Prompt injection: research

Journal articles, academic blogs, think-tank reports and papers in this section, newest first. Back to the news.

arXiv (research papers) Chuanming Tang SI

LiaisonAgent: An Multi-Agent Framework for Autonomous Risk Investigation and Governance

The rapid evolution of sophisticated cyberattacks has strained modern Security Operations Centers (SOC), which traditionally rely on rule-based or signature-driven detection systems. These legacy frameworks often generate high volumes of technical alerts that lack organizational context, leading to analyst fatigue and delayed incident responses. This paper presents LiaisonAgent, an autonomous multi-agent system designed to bridge the gap between technical risk detection and…

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arXiv (research papers) Tian Zhang SI

AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification

Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents aggregate dialogue history, tool outputs, and retrieved content into an accumulated runtime state to complete multi-step tasks. This execution model exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, in which attacker-controlled instructions embedded in external artifacts enter the agent state and later influence tool use. Multi-turn IPI is especially challenging because injected content can persist across steps and…

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arXiv (research papers) Marcus Graves SI

Reverse CAPTCHA: Evaluating LLM Susceptibility to Invisible Unicode Instruction Injection

We introduce Reverse CAPTCHA, an evaluation framework that tests whether large language models follow invisible Unicode-encoded instructions embedded in otherwise normal-looking text. Unlike traditional CAPTCHAs that distinguish humans from machines, our benchmark exploits a capability gap: models can perceive Unicode control characters that are invisible to human readers. We evaluate five models from two providers across two encoding schemes (zero-width binary and Unicode…

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arXiv (research papers) Qianlong Lan SI

Silent Egress: When Implicit Prompt Injection Makes LLM Agents Leak Without a Trace

Agentic large language model systems increasingly automate tasks by retrieving URLs and calling external tools. We show that this workflow gives rise to implicit prompt injection: adversarial instructions embedded in automatically generated URL previews, including titles, metadata, and snippets, can introduce a system-level risk that we refer to as silent egress. Using a fully local and reproducible testbed, we demonstrate that a malicious web page can induce an agent to…

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arXiv (research papers) Yanna Jiang SI

SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agents

Agentic systems increasingly rely on reusable procedural capabilities, \textit{a.k.a., agentic skills}, to execute long-horizon workflows reliably. These capabilities are callable modules that package procedural knowledge with explicit applicability conditions, execution policies, termination criteria, and reusable interfaces. Unlike one-off plans or atomic tool calls, skills operate (and often do well) across tasks. This paper maps the skill layer across the full lifecycle…

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arXiv (research papers) Piyush Jaiswal SI

Analysis of LLMs Against Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Attacks

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely deployed in real-world systems. Given their broader applicability, prompt engineering has become an efficient tool for resource-scarce organizations to adopt LLMs for their own purposes. At the same time, LLMs are vulnerable to prompt-based attacks. Thus, analyzing this risk has become a critical security requirement. This work evaluates prompt-injection and jailbreak vulnerability using a large, manually curated dataset across…

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arXiv (research papers) Che Wang SI

AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs

The integration of external data services (e.g., Model Context Protocol, MCP) has made large language model-based agents increasingly powerful for complex task execution. However, this advancement introduces critical security vulnerabilities, particularly indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Existing attack methods are limited by their reliance on static patterns and evaluation on simple language models, failing to address the fast-evolving nature of modern AI agents. We…

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arXiv (research papers) Che Wang SI

ICON: Indirect Prompt Injection Defense for Agents based on Inference-Time Correction

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions in retrieved content hijack the agent's execution. Existing defenses typically rely on strict filtering or refusal mechanisms, which suffer from a critical limitation: over-refusal, prematurely terminating valid agentic workflows. We propose ICON, a probing-to-mitigation framework that neutralizes attacks while preserving task continuity. Our key insight…

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arXiv (research papers) David Schmotz SI

Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce…

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arXiv (research papers) Zac Garby SI

The LLMbda Calculus: AI Agents, Conversations, and Information Flow

Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents: they plan, call tools, read untrusted data, and act on the results. This exposes them to prompt injection: data meant only to be read is obeyed as an instruction. The most principled defences replace content inspection with provenance: classifying data by source and keeping trusted and untrusted apart through a separation of duty (the dual-LLM pattern) and information-flow control. Yet the leading systems are hard to…

