Results for “Injection”

arXiv (research papers) Minjae Seo SI

MEMORY Wins All: Indirect Bias Injection Attacks via Social Media Content

Personal AI agents consume external content such as web pages and SNS feeds, and retain selected information in persistent memory. As a result, external content has become a new attack vector for memory poisoning, which steers an agent's later actions toward an adversary's bias. However, most existing attacks embed a malicious instruction in external content to make the agent retain the poisoned information, and prompt-injection filters can detect such content. We observe…

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arXiv (research papers) Ziliang Zhang SI

Mitigating Database Leakage in RAG Systems with Keyword-Grounded Fact Substitution

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for combining large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge sources. However, RAG systems remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which may mislead the retriever or generator to expose sensitive database contents. To address this issue, we propose KFS-RAG, a defense that mitigates information leakage by reformulating the retrieved context. Specifically, our method first identifies a small…

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arXiv (research papers) Yibo Peng SI

SecOPD: Mitigating Adaptive Prompt Injections by On-Policy Distillation

Prompt injection is listed as the \#1 threat to AI agents. When an agent accesses external data from websites, files, or emails, an attacker may inject a prompt into the data, saying, "Ignore all prior instructions and perform ." To prevent arbitrary manipulation of agents, defenders try to train secure LLMs, which, however, still suffer from near 100% attack success rates (ASRs) against adaptive prompt injections. We note that this is because existing defensive finetuning…

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arXiv (research papers) Arulnidhi Karunanidhi SI

Utility Under Attack: Agent Memory Poisoning and the Limits of Content Screening and Provenance Ranking

Persistent memory makes false information durable: once a false statement is stored, it can be retrieved into future sessions that match it. We measure the cost of this failure mode using plainly worded false assertions generated in a single pass, with no instruction, trigger, or retriever optimization. Poisoning 1.2% of a LongMemEval corpus reduces accuracy from 0.850 to 0.300. A four-stage write-time screening pipeline that reaches 0.832 recall on indirect prompt injection…

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arXiv (research papers) Bohao Liao SI

TraceGrant: A Contract-Governed Security Framework for the Task-Effect Lifecycle of Networked LLM Agents

Networked large language model (LLM) agents retrieve information from email, cloud storage, calendars, transaction platforms, and Web services to complete multistep tasks that produce persistent external effects. The same content needed for legitimate execution may also contain indirect prompt injections that redirect tool use, alter sensitive arguments, or disrupt task completion. Existing defenses mainly constrain untrusted content or individual tool calls, leaving user…

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arXiv (research papers) Roshan Sood SI

COPA: Continual Preference Optimization for Adaptive Prompt Injection Defense

LLMs remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in user inputs or external content manipulate model behavior and bypass safeguards. Existing defenses are predominantly static, relying on fixed alignment objectives or attack-specific filtering mechanisms that require redesign as new attack strategies emerge. While recent lifelong alignment methods address shifting user preferences, they do not account for adaptive adversaries that…

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arXiv (research papers) Sujin Chen SI

MobileWorldSafety: Benchmarking GUI Agent Safety Against Environmental Injection Attacks in Android Apps

LLM-powered GUI agents that autonomously operate smartphones are rapidly transitioning from research prototypes to early real-world deployment. However, because these agents routinely process untrusted environmental content, they are highly vulnerable to environmental injection attacks, which include indirect prompt injections and adversarial instructions. Such attacks can manipulate the behavior of agents without user awareness through diverse channels encountered in…

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arXiv (research papers) Rabimba Karanjai Larry SI

PACE: Policy-Attested Contract Execution for Safe AI Agents in Decentralized Finance

Autonomous AI agents are emerging as interfaces for decentralized finance (DeFi) actions such as swaps, lending operations, and yield management. Because these agents rely on large language models (LLMs) to plan transactions, they inherit the LLM's susceptibility to prompt injection and lack of mechanisms to bind a verifier's approval to the exact transaction ultimately submitted on-chain. We present PACE (Policy-Attested Contract Execution), a transaction-level…

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arXiv (research papers) Jiawei Liu SI

Security of Foundation-Model-Powered Embodied Agents: Attack Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation

Foundation models are increasingly used for perception, reasoning, planning, and action generation in embodied agents, creating security risks that can propagate from digital inputs to physical behavior. Existing surveys often organize threats by mechanisms such as jailbreaks, prompt injection, backdoors, poisoning, or adversarial examples, but these categories do not consistently identify where an adversary first enters the embodied control loop. We present a…

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arXiv (research papers) Zonghao Ying SI

Security Assessment of DeepSeek Harness with A.I.G: Evaluating Resistance to Indirect Prompt Injection

