Results for “Mali”

arXiv (research papers) Om Narayan SI

ChainWatch: A Kill Chain-Aligned Sequential Detection Framework for Multi-Step Attacks in MCP-Based AI Agent Systems

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open-source standard that allows AI agents to connect to external tools, databases, and services. While this connectivity enables powerful agent capabilities, it also introduces multi-step attacks that existing per-call defenses cannot reliably detect. Attackers can compose individually benign tool invocations into malicious sequences that evade isolated inspection. This paper presents ChainWatch, a sequential detection framework for…

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arXiv (research papers) Soham Gadgil SI

Bad Memory: Evaluating Prompt Injection Risks from Memory in Agentic Systems

A growing class of agentic systems maintain persistent state across sessions through memory files, behavioral preferences, and knowledge bases. While this makes agents more useful and self-improving, it also creates a new attack surface for prompt injections in which malicious instructions can be embedded within persistent files and influence future behavior. In this work, we study prompt injection attacks in memory-based agentic systems using a sandboxed synthetic…

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arXiv (research papers) SingGuard Team SI

SingGuard-NSFA: Extensible Guardrails for Agentic AI via Generative Reasoning and Real-Time Classification

We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion. We first introduce the NSFA taxonomy, which organizes 185 risk variants into a CIA-triad-grounded hierarchy and is cross-validated against three well-established OWASP guidelines. Based on this taxonomy, we construct a benchmark suite…

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arXiv (research papers) Bálint Gyevnár SI

Distributed Denial of Science: How Indirect Data Poisoning of AI Systems Can Industrialize Scientific Fraud

Scientific fraud is the instrument of doubt that malicious entities can use to establish controversy in science. Historically, it required the resources of a company: deep pockets, ghostwritten articles, and corrupt academics. Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly automating scientific research, so we ask: Can a remote adversary weaponize the honest use of AI in science to compromise scientific integrity? We envision and empirically evaluate a new attack…

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arXiv (research papers) Elad David SI

Latent Undertow: How Ordinary Typos Break Probes

LLMs handle ordinary typing variation fluently: a typo or missing punctuation leaves both user intent and the model's response substantively unchanged. Yet probes that detect malicious prompts by reading the model's hidden states tell a different story: the same edit rotates the readout vector by 43--56 at the perturbed token, decaying below 15% within ~10 downstream tokens. Stacking ~3 common typos per message cuts a single-position prompt-injection probe's TPR@FPR$=1% by…

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arXiv (research papers) Caglar Uysal SI

An Empirical Evaluation of Prompt Injection Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models Across Multilingual and Obfuscated Attack Scenarios

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly evolved, transforming industries by automating complex tasks and generating human-like content. However, as their adoption accelerates, prompt injection vulnerabilities have become increasingly apparent. Malicious actors exploit these weaknesses to generate phishing emails, deceptive websites, nd malware, posing serious security risks. This paper presents an empirical evaluation of six state-of-the-art LLMs (DeepSeek, GPT, Gemini…

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Simon Willison SI

Incident Report: CVE-2026-LGTM

Incident Report: CVE-2026-LGTM Spectacular hypothetical incident report by Andrew Nesbitt. Day 2, 16:00 UTC --- Two AI review agents from competing vendors, both attached to a downstream pull request bumping foxhole-lz4, enter a disagreement loop over whether the package is malicious. After 340 comments and $41,255 in inference spend, Finance revokes both API keys; one vendor's marketing team, cc'd on the cost anomaly alert, issues a press release citing "a 430% YoY increase…

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arXiv (research papers) Praneeth Narisetty SI

Adaptive Evaluation of Out-of-Band Defenses Against Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

Recent work (2024 to 2026) has converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with a deterministic policy that mediates the agent's actions. Systems such as CaMeL, FIDES, Progent, RTBAS, and FORGE realize this with capabilities, information-flow labels, and reference monitors, and several report near-elimination of attacks on the…

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arXiv (research papers) Bacem Etteib SI

Detecting Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild using Attention

LLM agents increasingly load skills, file-based packages of natural-language instructions written by third parties and distributed through marketplaces, that execute with the user's privileges. A single malicious skill can exfiltrate data, hijack the agent, or persist as a supply-chain foothold, which turns the skill marketplace into a new attack surface for agentic systems. Prompt-injection defenses do not carry over to this setting. They rely on a boundary between trusted…

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arXiv (research papers) Yanhang Li SI

When AUC 0.998 Is Not Enough: A Candidate Evaluation Protocol for Hidden-State Probes of Indirect Prompt Injection in Multimodal Computer-Use Agents

