Results for “Agent”

Berkeley AI Research blog SI

Intelligence is Free, Now What? Data Systems for, of, and by Agents

... government of the people, by the people, for the people ... — Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1863) The cost of AI is dropping rapidly. GPT-4-class capabilities cost roughly $30 per million tokens in early 2023; today the same runs under $1, and some providers are pushing costs below $0.10. Across benchmarks, inference prices have fallen between 9x and 900x per year, with a median decline near 50x. Even frontier models are getting dramatically cheaper each…

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arXiv (research papers) Kristina Nikolić SI

Untrusted Content Masking for Web Agents with Security Guarantees

Defenses that provide security guarantees against prompt injection attacks rely on strict isolation between trusted instructions and untrusted data. In text-based environments such as tool-use APIs, this separation arises naturally: agents can reason from interface definitions without ever processing untrusted content. Extending these guarantees to web agents faces a fundamental challenge: to perceive and interact with their environment, web agents must first observe the…

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arXiv (research papers) Woohyuk Choi SI

Agent Data Injection Attacks are Realistic Threats to AI Agents

AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled untrusted data is interpreted as an instruction. In response, many mitigations have been proposed to prevent instruction injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new category of IPI…

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arXiv (research papers) Bogdan Banu SI

Biological Motifs for Agentic Control

The transition of Large Language Models (LLMs) from passive generators to autonomous agents has introduced significant challenges in reliability, security, and state management. Current agentic architectures are often constructed ad-hoc, prone to hallucination cascades, infinite loops, and prompt injection attacks. This paper argues that many of these failure modes can be analyzed using control motifs long studied in systems biology, provided the comparison is made at the…

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arXiv (research papers) Juhee Kim SI

DualView: Preventing Indirect Prompt Injection in Personal AI Agents

Personal AI agents that run on the user's local machine automate daily tasks including web search, email, and file management. Their access to computer resources, including the network, file system, and shell, exposes them to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Prior Dual LLM defenses block IPI by replacing untrusted data with symbols that the agent can reference but not read. However, they track untrusted data only inside the agent's context, so when the agent saves…

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arXiv (research papers) Bo Jin SI

Agentao: A Policy-Governed Runtime Harness for Embeddable Tool-Using LLM Agents

LLM agents increasingly operate as execution systems that invoke tools, modify local state, use persistent memory, and interact with external protocols. These capabilities make agents useful, but they also introduce risks related to over-privileged actions, weak auditability, prompt injection, tool poisoning, and uncontrolled side effects. This paper presents Agentao, a governed local-first runtime for tool-using LLM agents. Agentao separates model-generated action proposals…

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arXiv (research papers) Josh Hills SI

Distributed Attacks in Persistent-State AI Control

As AI coding agents become more autonomous, they increasingly ship code iteratively, with the codebase persisting across sessions. This persistence creates a new attack surface: a misaligned or prompt-injected agent can distribute attacks across pull requests (PRs) and time its payload for the PR with the best natural cover. To study the resulting dynamics, we introduce Iterative VibeCoding, a setting for AI control, the study of safely deploying capable but potentially…

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Phenomenal World Benjamin Y. Fong Geopolitics

The Anti-Amazon

We are in a new age of logistical prowess, led by the dynamism of Amazon as it strives to carry out dizzyingly complex forms of order fulfillment and delivery. With the age of agentic commerce just around the corner—think of going to ChatGPT and having an AI agent scour every website for the cheapest offering

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arXiv (research papers) Peizhi Niu SI

Understanding and Evaluating Claw-like Agent Security Through a Computer-Systems Lens

Claw-like AI agents (e.g., OpenClaw) are always-on processes with persistent access to credentials, files, tools, and external services. They take on system-level responsibilities -- installing packages, maintaining state, scheduling subtasks, and mediating I/O -- making security failures far more severe than in other agents. Yet existing benchmarks focus on model responses and tool calls, leaving cross-component failure modes largely unmeasured. We adopt a computer-system…

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arXiv (research papers) Krishna Mohan SI

Agent Security Meets Regulatory Reality -- A Practitioner Systematization of Autonomous-Agent Threats and Controls in Regulated Financial Systems

Large language model agents are entering regulated financial systems, yet the security literature characterizing their attack surface is almost entirely laboratory-based, and the practitioner guidance on regulated deployment is neither peer-reviewed nor connected to a formal threat model. We bridge the two from production experience. We map six established agentic threat categories namely prompt injection, identity and authorization, action auditability, tool abuse, data…

