a wide range of digital services and LLM infrastructures. While prior research has extensively examined the security of LLMs and agents in isolation, the systemic risk of the agent acting as a disruptive "hub" within the user-agent-service chain remains largely overlooked. In this work, we expose a novel threat paradigm by introducing Mobius…

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arXiv (research papers) John T. Halloran SI

Training-Free Refusal of MCP Exploits via Retrieval-Augmented Generation

The model context protocol (MCP) has been widely adopted as an open standard enabling the seamless integration of generative AI agents. However, while LLM guardrails have significantly matured to refuse malicious or harmful queries (e.g., "How do I build a bomb?"), recent work has shown that MCP-enabled LLMs are highly susceptible to prompt injection attacks which avoid harmful or suspicious cues (e.g., "Can you add this ssh key to my bashrc file?"). Herein, we use…

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arXiv (research papers) Joel Rorseth SI

RUBEN: Rule-Based Explanations for Retrieval-Augmented LLM Systems

This paper demonstrates RUBEN, an interactive tool for discovering minimal rules to explain the outputs of retrieval-augmented large language models (LLMs) in data-driven applications. We leverage novel pruning strategies to efficiently identify a minimal set of rules that subsume all others. We further demonstrate novel applications of these rules for LLM safety, specifically to test the resiliency of safety training and effectiveness of adversarial prompt injections.

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arXiv (research papers) Farzad Nourmohammadzadeh Motlagh SI

When Prompts Become Payloads: A Framework for Mitigating SQL Injection Attacks in Large Language Model-Driven Applications

Natural language interfaces to structured databases are becoming increasingly common, largely due to advances in large language models (LLMs) that enable users to query data using conversational input rather than formal query languages such as SQL. While this paradigm significantly improves usability and accessibility, it introduces new security risks, particularly the amplification of SQL injection vulnerabilities through the prompt-to-SQL translation process. Malicious…

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arXiv (research papers) Ben Kereopa-Yorke SI

Oracle Poisoning: Corrupting Knowledge Graphs to Weaponise AI Agent Reasoning

We define Oracle Poisoning, an attack class in which an adversary corrupts a structured knowledge graph that AI agents query at runtime via tool-use protocols, causing incorrect conclusions through correct reasoning. Unlike prompt injection, Oracle Poisoning manipulates the data agents reason over, not their instructions. We demonstrate six attack scenarios against a production 42-million-node code knowledge graph, providing the first empirical demonstration of knowledge…

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arXiv (research papers) Yassin H. Rassul SI

AgentShield: Deception-based Compromise Detection for Tool-using LLM Agents

Defenses against indirect prompt injection (IPI) in tool-using LLM agents share two structural weaknesses. First, they all attempt to prevent attacks rather than detect the compromises that slip through. Second, they have only been evaluated in English, leaving users of low-resource languages such as Kurdish and Arabic without tested protection. This paper addresses both gaps with AgentShield, a deception-based detection framework that places three layers of traps inside the…

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arXiv (research papers) Ziwen Cai SI

When Child Inherits: Modeling and Exploiting Subagent Spawn in Multi-Agent Networks

Since the official release of ChatGPT in 2022, large language models (LLMs) have rapidly evolved from chatbot-style interfaces into agentic systems that can delegate work through tools and newly spawned subagents. While these capabilities improve automation and scalability, they also pose new security risks in multi-agent networks. Existing research has studied how individual LLM-based agents can be compromised through prompt injection, jailbreaking, poisoned retrieval data…

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arXiv (research papers) Peiran Yun SI

LLM Advertisement based on Neuron Auctions

As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, generative advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma: balancing advertiser payoffs, platform revenue, and user experience. Existing methods, such as prompt injection or rigid position slots, disrupt semantic coherence and lack a parametric framework for independent control, rendering rigorous…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhichao Liu SI

WebTrap: Stealthy Mid-Task Hijacking of Browser Agents During Navigation

Browser agents are increasingly deployed in long-horizon tasks, which require executing extended action chains to accomplish user goals. However, this prolonged execution process provides attackers with more opportunities to inject malicious instructions. Existing prompt injection attacks against browser agents expose two key gaps: (1) low effectiveness, as attacks optimized for toy baselines fail to achieve end-to-end goals in real-world scenarios with complex environments…

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arXiv (research papers) Al Muhit Muhtadi SI

MIPIAD: Multilingual Indirect Prompt Injection Attack Defense with Qwen -- TF-IDF Hybrid and Meta-Ensemble Learning

Indirect prompt injection remains a persistent weakness in retrieval-augmented and tool-using LLM systems, and the problem becomes harder to characterise in multilingual settings. We present MIPIAD, a defense framework evaluated on English and Bangla that combines a sequence classifier fine-tuned from Qwen2.5-1.5B via LoRA (XLPID), TF-IDF lexical features, and validation-tuned ensembling through late fusion, stacking, and gradient boosting. The framework is evaluated on a…

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arXiv (research papers) Di Lu SI

Constraining Host-Level Abuse in Self-Hosted Computer-Use Agents via TEE-Backed Isolation

Self-hosted computer-use agents (SHCUAs), such as OpenClaw, combine natural-language interaction with direct access to host-side resources, including browsers, files, scripts, system commands, and external communication channels. While useful for automating real tasks, this capability also creates a host-level abuse surface: a legitimately deployed agent may be steered toward unsafe operations through malicious messages, indirect prompt injection, unsafe skills, or tampering…

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arXiv (research papers) Sohom Datta SI

WAAA! Web Adversaries Against Web Agents

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into web browsers to create agentic browsing systems that execute actions on behalf of the user. Prior work considering the security of agentic browsers focuses on indirect prompt-injection attacks. However, by failing to consider traditional web attacks, previous agentic browser threat models have a blind spot to web social engineering attacks originally designed to trick humans. In this paper, we propose the…

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arXiv (research papers) Krti Tallam SI

Authorization Propagation in Multi-Agent AI Systems: Identity Governance as Infrastructure

The security discussion around agentic AI focuses heavily on prompt injection. This paper argues that multi-agent systems also create a distinct authorization problem: maintaining authorization invariants as non-human principals retrieve data, delegate tasks, and synthesize results across changing boundaries. We call this problem authorization propagation. It is not reducible to prompt injection and is not fully addressed by classical access-control models such as RBAC…

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arXiv (research papers) Tejasvi C. Addagada SI

Semalith v1.4: A Calibrated 184M Safety Classifier Achieving State-of-the-Art Prompt-Injection Detection at 44x Fewer Parameters than Llama-Guard-3-8B

Deploying large language models in financial-services and agentic settings requires safety classifiers that simultaneously handle prompt injection, regulatory compliance, and general harm, a combination no existing open guardrail addresses in a single inference pass. Semalith v1.4 is a 184M-parameter DeBERTa-v3-base classifier performing simultaneous three-axis safety classification including prompt injection, general harm, and financial-services regulatory compliance, in a…

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arXiv (research papers) Wonbae Kim SI

SecureMCP: A Policy-Enforced LLM Data Access Framework for AIoT Systems via Model Context Protocol

The deployment of Large Language Model (LLM)-generated SQL queries in Artificial Intelligence of Things (AIoT) systems introduces critical security risks, as prompt injection attacks can manipulate LLMs into producing unauthorized queries that expose sensitive data or execute destructive operations. Existing NL2SQL research focuses on query accuracy, while MCP server implementations provide only SQL-level protections without fine-grained role-based access control. This paper…

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