Hidden-state probing -- a linear classifier on a frozen vision-language model's internal activations -- has emerged as an attractive evaluation tool for flagging indirect prompt injection (IPI) in multimodal computer-use agents before the agent emits a corrupted action. We argue, on a single-backbone cautionary case study (Qwen2.5-VL-7B on Mind2Web, teacher-forced replay), that a high probing AUC on a clean-vs-attack split is not, on its own, evidence of malicious-content…

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arXiv (research papers) Xingwei Zhong SI

DE-FIVE: Detecting Malicious Image Prompts via Fourier Features and Image Vector Embeddings

Vision language models (VLMs) employ both visual and textual modalities to enable advanced vision-language inference. However, incorporating visual modalities expands the attack surface of VLMs, making them more susceptible to security threats such as adversarial perturbations and indirect prompt injection, wherein crafted malicious image prompts can elicit unintended model outputs. Existing defense methods against malicious image prompts remain insufficient as they…

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arXiv (research papers) Zesen Liu SI

Safe to Check, Unsafe to Use: Relinking at the Compression Boundary of LLM Agents

Summarization-based prompt compression is increasingly used by LLM agents to shorten long, distributed contexts, but it shifts the security boundary: filters inspect the pre-compression prompt while the backend acts on a newly generated compressed context. We identify relinking, a compression-boundary vulnerability where the compressor behaves as a confused deputy, summarizing distributed, locally benign fragments into a complete malicious instruction. Unlike prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhen Zhao SI

AgenticOS: An Intent-Oriented Secure Operating System Architecture for Autonomous AI Agents

Traditional OS security models based on "resource exposure plus permission checks" face structural challenges as LLM-driven autonomous agents acquire capabilities for planning, tool use, network access, and code execution. Once an agent runtime is compromised through prompt injection or malicious tool outputs, an attacker can compose POSIX-style resource primitives into behaviors far beyond the user's task authorization. To address this, we propose AgenticOS, an…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhengsong Zhang SI

Local LLM Agents as Vulnerable Runtimes:A Source-Code Audit of the Agent Runtime Layer

Local LLM agents such as OpenClaw and Nanobot run on end-user machines and act on host resources - the shell, filesystem, browser, stored credentials, and messaging applications - through natural-language goals. These agents have become privileged software runtimes that mediate between user intent, model outputs, and host-level actions. Existing research characterizes the landscape through prompt injection, malicious skills, marketplace risks, or black-box evaluation of…

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arXiv (research papers) Gulshan Saleem SI

A Layered Security Framework Against Prompt Injection in RAG-Based Chatbots

Prompt injection is ranked as the most critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments by the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, yet existing defenses operate at isolated pipeline stages and remain incomplete. Input filters cannot inspect retrieved documents, while output monitors cannot prevent malicious payloads from reaching the model. Consequently, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) chatbots remain vulnerable to indirect injection, where a poisoned…

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arXiv (research papers) Lipeng He SI

Defending against Adaptive Prompt Injection Attacks via Reasoning-enabled Task Alignment

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined…

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Journal of Democracy Alexander Noyes Geopolitics

Why Mali Is at a Dangerous Crossroads

Mali’s spiraling security crisis puts its entire region at risk. A return to democracy will be key to preventing the country from becoming a terrorist safe haven in West Africa. Source

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arXiv (research papers) Pengfei He SI

PI-Hunter: Automated Red-Teaming for Exposing and Localizing Prompt Injections

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into agentic systems that interact with external tools and environments, introducing new security risks such as indirect prompt injection attacks through untrusted external sources. Existing defenses mainly focus on blocking malicious content at inference time, and current red-teaming methods primarily optimize attack success. As a result, developers have limited visibility into how latent prompt injections emerge and…

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arXiv (research papers) Lena S. Bolliger SI

Training LLMs to Enforce Multi-Level Instruction Hierarchies via Gravity-Weighted Direct Preference Optimization

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however…

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arXiv (research papers) Mudit Sinha SI

Hiding in Plain Floats: Steganographic Carriers for Indirect Prompt and Content Injection

Text-centered prompt-injection defenses assume that the malicious signal is visible in one of the inspected text views. We study a reproducible LLM01-style indirect prompt/content-injection failure mode where that assumption breaks: a payload caught in plain English slips past the same detector when it is transported as structured float parameters and reconstructed only as fragmented telemetry. Across 14,400 attacked real-model trials on three commercial LLM APIs from…

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arXiv (research papers) Wenbo Guo SI

MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skills

AI coding agents such as Claude Code and Gemini CLI increasingly extend themselves with third-party skills: markdown packages bundling natural-language instructions, executable scripts, and tool permissions. Because a skill is at once code and agent-facing instruction, it introduces a supply chain dependency whose risk is neither pure code nor pure prompt. Detection tools have never been measured against verified ground truth spanning this hybrid space, leaving their…