We assess indirect prompt injection in DeepSeek Harness (DSH), using AI-Infra-Guard (A.I.G) to construct tests, deliver controlled taint, execute DSH, collect traces, and judge outcomes. The study covers 14,560 controlled executions over 16 indirect-content channels, text and file carrier modes, 35 payload objectives, one unmodified baseline, and 12 attack methods. The experiment preserves DSH's agent loop, tool registry, model adapter, and session-event path; source tools…

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arXiv (research papers) Xabier Muruaga SI

Bounded Agents: Delegation Security for Multi-Agent AI Systems

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk…

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arXiv (research papers) Madhusudhanan G SI

Visible Reasoning and Indirect Prompt-Injection Monitorability Across English, Tamil, and Tanglish

Chain-of-thought monitoring is a potentially useful safety signal, but its reliability across languages and behavioral settings remains uncertain. In a small case study of eight manually verified synthetic scenarios, one model, one annotator, and one deterministic generation seed, I study API-visible reasoning during indirect prompt injection in Sarvam-105B across English, Tamil, and Tanglish. A four scenario pilot found 5/12 injected attack successes without reasoning and…

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arXiv (research papers) Yutao Mou SI

ToolHazard: Scaling Adversarial Environments for Security Evaluation and Alignment of LLM-based Agents

Large language model (LLM) agents integrated with external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injections embedded in environmental states. However, existing studies largely rely on manually implemented or reused environments, stochastic LLM-based tool simulation, and predefined injection locations, limiting scalable security research across broader domains. To bridge this gap, we propose **ToolHazard**, a scalable adversarial environment synthesis framework that reduces…

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arXiv (research papers) Spiros Tsigkopoulos SI

From Prompt Injection to Web Exploitation: Revisiting Classic Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Applications

Large Language Models are increasingly integrated into web applications through chatbots, tool-calling pipelines, and agentic workflows. In these systems, user input may influence not only generated text, but also backend actions such as database queries, HTTP requests, file operations, template rendering, or API calls. This paper introduces LLM-mediated web attacks, a class of attacks in which attacker-controlled input is transformed by an LLM-integrated application and…

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arXiv (research papers) Lier Jin SI

Same Question, Different Answer? Measuring and Mitigating Prompt Privilege for Equitable AI Access

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into healthcare, education, public services, and everyday decision making. They should provide comparable assistance regardless of a user's literacy, communication style, or prompt-engineering expertise. However, existing research on prompt robustness primarily focuses on adversarial attacks, prompt injection, and prompt optimization, while overlooking whether semantically equivalent requests receive different…

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arXiv (research papers) Rahul Deivasigamani SI

Not an A11y: How Android Accessibility Exposes Mobile AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injection

The rise of autonomous AI agents represents a major paradigm shift in how users interact with mobile devices. Frameworks such as MobileRun and Mobile-Use can autonomously navigate Android applications and execute complex multi-step tasks. To interpret user interfaces, these frameworks rely primarily on Android accessibility (A11y) trees and secondarily on visual screenshots. In this paper, we demonstrate that this architectural dependence on unsanitized accessibility…

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arXiv (research papers) Sihan Hou SI

Toward Metacognitive One-Shot Indirect Prompt Injection: Strategy Abstraction Via Outcome-Conditioned Reflection

Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which malicious instructions embedded in external observations manipulate subsequent agent decisions and actions. Most existing adaptive attacks rely on repeatedly querying and refining against the target agent, whereas realistic attackers may have only a single opportunity to interact with an unknown target agent. We propose SAVOR (Strategy Abstraction Via Outcome-Conditioned…

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arXiv (research papers) Kaysarul Anas Apurba SI

Defending Retrieval-Augmented Intrusion Detection Against Knowledge Poisoning and Prompt Injection

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables large language models to classify network flows and generate human-readable incident reports by retrieving semantically similar historical traffic from a vector knowledge base. However, the retrieval layer introduces vulnerabilities to knowledge poisoning and prompt-injection attacks. We present RAG-IDS, a three-tier multi-agent intrusion detection framework with a retrieval-boundary defense combining soft trust scoring…

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arXiv (research papers) Laiqiao Qin SI

BASIS: Breach-Aware Selective Prompt Injection Shielding with Prefill Attention Probes

Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data. Existing detection methods only detect the presence of injection and refuse to respond upon detection, overlooking the fact that for many modern aligned models, well-crafted instructions can resist most injection attacks. This means that the injection robustness varies significantly…

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Journal articles (OpenAlex) Abhay Kumar Ray, Rupak Sharma, Sunil Kr Pandey · International Journal of Wireless and Microwave Technologies Gadgets

Multiclass Cyber Attack Classification in Smart Home IoT Networks Using Ensemble Machine Learning with the ML-EdgeIIoT Dataset

With the rapid adoption of smart home solutions and related technologies, edge computing has emerged as a key enabler by offering low-latency data processing, increased efficiency and improved scalability. However, this integration in IoT systems introduces complex security challenges in smart home edge environments, increasingly susceptible to cyber threats such as denial-of-service (DoS), malware injection, passive surveillance, and unauthorized access. This paper…

