Results for “Prompt”

arXiv (research papers) Zonghao Ying SI

Security Assessment of DeepSeek Harness with A.I.G: Evaluating Resistance to Indirect Prompt Injection

We assess indirect prompt injection in DeepSeek Harness (DSH), using AI-Infra-Guard (A.I.G) to construct tests, deliver controlled taint, execute DSH, collect traces, and judge outcomes. The study covers 14,560 controlled executions over 16 indirect-content channels, text and file carrier modes, 35 payload objectives, one unmodified baseline, and 12 attack methods. The experiment preserves DSH's agent loop, tool registry, model adapter, and session-event path; source tools…

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arXiv (research papers) Xabier Muruaga SI

Bounded Agents: Delegation Security for Multi-Agent AI Systems

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk…

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arXiv (research papers) Madhusudhanan G SI

Visible Reasoning and Indirect Prompt-Injection Monitorability Across English, Tamil, and Tanglish

Chain-of-thought monitoring is a potentially useful safety signal, but its reliability across languages and behavioral settings remains uncertain. In a small case study of eight manually verified synthetic scenarios, one model, one annotator, and one deterministic generation seed, I study API-visible reasoning during indirect prompt injection in Sarvam-105B across English, Tamil, and Tanglish. A four scenario pilot found 5/12 injected attack successes without reasoning and…

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arXiv (research papers) Yutao Mou SI

ToolHazard: Scaling Adversarial Environments for Security Evaluation and Alignment of LLM-based Agents

Large language model (LLM) agents integrated with external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injections embedded in environmental states. However, existing studies largely rely on manually implemented or reused environments, stochastic LLM-based tool simulation, and predefined injection locations, limiting scalable security research across broader domains. To bridge this gap, we propose **ToolHazard**, a scalable adversarial environment synthesis framework that reduces…

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arXiv (research papers) Spiros Tsigkopoulos SI

From Prompt Injection to Web Exploitation: Revisiting Classic Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Applications

Large Language Models are increasingly integrated into web applications through chatbots, tool-calling pipelines, and agentic workflows. In these systems, user input may influence not only generated text, but also backend actions such as database queries, HTTP requests, file operations, template rendering, or API calls. This paper introduces LLM-mediated web attacks, a class of attacks in which attacker-controlled input is transformed by an LLM-integrated application and…

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arXiv (research papers) Sam Siavoshian SI

ChronoState: Hidden Elapsed-Time Conditioning for Temporal-State Action Selection in Frozen-Backbone Language Models

Temporal decisions in language-model systems often depend on both symbolic task state and elapsed wall-clock time, such as cache expiration, job completion, quota resets, deadlines, or stale sessions. We study whether elapsed time can be supplied as a non-token, system-side scalar and composed with visible symbolic state by a frozen-backbone language model. We introduce ChronoState, a compositional temporal-state benchmark in which symbolic state appears in the prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) Lier Jin SI

Same Question, Different Answer? Measuring and Mitigating Prompt Privilege for Equitable AI Access

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into healthcare, education, public services, and everyday decision making. They should provide comparable assistance regardless of a user's literacy, communication style, or prompt-engineering expertise. However, existing research on prompt robustness primarily focuses on adversarial attacks, prompt injection, and prompt optimization, while overlooking whether semantically equivalent requests receive different…

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arXiv (research papers) Rahul Deivasigamani SI

Not an A11y: How Android Accessibility Exposes Mobile AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injection

The rise of autonomous AI agents represents a major paradigm shift in how users interact with mobile devices. Frameworks such as MobileRun and Mobile-Use can autonomously navigate Android applications and execute complex multi-step tasks. To interpret user interfaces, these frameworks rely primarily on Android accessibility (A11y) trees and secondarily on visual screenshots. In this paper, we demonstrate that this architectural dependence on unsanitized accessibility…

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arXiv (research papers) Sihan Hou SI

Toward Metacognitive One-Shot Indirect Prompt Injection: Strategy Abstraction Via Outcome-Conditioned Reflection

Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which malicious instructions embedded in external observations manipulate subsequent agent decisions and actions. Most existing adaptive attacks rely on repeatedly querying and refining against the target agent, whereas realistic attackers may have only a single opportunity to interact with an unknown target agent. We propose SAVOR (Strategy Abstraction Via Outcome-Conditioned…

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arXiv (research papers) Kaysarul Anas Apurba SI

Defending Retrieval-Augmented Intrusion Detection Against Knowledge Poisoning and Prompt Injection

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables large language models to classify network flows and generate human-readable incident reports by retrieving semantically similar historical traffic from a vector knowledge base. However, the retrieval layer introduces vulnerabilities to knowledge poisoning and prompt-injection attacks. We present RAG-IDS, a three-tier multi-agent intrusion detection framework with a retrieval-boundary defense combining soft trust scoring…