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arXiv (research papers) Mamdouh Alenezi SI

From Determinism to Delegation: AI-Native Software Engineering and the Evolution of the Agentic Engineer

Software engineering is experiencing its most significant transformation since the emergence of high-level programming languages. As large language models (LLMs) increasingly enable sustained, multi-step, tool-mediated execution, engineering value is shifting from writing deterministic code to supervising probabilistic and autonomous behavior. This paper argues that AI-Native Software Engineering is a paradigm shift rather than a mere tooling advance, creating a new…

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Simon Willison SI

Incident Report: CVE-2026-LGTM

Incident Report: CVE-2026-LGTM Spectacular hypothetical incident report by Andrew Nesbitt. Day 2, 16:00 UTC --- Two AI review agents from competing vendors, both attached to a downstream pull request bumping foxhole-lz4, enter a disagreement loop over whether the package is malicious. After 340 comments and $41,255 in inference spend, Finance revokes both API keys; one vendor's marketing team, cc'd on the cost anomaly alert, issues a press release citing "a 430% YoY increase…

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arXiv (research papers) Isabela Burattini Freire Geopolitics

SimPol: Simulating polarisation in political belief networks in European countries

Here we combine empirical network analysis with agent-based modelling to understand how different ways of structuring belief systems may affect the polarisation drive, and how the diversity of belief systems in Europe may result in different polarisation trajectories. Using the 2016 European Social Survey, we infer belief networks across 23 European countries via a Bayesian algorithm, revealing that belief systems are predominantly organised around immigration, LGBT rights…

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arXiv (research papers) Inderjeet Singh SI

MIRROR: Novelty-Constrained Memory-Guided MCTS Red-Teaming for Agentic RAG

Multimodal agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems expand the attack surface beyond prompt injection to include text poisoning, image injection, direct-query attacks, and orchestrator-level tool manipulation. Existing red-teaming approaches are typically surface-specific and often recycle known attack templates; on text-poisoning benchmarks we measure 73-84% exact duplication. We present MIRROR, a unified cross-surface framework that performs memory-guided Monte…

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arXiv (research papers) Nada Lahjouji SI

Agents That Know Too Much: A Data-Centric Survey of Privacy in LLM Agents

Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf. As they move from answering questions to operating over sensitive data, privacy becomes harder to enforce. An agent touches many data sources, runs multi-step workflows, keeps state across sessions, and acts with delegated permissions. Sensitive information can therefore leak not only through its final answer but…

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arXiv (research papers) Praneeth Narisetty SI

Adaptive Evaluation of Out-of-Band Defenses Against Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

Recent work (2024 to 2026) has converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with a deterministic policy that mediates the agent's actions. Systems such as CaMeL, FIDES, Progent, RTBAS, and FORGE realize this with capabilities, information-flow labels, and reference monitors, and several report near-elimination of attacks on the…

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arXiv (research papers) Hyejun Jeong SI

AI Snitches Get Glitches: Towards Evading Agentic Surveillance

AI agents are now routinely entrusted with access to users' data and communications, operating with growing autonomy and low human supervision. This increasing reliance on AI agents introduces a novel privacy risk that we call agentic surveillance, wherein third-party-provided agents leverage their access privilege to monitor for specific user behaviors, compile a targeted report, and covertly deliver it via tools. Users under surveillance may have neither the ability to…

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The Guardian Chile John Bartlett in Santiago Geopolitics

Former Pinochet agents convicted over 1976 Washington DC carbomb murder

Attack targeted former Chile ambassador Orlando Letelier and his US colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt Fifty years after Gen Augusto Pinochet’s secret police detonated a car bomb in the heart of Washington DC, killing Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean minister and ambassador to the US, and his American colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt, a Santiago court has convicted three former agents of Moffitt’s murder. Judge Paola Plaza, a special minister for human rights in Chile, sentenced…

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arXiv (research papers) Yedidel Louck SI

Securing LLM-Agent Long-Term Memory Against Poisoning: Non-Malleable, Origin-Bound Authority with Machine-Checked Guarantees

LLM agents increasingly rely on persistent long-term memory, which creates a critical vulnerability that we study here: memory poisoning. An adversary can store untrusted content in one session that later steers a consequential action, such as a payment, a setting change, or data exfiltration, in a future session. Existing defenses base a memory item's authority to act on either its content (detection or trust-scoring) or its derivation history (lineage). We show that both…

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arXiv (research papers) Bacem Etteib SI

Detecting Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild using Attention

