Results for “Injection”

arXiv (research papers) Yupu Wang SI

Package Hallucination Attacks on Coding Agents through Prompt Injection in Rule Files

Modern agentic coding frameworks increasingly rely on community-shared rule files (e.g., AGENTS.md or .cursorrules) to guide autonomous code generation, yet the security risks of this pipeline remain underexplored. To bridge this gap, we introduce the package hallucination attack, where an attacker injects malicious prompts into benign rule files to induce coding agents to replace legitimate dependencies with attacker-controlled packages. To obtain effective malicious…

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arXiv (research papers) Pengfei He SI

ASPIRE: Agentic Safety & Prompt Injection Red-teaming Engine

LLM agents retrieve untrusted content and act through tools, creating indirect prompt-injection risks that can cause unauthorized actions or persistent state changes. Existing automated red-teaming largely optimizes payloads for pre-specified scenarios, leaving latent vulnerabilities across the agent's behavior space unexplored. We present ASPIRE, an Agentic Safety & Prompt Injection Red-teaming Engine for open-ended, behavior-level vulnerability discovery. ASPIRE maintains…

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arXiv (research papers) Sarim Hashmi SI

AdvSim2Real : Training Web Agents Against Adaptive Prompt Injection in a Web World Model

Web agents complete user requests by reading and acting on pages that third parties write, so an instruction planted on a page can redirect the agent away from the user's goal. The agent cannot simply ignore the page, because the page also holds the values and controls the task requires. Current defenses fine-tune the agent on injections fixed before training, and attackers that adapt to the trained model bypass them. Adversarial training lets the attacker adapt but keeps…

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arXiv (research papers) Niveen O. Jaffal SI

RAG-PIBench: A Leakage-Aware Benchmark for Prompt-Injection Detection in Trustworthy RAG Systems

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks embedded in retrieved content. We introduce RAG-PIBench, a benchmark for RAG-style prompt-injection detection containing 4,876 contextual examples across frozen train, validation, and protected-test splits. Using a leakage-aware construction pipeline and strict evaluation protocol, we compare keyword-based, semantic-reference, TF-IDF, and transformer-based detectors. DistilBERT achieves…

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arXiv (research papers) Haneen Najjar SI

Surviving the Router: Optimizing Skill Injections for Retrieval and Execution

AI agents increasingly rely on modular third-party "skills" that are dynamically selected by skill routers to execute complex tasks. While recent studies highlight the threat of prompt injections embedded in these skills, existing evaluations often assume settings where the malicious skill is already selected for execution. We show that this assumption can substantially overestimate attack success. In realistic multi-skill environments, injected skills must first compete for…

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Hacker News sbulaev SI

Passing the Test You Trained On: Re-Evaluating Prompt-Injection Detectors

Article URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03448 Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49974036 Points: 2 # Comments: 0

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arXiv (research papers) Mohamed Dhouib SI

RAISED: Self-Distillation for Robustness to Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

Tool-using language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because they must act on untrusted external content. Existing training-time defenses can reduce attack success rates, but often at the cost of general capabilities. We show that training-based defenses induce substantial drift in the model's output distribution, altering its behavior even in benign settings and providing a potential mechanism for utility degradation. We further identify a failure…

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arXiv (research papers) Aniruddh Pramod SI

Towards a Unified Misuse Monitoring Benchmark

LLM agents increasingly act in multi-actor environments, exposing them to misuse from multiple sources: decomposition attacks, where a harmful request is split into innocuous sub-requests, and prompt injection attacks, where a compromised tool delivers a malicious instruction. Existing evaluations treat these threats separately and ask whether a trajectory is harmful, rather than when it becomes harmful. We propose monitoring the agent's responses, where its actions are…

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Hacker News pykello SI

CounterSteer: Suppressing Indirect Prompt Injection with Activation Steering

Article URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36570 Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49960155 Points: 1 # Comments: 0

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arXiv (research papers) James Peters-Gill SI

Can CaMeLs Talk? Securing Multi-Agent Systems Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

Indirect prompt injection attacks - malicious instructions embedded in content processed by large language models - remain a major obstacle to safely deploying tool-using agents. CaMeL [Debenedetti et al., 2025] mitigates this threat for an individual agent by separating trusted control flow from untrusted data and enforcing capability-based security policies at runtime. In this work, we investigate whether CaMeL's security guarantees compose in hierarchical multi-agent…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhe Yu SI