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arXiv (research papers) Laiqiao Qin SI

BASIS: Breach-Aware Selective Prompt Injection Shielding with Prefill Attention Probes

Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data. Existing detection methods only detect the presence of injection and refuse to respond upon detection, overlooking the fact that for many modern aligned models, well-crafted instructions can resist most injection attacks. This means that the injection robustness varies significantly…

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arXiv (research papers) Jeremy McHugh SI

The Anatomy of a Prompt Injection: A Component Model for Structured Analysis

Four years after prompt injection was first identified in 2022, attacks are still predominantly documented as verbatim strings rather than structured exploits, despite advancing agent capabilities and threat actors embedding injections to subvert AI-assisted security analysis. This paper formalizes the structure of prompt-injection artifacts, enabling defenders, red teamers, and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) teams to label, compare, and mutate attacks without relying on…

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arXiv (research papers) Aditya Katkar SI

NiyamAI - An Intent-Bound AI Agent with Cryptographically Verifiable Guardrails using Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Autonomous LLM agents with tool execution capabilities introduce severe security risks through prompt injection, goal hijacking, and unauthorized action invocation. Existing guardrails rely on unverified, host local software filters system prompts, semantic classifiers, policy engines that share the execution environment of the untrusted agent, offering no guarantee to an external observer that a safety policy was correctly evaluated. A compromised host produces no evidence…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhuoxin Zhan SI

StepJack: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agent Safety Against Multi-Step Indirect Prompt Injection

Computer-use agents (CUAs) face a growing threat from indirect prompt injection, where adversarial instructions are planted in the environment such as web pages. In this paper, we introduce multi-step indirect prompt injection, a new attack class against CUAs in which the adversarial goal is decomposed into multiple innocuous-looking sub-steps and distributed across a chain of pages referenced along the agent's navigation path. We develop a pipeline to automatically…

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arXiv (research papers) S. M . Bhagya P. Samarakoon SI

Hijacking Robots with a Piece of Paper: A Systematic Study of Physical Prompt Injection in VLM-Controlled Robots

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as planners in robotic systems, where they translate natural-language commands into executable actions grounded in visual scene understanding. This tight coupling between perception and instruction-following introduces a new attack surface: adversarial text placed within the robot's visual field can act as an indirect prompt injection into the VLM's reasoning stack. We present a systematic study of physical prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) He Zhang SI

PromptShield Home: Ambient Multimodal Prompt Injection Defense for Smart-Home Agents

Smart-home assistants increasingly use multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that perceive video and audio directly. This raises a safety question specific to the home: can the agent tell a genuine user command from ambient or externally-sourced content, television speech, on-screen text, or an overheard conversation, that merely looks like a command? We introduce PromptShield-Home, a pilot benchmark of realistic smart-home scenarios spanning addressee ambiguity…

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arXiv (research papers) Buzhao Liu SI

Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Text

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use in orchestrating workflows of tool-using agents. This, however, also exposes such agents to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, such as indirect prompt injection (IPI). One class of approaches to defend against such attacks aims to detect malicious sentences within otherwise benign text. While a number of approaches for this have been proposed, all tend to be brittle…

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arXiv (research papers) Yanting Wang SI

Agent Against Agent: An Agentic System for Automatic Prompt Injection Red Teaming

Prompt injection poses significant security risks to LLM agents. Efficient and effective red-teaming is therefore critical, both for evaluating these risks and for collecting training data to improve defenses. Existing state-of-the-art prompt injection red-teaming methods primarily rely on reinforcement learning (RL), producing attacker models that often generalize poorly to new target LLMs. In this work, we develop PIMiner, an agentic system for prompt injection…

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arXiv (research papers) Longtao Guo SI

LoginTrap: Uncovering Task-Agnostic Phishing-Style Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks against LLM-based Web Agents

LLM-based web agents automate user tasks by observing webpages and executing browser actions on behalf of users. As these agents operate on real web services, login becomes a sensitive authentication boundary because it involves credentials and sensitive information. Existing work shows that malicious webpage content can manipulate web agent actions, but it has not fully examined whether such content can induce login and cause end-to-end private data leakage. We study this…

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arXiv (research papers) Xuebin Li SI

Breadcrumbing Search Agents: Per-Turn Scheming Over Long-Horizon Trajectories

LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking. Prior work on search-agent safety primarily focuses on static web-content injection, but modern agents issue follow-up queries and cross-check competing sources, so a single injected page is often diluted or rejected…

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arXiv (research papers) Peichun Hua SI

Behavioral Skill Reconstruction: Reconstructing Hidden Functionality from LLM Agent Skills