LLM agents increasingly load skills, file-based packages of natural-language instructions written by third parties and distributed through marketplaces, that execute with the user's privileges. A single malicious skill can exfiltrate data, hijack the agent, or persist as a supply-chain foothold, which turns the skill marketplace into a new attack surface for agentic systems. Prompt-injection defenses do not carry over to this setting. They rely on a boundary between trusted…

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arXiv (research papers) Adam Storek SI

GIF: Locally Sound Geometric Information Flow Control for LLMs

Large language models increasingly mediate interactions between sensitive data, untrusted inputs, and privileged actions in agentic systems, creating security and privacy risks. These range from prompt injections that manipulate downstream tool use to leakage of confidential information through model outputs. Recent Information Flow Control (IFC)-based defenses show promise but lack a principled semantic foundation for reasoning about information flow through the model…

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arXiv (research papers) Yanhang Li SI

When AUC 0.998 Is Not Enough: A Candidate Evaluation Protocol for Hidden-State Probes of Indirect Prompt Injection in Multimodal Computer-Use Agents

Hidden-state probing -- a linear classifier on a frozen vision-language model's internal activations -- has emerged as an attractive evaluation tool for flagging indirect prompt injection (IPI) in multimodal computer-use agents before the agent emits a corrupted action. We argue, on a single-backbone cautionary case study (Qwen2.5-VL-7B on Mind2Web, teacher-forced replay), that a high probing AUC on a clean-vs-attack split is not, on its own, evidence of malicious-content…

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arXiv (research papers) Zesen Liu SI

Safe to Check, Unsafe to Use: Relinking at the Compression Boundary of LLM Agents

Summarization-based prompt compression is increasingly used by LLM agents to shorten long, distributed contexts, but it shifts the security boundary: filters inspect the pre-compression prompt while the backend acts on a newly generated compressed context. We identify relinking, a compression-boundary vulnerability where the compressor behaves as a confused deputy, summarizing distributed, locally benign fragments into a complete malicious instruction. Unlike prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhen Zhao SI

AgenticOS: An Intent-Oriented Secure Operating System Architecture for Autonomous AI Agents

Traditional OS security models based on "resource exposure plus permission checks" face structural challenges as LLM-driven autonomous agents acquire capabilities for planning, tool use, network access, and code execution. Once an agent runtime is compromised through prompt injection or malicious tool outputs, an attacker can compose POSIX-style resource primitives into behaviors far beyond the user's task authorization. To address this, we propose AgenticOS, an…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhengsong Zhang SI

Local LLM Agents as Vulnerable Runtimes:A Source-Code Audit of the Agent Runtime Layer

Local LLM agents such as OpenClaw and Nanobot run on end-user machines and act on host resources - the shell, filesystem, browser, stored credentials, and messaging applications - through natural-language goals. These agents have become privileged software runtimes that mediate between user intent, model outputs, and host-level actions. Existing research characterizes the landscape through prompt injection, malicious skills, marketplace risks, or black-box evaluation of…

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arXiv (research papers) Shanghao Shi SI

Think Twice Before You Act: Protecting LLM Agents Against Tool Description Poisoning via Isolated Planning

The integration of external tools has substantially expanded the capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents, but it also introduces new attack surfaces beyond prompt injection. In particular, cross-tool description poisoning can manipulate planner-visible tool metadata to steer an agent's trajectory, even if the poisoned tool itself is never chosen. To understand the effectiveness of existing defenses against this emerging threat, we first evaluate several…

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arXiv (research papers) Reza Soosahabi SI

Analyzing Defensive Misdirection Against Model-Guided Automated Attacks on Agentic AI Systems

Agentic AI systems increasingly rely on language-model components to interpret instructions, process external data, invoke tools, and coordinate with other agents. These capabilities make prompt-injection and jailbreak attacks more consequential, especially as attackers adopt model-guided automation to scale probing, prompt refinement, and response evaluation. This work analyzes the resulting attack-defense setting through a probabilistic model of a target system, its…

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arXiv (research papers) J Alex Corll SI

Amplify, Don't Create: Temporal Accumulation for Slow-Burn Prompt Injection

Most prompt-injection detectors score a single event or message. Control-plane attacks against tool-using agents can instead distribute weak directives across a trajectory while keeping each event below threshold. We test whether a proxy-side temporal accumulator recovers this slow-burn signal by reducing frozen per-event scores to peak and CUSUM persistence statistics. To avoid circularity, grafts are generated against a held-out autoregressive cloaking target and then…

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