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arXiv (research papers) Jeremy McHugh SI

The Anatomy of a Prompt Injection: A Component Model for Structured Analysis

Four years after prompt injection was first identified in 2022, attacks are still predominantly documented as verbatim strings rather than structured exploits, despite advancing agent capabilities and threat actors embedding injections to subvert AI-assisted security analysis. This paper formalizes the structure of prompt-injection artifacts, enabling defenders, red teamers, and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) teams to label, compare, and mutate attacks without relying on…

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arXiv (research papers) Aditya Katkar SI

NiyamAI - An Intent-Bound AI Agent with Cryptographically Verifiable Guardrails using Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Autonomous LLM agents with tool execution capabilities introduce severe security risks through prompt injection, goal hijacking, and unauthorized action invocation. Existing guardrails rely on unverified, host local software filters system prompts, semantic classifiers, policy engines that share the execution environment of the untrusted agent, offering no guarantee to an external observer that a safety policy was correctly evaluated. A compromised host produces no evidence…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhuoxin Zhan SI

StepJack: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agent Safety Against Multi-Step Indirect Prompt Injection

Computer-use agents (CUAs) face a growing threat from indirect prompt injection, where adversarial instructions are planted in the environment such as web pages. In this paper, we introduce multi-step indirect prompt injection, a new attack class against CUAs in which the adversarial goal is decomposed into multiple innocuous-looking sub-steps and distributed across a chain of pages referenced along the agent's navigation path. We develop a pipeline to automatically…

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arXiv (research papers) Leo Sambrook SI

Hardware Keystores for AI Agent Signing Workflows: A Zero-Trust MCP Enforcement Architecture

AI agents increasingly sign Git commits, certify documents, and attest release artifacts on behalf of their operators, using private keys that live in software-accessible locations (plaintext files, environment variables, container memory) readable by any process the agent can reach. A widely deployed agent framework recently leaked its keys this way to a single email injection. Hardware keystores (HSM, TPM, smart card) keep the key on-device, but exposing the keystore as a…

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arXiv (research papers) S. M . Bhagya P. Samarakoon SI

Hijacking Robots with a Piece of Paper: A Systematic Study of Physical Prompt Injection in VLM-Controlled Robots

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as planners in robotic systems, where they translate natural-language commands into executable actions grounded in visual scene understanding. This tight coupling between perception and instruction-following introduces a new attack surface: adversarial text placed within the robot's visual field can act as an indirect prompt injection into the VLM's reasoning stack. We present a systematic study of physical prompt…

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arXiv (research papers) He Zhang SI

PromptShield Home: Ambient Multimodal Prompt Injection Defense for Smart-Home Agents

Smart-home assistants increasingly use multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that perceive video and audio directly. This raises a safety question specific to the home: can the agent tell a genuine user command from ambient or externally-sourced content, television speech, on-screen text, or an overheard conversation, that merely looks like a command? We introduce PromptShield-Home, a pilot benchmark of realistic smart-home scenarios spanning addressee ambiguity…

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arXiv (research papers) Buzhao Liu SI

Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Text

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use in orchestrating workflows of tool-using agents. This, however, also exposes such agents to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, such as indirect prompt injection (IPI). One class of approaches to defend against such attacks aims to detect malicious sentences within otherwise benign text. While a number of approaches for this have been proposed, all tend to be brittle…

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arXiv (research papers) Yanting Wang SI

Agent Against Agent: An Agentic System for Automatic Prompt Injection Red Teaming

Prompt injection poses significant security risks to LLM agents. Efficient and effective red-teaming is therefore critical, both for evaluating these risks and for collecting training data to improve defenses. Existing state-of-the-art prompt injection red-teaming methods primarily rely on reinforcement learning (RL), producing attacker models that often generalize poorly to new target LLMs. In this work, we develop PIMiner, an agentic system for prompt injection…

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arXiv (research papers) Longtao Guo SI

LoginTrap: Uncovering Task-Agnostic Phishing-Style Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks against LLM-based Web Agents

LLM-based web agents automate user tasks by observing webpages and executing browser actions on behalf of users. As these agents operate on real web services, login becomes a sensitive authentication boundary because it involves credentials and sensitive information. Existing work shows that malicious webpage content can manipulate web agent actions, but it has not fully examined whether such content can induce login and cause end-to-end private data leakage. We study this…

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arXiv (research papers) Xuebin Li SI

Breadcrumbing Search Agents: Per-Turn Scheming Over Long-Horizon Trajectories

LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking. Prior work on search-agent safety primarily focuses on static web-content injection, but modern agents issue follow-up queries and cross-check competing sources, so a single injected page is often diluted or rejected…

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