Readable Before Actionable: Causal Tracing of Indirect Prompt Injection

Indirect prompt injection causes LLM agents to follow commands embedded in external data. A probe may distinguish instructions from data without identifying a state edit that changes the next action. We study this gap through counterfactual role probes, component-wise activation patching, and separate interventions on AgentDojo trajectories. Role decoding survives changes in content and format. In controlled Qwen tests, it precedes strong tool-choice effects from patches…

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arXiv (research papers) Rui Wang SI

Who Is Your Agent Serving? Provider-Side Indirect Prompt Injection in Proactive Agents

Proactive personal agents increasingly decide what to recommend, how to personalize advice, and what follow-up assistance to offer, creating a new user-decision attack surface for provider-side indirect prompt injection. We show that an external provider need not access private user context, compromise the agent, or gain additional permissions: by controlling only content associated with its own target, it can redirect an otherwise benign agent to advance that target…

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arXiv (research papers) Jingkai Liu SI

Blocking at the Boundary: Auditing Long-Horizon Agents against Staged Prompt Injection

Long-horizon agents consume external content, invoke tools, and modify persistent state. Indirect prompt injection can exploit task-specific context, propagate across causally connected stages, and alter a consequential action while the workflow continues; we term this staged prompt injection. We build an automated, feedback-guided attack generation pipeline and apply it to Claude Code and Codex in their native runtimes. The confirmed attacks span eight workflow scenarios…

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arXiv (research papers) Xinran Zheng SI

APEX: Active Protection at Execution Boundaries for LLM Agents

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) hides adversarial instructions in content that large language model (LLM) agents read at runtime. As agents compose heterogeneous capability units, including Tools, MCP servers, and Skills, the carriers of injection multiply, and defenses built to recognize attack patterns fall behind them. We instead shift defense from covering attack patterns to one stable point: whatever the carrier and however the injection propagates, harm materializes…

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arXiv (research papers) Zixuan Wang SI

Self-Reflection Fine-Tuning: Enhancing Agent Security against Prompt Injection Attacks from Failure Experience

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in tool-augmented environments, but their reliance on external inputs makes them highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can hijack task objectives. Existing safety alignment methods rely on static expert trajectories or preference optimization, limiting their ability to generalize to adaptive attack patterns. In this work, we propose Self-Reflection Fine-Tuning (SRFT), a training framework that enables…

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Hacker News lucknite SI

Shield: A 118M model for detecting prompt injections and jailbreaks

Article URL: https://huggingface.co/ZeroLeaks/shield-small Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49940088 Points: 2 # Comments: 0

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arXiv (research papers) Zhuowen Liu SI

Passing the Test You Trained On: Re-evaluating Prompt-Injection Detectors for LLM Agents

LLM agents increasingly screen tool outputs with small prompt-injection detectors, and teams choose among detectors by their scores on public benchmarks. We ask whether those scores predict how a detector behaves inside an agent. We replay the ground-truth tool calls of two agent benchmarks, AgentDojo and tau-bench, without an LLM to obtain tool outputs that are benign by construction, label injected outputs by differential replay, and evaluate fifteen detectors, including…

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arXiv (research papers) Bijeeta Pal SI

Persona Guardrail: A Production-Grade Defense Framework for Agentic Systems

Large language model-based agents are increasingly deployed to perform domain-specific tasks by interacting with enterprise knowledge, tools, and external services. Existing runtime guardrails primarily target prompt injection and other attack-specific behaviors under a black-box threat model, but provide limited guarantees that agents operate within their intended functionality. As a result, production agents remain vulnerable to malicious requests and out-of-domain queries…

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arXiv (research papers) Giulio Zingrillo SI

Securing Computer-Use Agents Against Branch Steering Attacks

Modern Computer Use Agents (CUAs) directly interact with graphical user interfaces and execute third-party web tools, exposing them to indirect prompt injection across every rendered page and tool response. While the Dual-LLM pattern is the primary system-level architecture offering formal security guarantees - using an isolated Planner LLM (P-LLM) to fix execution paths before processing untrusted inputs via a Quarantined LLM (Q-LLM) - these guarantees break down in…

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arXiv (research papers) Narek Maloyan SI

Evaluating and Improving the Robustness of Large Language Models to Input Sequence Variations

Large language models (LLMs) in production systems face prompt injections, trojans (backdoors), and manipulation of automatic quality metrics. This thesis develops models, methods, and algorithms for evaluating and improving LLM robustness to adversarial input sequence variations. We propose R_stab(f), a generative robustness metric based on the Jensen-Shannon divergence between per-step output distributions under small input perturbations. For localized attacks we prove…

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arXiv (research papers) Elad David SI

