Results for “Anthropic”

Simon Willison SI

Quoting Boris Cherny

More than any of these eval scores, what is most exciting to me is something else: Opus 5 is our least prompt injectable model yet. It is a bit buried in the system card, but across PI evals and red teaming, Opus 5 is very hard to prompt inject successfully. — Boris Cherny, here's that System Card section, page 73 Tags: ai, prompt-injection, generative-ai, llms, anthropic, claude, boris-cherny

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arXiv (research papers) David Huang SI

Rapid Poison: Practical Poisoning Attacks Against the Rapid Response Framework

The Rapid Response (RR) framework, deployed in production systems, including Anthropic's ASL-3 safeguards, continuously improves jailbreak-detection classifiers. When new jailbreaks emerge that bypass these classifiers, Rapid Response generates synthetic variants for training, helping the model generalize from the new attacks and quickly adapt. We reveal that prompt injection can infiltrate this pipeline to deliver poisoned samples into the classifier's training set…

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Simon Willison SI

Clinejection — Compromising Cline's Production Releases just by Prompting an Issue Triager

Clinejection — Compromising Cline's Production Releases just by Prompting an Issue Triager Adnan Khan describes a devious attack chain against the Cline GitHub repository, which started with a prompt injection attack in the title of an issue opened against the repo. Cline were running AI-powered issue triage using the anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 action, configured to run Claude Code with --allowedTools "Bash,Read,Write,..." any time any user opened an issue in their…

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Simon Willison SI

Claude Cowork Exfiltrates Files

Claude Cowork Exfiltrates Files Claude Cowork defaults to allowing outbound HTTP traffic to only a specific list of domains, to help protect the user against prompt injection attacks that exfiltrate their data. Prompt Armor found a creative workaround: Anthropic's API domain is on that list, so they constructed an attack that includes an attacker's own Anthropic API key and has the agent upload any files it can see to the https://api.anthropic.com/v1/files endpoint, allowing…

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Simon Willison SI

First impressions of Claude Cowork, Anthropic's general agent

New from Anthropic today is Claude Cowork, a "research preview" that they describe as "Claude Code for the rest of your work". It's currently available only to Max subscribers ($100 or $200 per month plans) as part of the updated Claude Desktop macOS application. Update 16th January 2026: it's now also available to $20/month Claude Pro subscribers. I've been saying for a while now that Claude Code is a "general agent" disguised as a developer tool. It can help you with any…

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Simon Willison SI

Claude Opus 4.5, and why evaluating new LLMs is increasingly difficult

Anthropic released Claude Opus 4.5 this morning, which they call "best model in the world for coding, agents, and computer use". This is their attempt to retake the crown for best coding model after significant challenges from OpenAI's GPT-5.1-Codex-Max and Google's Gemini 3, both released within the past week! The core characteristics of Opus 4.5 are a 200,000 token context (same as Sonnet), 64,000 token output limit (also the same as Sonnet), and a March 2025 "reliable…

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