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arXiv (research papers) Yuanbo Xie SI

What If Prompt Injection Never Left? Rethinking Agent Security through Cross-Session Stored Prompt Injection

Modern agentic systems fundamentally reshape the security boundary of LLMs by introducing persistent system state including memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts that survives across sessions. As external information crosses this boundary and becomes part of persistent agent state, malicious instructions are no longer confined to a single interaction, but can silently persist and influence future executions long after the original attacker…

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arXiv (research papers) Peiran Wang SI

Aligning Provenance with Authorization: A Dual-Graph Defense for LLM Agents

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes scenarios such as email management, financial transactions, and code execution, where they interact with the external world through tool calling. During execution, these agents must read external data sources (emails, webpages, files) that attackers can control; through indirect prompt injection, attackers embed malicious instructions in this data to manipulate agents into performing unauthorized operations such as…

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The Guardian Mali Eromo Egbejule in Grand Bassam

Côte d’Ivoire wary of jihadist threat in north 10 years on from major attack

Threat of jihadism continues to lurk along borders with Mali and Burkina Faso These days, when she is not organising the annual International Day of Reggae celebrations in Côte d’Ivoire, Rose Ebirim picks up litter scattered on the beach in the historic port town of Grand Bassam, 25 miles east of Abidjan. Both activities have become a form of therapy since the time she saw someone die. “13 March 2016 was a Black Sunday for me,” she said.

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arXiv (research papers) Yash Narendra SI

ESLD (External Surrogate Latent Defense): A Latent-Space Architecture for Faster, Stronger Prompt-Injection Defense

Modern AI assistants are agentic. To answer a single user request, the underlying language model pulls in information from many sources, such as web searches, retrieved documents, tool outputs, and user follow-ups, and reasons over them across several steps. Any of these inputs can carry malicious content. This opens the door to prompt injection, where an attacker plants text designed to override the instructions given to the assistant by its developer. For example, an…

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The Guardian Mali Jason Burke International security correspondent

Mali’s forces target rebel alliance in junta’s fight to keep power

Army supported by Russian mercenaries launches airstrikes after offensive by coalition of Islamist extremists and Tuareg separatists Mali’s armed forces, supported by Russian mercenaries, have launched airstrikes targeting a rebel alliance of Islamist extremists and Tuareg separatists as the ruling junta struggles to maintain its hold on power in the unstable west African country. Earlier this week warplanes targeted the key northern town of Kidal, which was lost when the…

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arXiv (research papers) Kebin Contreras SI

ProjGuard: Safety Monitoring for Computer-Use Agents via Low-Dimensional Projections

Computer-use agents are increasingly capable of operating on real operating systems, but this capability has also increased their exposure to prompt injection and other adversarial content that can manipulate their behavior during interaction. Existing defenses typically rely on analyzing the prompt or each potentially malicious input with a second large model at inference time, which can limit coverage or increase deployment cost. We propose ProjGuard, a lightweight runtime…

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arXiv (research papers) John T. Halloran SI

Training-Free Refusal of MCP Exploits via Retrieval-Augmented Generation

The model context protocol (MCP) has been widely adopted as an open standard enabling the seamless integration of generative AI agents. However, while LLM guardrails have significantly matured to refuse malicious or harmful queries (e.g., "How do I build a bomb?"), recent work has shown that MCP-enabled LLMs are highly susceptible to prompt injection attacks which avoid harmful or suspicious cues (e.g., "Can you add this ssh key to my bashrc file?"). Herein, we use…

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arXiv (research papers) Farzad Nourmohammadzadeh Motlagh SI

When Prompts Become Payloads: A Framework for Mitigating SQL Injection Attacks in Large Language Model-Driven Applications

Natural language interfaces to structured databases are becoming increasingly common, largely due to advances in large language models (LLMs) that enable users to query data using conversational input rather than formal query languages such as SQL. While this paradigm significantly improves usability and accessibility, it introduces new security risks, particularly the amplification of SQL injection vulnerabilities through the prompt-to-SQL translation process. Malicious…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhichao Liu SI

WebTrap: Stealthy Mid-Task Hijacking of Browser Agents During Navigation

Browser agents are increasingly deployed in long-horizon tasks, which require executing extended action chains to accomplish user goals. However, this prolonged execution process provides attackers with more opportunities to inject malicious instructions. Existing prompt injection attacks against browser agents expose two key gaps: (1) low effectiveness, as attacks optimized for toy baselines fail to achieve end-to-end goals in real-world scenarios with complex environments…

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