Prompted to Discriminate: Generalizing Malicious-Input Probes in the Wild

LLM agents increasingly rely on activation probes as runtime monitors for prompt injection, jailbreaks, and unsafe requests, reading the model's own hidden state to catch a harmful input before the agent acts on it. A cheap, increasingly common move, borrowed from LLM-as-judge prompting, is to append a short classification instruction after the user's turn and read the probe at that point, to sharpen it: the instruction asks the model to represent the incoming request as a…

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arXiv (research papers) Alessandro Pegoraro SI

The Innocent Courier: Covert Exfiltration Through Legitimate LLM Web Fetching

With the increasing capabilities of Large-Language-Models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents, users are increasingly using them to solve everyday problems, such as answering e-mails or providing programming support. Existing work has extensively investigated security and privacy risks, such as prompt injections and the disclosure of sensitive data to chatbot providers. While various solutions were developed to address these risks, including input structuring to prevent prompt…

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Hacker News raorajat007 SI

Prompt Injection Firewall for AI APIs and Agent Tool Calls

Article URL: https://github.com/rajatrao/jevshield Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49916630 Points: 1 # Comments: 0

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arXiv (research papers) Birk Torpmann-Hagen SI

Memetic Trojans: Social Contagions as Carriers of Adversarial Payloads in Agent Networks

Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents increasingly interact in network environments where adversarial content can propagate between agents. Known attacks include agent worms, which spread through self-replicating prompt injections or configuration compromises. We introduce \emph{memetic trojans}, a distinct class of network-mediated attack that exploits agents' tendencies to retransmit and amplify content. Unlike agent worms, whose propagation is adversarially…

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arXiv (research papers) Yuelin Han SI

Measuring LLM Agent Defenses by Layer: GDA Measurement and an Envelope-Layer Attack-Defense Model

Agent interaction protocols such as ACP and A2A let a remote peer deliver a task the receiving agent treats as legitimate, opening a channel for indirect prompt injection. Evaluating and defending such agents is difficult because the attack success rate (ASR) cannot distinguish an LLM recognition failure from an agent-layer block, and so cannot indicate which layer to strengthen. We contribute three artifacts. (1) GDA Measurement, a red-team method that captures the raw…

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arXiv (research papers) Rui Wen SI

Where Do LLMs Decide to Break the Rules? Mechanistic Localization of Prompt Injection Compliance

When a prompt injection attack succeeds, a Large Language Model (LLM) abandons its assigned system role to comply with an adversarial instruction. While prior work has extensively quantified how often this occurs, we ask a more fundamental question: where inside the network does the model actually decide to break the rules? Using layer-by-layer causal activation patching across five models (4B to 32B parameters), we find a clear dissociation: attack information is linearly…

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arXiv (research papers) Yanjie Li SI

ToolFence: Fine-Grained Authorization for Secure Tool-Using LLM Agents

Tool-using LLM agents remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because trusted instructions and untrusted observations share one context, allowing malicious content to steer consequential input-filtering defenses. Multi-path consensus defenses still leave a high attack success rate because they examine content or aggregated outputs rather than authorizing effects, especially for the within-tool attack, which preserves the intended tool but manipulates its arguments…

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arXiv (research papers) Federico Torrielli SI

Selecting The Most Informative Tokens in Natural Language Autoencoders

Natural language autoencoders translate a language model's internal activations into readable explanations. Explaining every token position is costly. Which positions should an auditor inspect to understand a potential threat? We study this question across $4.7$ million explanations on prompt injection and concealment. We compare signals from model computation with a ranker trained only on chat structure. Chat structure usually selects more relevant explanations than the…

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arXiv (research papers) Dongxu Cui SI

ContractWarden: Kernel-Enforced Damage Boundaries for AI Agents via Human-Authorized Contracts

Large language model agents can execute commands, create subprocesses, and directly access files and networks, allowing prompt injection or planning errors to become operating-system side effects. We present ContractWarden, a Linux reference monitor that enforces a human-authorized damage boundary without trusting the agent or its policy suggestions. A model may propose a tri-state asset contract - allow, deny, or no_egress - but a human makes the final choice. An execution…

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arXiv (research papers) Zonghao Ying SI

pikit: A Composable Toolkit for Indirect Prompt Injection Research and Evaluation

Indirect prompt injection embeds malicious instructions within external content retrieved by LLM-based agents, altering target behavior without user authorization. We introduce pikit, a research toolkit designed to systematically evaluate these threats across three core dimensions: attacks (13 methods), channels (16 carriers across text and file modes), and defenses (9 prevention strategies and 3 offline detection baselines). Built on a decorator-based registry, pikit…

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