Closed source agent skills may encode proprietary instructions, scripts, constants, and data. Providers may offer their capabilities as services while keeping the underlying packages hidden. Prior work focuses on prompt injection attacks that directly disclose these artifacts, and existing defenses accordingly aim to prevent such leakage. However, preventing file disclosure does not prevent users from recovering the functionality those files implement. This raises a…

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arXiv (research papers) Shihao Weng SI

AgentAntibody: An Adaptive Immune System for Defending LLM Agents against Prompt Injection

Prompt injection remains a critical threat to LLM agents, yet existing defenses treat each task as a self-contained problem, independent of previous encounters. In practice, user requests are often underspecified: they describe the desired outcome without fully specifying acceptable behavior. An injection can exploit this ambiguity, causing the agent to complete the task in a way the user would reject. As the user's expectations become clearer through concrete cases, a…

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arXiv (research papers) Jia-Chen Zhang SI

Invisible Ink Threats: Adversarial Goals Behind Legitimate Tasks in Computer-Use Agents

Computer-use agents (CUAs), which empower large language models to autonomously operate operating systems and the web, are increasingly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks. A widely adopted defense is the human-in-the-loop paradigm, in which the agent pauses for explicit user confirmation before executing sensitive operations. While effective against conspicuously high-harm attacks, this defense offers little protection against what we term Invisible Ink Threats…

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arXiv (research papers) Neha Nagaraja SI

When Prompts Control Robots: Prompt Injection Attacks in Multi-Agent Robotic Systems

Large language models are increasingly integrated into autonomous robotic systems for task planning and control, but this integration exposes them to prompt injection attacks that can lead to unsafe decisions and physical harm. Multi-agent settings increase the risks through cross-agent contamination and broader attack surfaces. In this paper, we evaluate prompt injection attacks against an LLM-based multi-agent robotic system, considering both direct injections into task…

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arXiv (research papers) Jianshuo Dong SI

Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States

Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.g., malicious side-tasks hidden in external tool results. While many efforts have sought to address this threat, little is known about the internals of agentic LLMs when they are exposed to IPI attacks. For simplicity, we refer to this condition as IPI exposure. In this paper, we study IPI exposure from three perspectives. (1) Probing: Across eight models, including the 753B-parameter GLM-5.2 and the…

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arXiv (research papers) Fazhong Liu SI

Security of World-Model-Based Embodied AI: A Lifecycle of Threats, Defenses, and Evaluation

World models give embodied AI a predictive core: they compress observations into states, simulate action-conditioned futures, and enable planning beyond reactive control. This predictive layer, however, opens a new security boundary-compromise can propagate from data, sensors, prompts, or feedback into physical action. Rather than treating world models as an isolated component, this survey traces threats across their entire lifecycle-from data construction and representation…

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arXiv (research papers) Mingxiao Liu Hangzhou Dianzi University SI

Piggybacking on Perception: Stealthy Concurrent Audio Prompt Injections against Multimodal LLM Agents

Large Language Model (LLM)-driven multimodal agents are increasingly deployed to execute autonomous tasks via continuous audio interaction. While this paradigm enhances interaction naturalness, it introduces a critical yet under-explored attack surface, as audio inputs inevitably contain environmental noise beyond user control. In this paper, we investigate concurrent audio prompt injection attacks targeting multimodal agents. Distinct from traditional acoustic attacks on…

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Simon Willison SI

AI Worming through Word

AI Worming through Word Neat new prompt injection variant by Håkon Måløy, who found a way to upgrade prompt injection attacks against Microsoft Word to full self-replicating worms: An attacker places hidden instructions in a document that is later used as source material in Copilot for Word. Copilot may interpret those instructions as part of the user’s request, causing it to manipulate the document being drafted or edited. Copilot may then also copy the hidden instructions…

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arXiv (research papers) Eric Wallace SI

GPT-Red: Automated Red Teaming via Self-Play at Scale

We introduce \textbf{GPT-Red}, an automated red-teaming agent that is trained to discover novel prompt injection attacks against frontier LLMs. The goal of this model is to evaluate and improve the robustness of our production systems. To this end, we use it to adversarially train GPT-5.6, our most robust model to prompt injections to date. To create GPT-Red, we design a scalable self-play algorithm where the model is tasked with attacking a diverse population of…

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arXiv (research papers) Arseny Kravchenko SI

APPA: Recoverable Information-Flow Control for Real-World LLM Agents

LLM agents deployed in practical workflows routinely mix private context, untrusted tool and web outputs, and external side effects. While information-flow control (IFC) provides structural defenses against prompt injection, data exfiltration, and confused-deputy attacks, conventional IFC relies on monotone taint tracking that either over-blocks benign operations or permanently strands downstream execution once an agent ingests unvetted data. We present APPA (Agentic…

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