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arXiv (research papers) Lei Ba SI

CIBER: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Security Evaluation of Code Interpreter Agents

LLM-based code interpreter agents are increasingly deployed in critical workflows, yet their robustness against risks introduced by their code execution capabilities remains underexplored. Existing benchmarks are limited to static datasets or simulated environments, failing to capture the security risks arising from dynamic code execution, tool interactions, and multi-turn context. To bridge this gap, we introduce CIBER, an automated benchmark that combines dynamic attack…

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arXiv (research papers) Charles Ye SI

Prompt Injection as Role Confusion

LLMs see the world as a single stream of text, partitioned into roles like or . We trace prompt injection to role confusion: models perceive the source of text from how it sounds, not its labeled role. A command hidden in a webpage hijacks an agent simply because it sounds like text, despite its label. We design role probes to measure how LLMs internally perceive "who is speaking," and find that injected text occupies the same representational space as the trusted role it…

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arXiv (research papers) Kiarash Ahi SI

Trustworthy AI LLM Scalability Risk Index (LSRI): A Cybersecurity Framework Assessing Agentic-AI Security & Software Model Supply Chain Safety Boosting AI-Generated Malware Defense & Explainability Mitigating Emerging Risks of Generative AI

As AI shifts from human-in-the-loop interfaces to autonomous multi-agent systems capable of real-time code execution and tool integration through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP), traditional SAST, DAST, and legacy AI safety methods fail to detect modern agentic-AI threats. This paper introduces the LLM Scalability Risk Index (LSRI), a parametric framework and cybersecurity standard for stress-testing autonomous orchestration pipelines. LSRI measures the…

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arXiv (research papers) Emmanuel Bamidele SI

AMV-L: Lifecycle-Managed Agent Memory for Tail-Latency Control in Long-Running LLM Systems

Long-running LLM agents require persistent memory to preserve state across interactions, yet most deployed systems manage memory with age-based retention (e.g., TTL). While TTL bounds item lifetime, it does not bound the computational footprint of memory on the request path: as retained items accumulate, retrieval candidate sets and vector similarity scans can grow unpredictably, yielding heavy-tailed latency and unstable throughput. We present AMV-L (Adaptive Memory Value…

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arXiv (research papers) Manuel Wirth SI

Trojan Horses in Recruiting: A Red-Teaming Case Study on Indirect Prompt Injection in Standard vs. Reasoning Models

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated decision-making pipelines, specifically within Human Resources (HR), the security implications of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) become critical. While a prevailing hypothesis posits that "Reasoning" or "Chain-of-Thought" Models possess safety advantages due to their ability to self-correct, emerging research suggests these capabilities may enable more sophisticated alignment failures. This…

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arXiv (research papers) Yu Yin SI

The Vulnerability of LLM Rankers to Prompt Injection Attacks

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful re-rankers. Recent research has however showed that simple prompt injections embedded within a candidate document (i.e., jailbreak prompt attacks) can significantly alter an LLM's ranking decisions. While this poses serious security risks to LLM-based ranking pipelines, the extent to which this vulnerability persists across diverse LLM families, architectures, and settings remains largely under-explored. In this paper, we…

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arXiv (research papers) Xiaojun Jia SI

SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents

Agent skills extend LLM agents with task-specific instructions, executable scripts, and auxiliary resources, improving reusability but creating a new supply-chain attack surface. A malicious or compromised skill can be repeatedly loaded as trusted guidance and steer downstream tool use. Existing skill-based prompt-injection attacks are often manual and brittle, because explicit malicious instructions are rejected or ignored when they are not aligned with the original…

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arXiv (research papers) Max Fomin SI

When Benchmarks Lie: Evaluating Malicious Prompt Classifiers Under True Distribution Shift

Detecting prompt injection, jailbreak attacks, and harmful requests is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely, yet current evaluation practices in this literature overestimate generalization. We train activation-based classifiers (linear probes on LLM hidden states) on a benchmark of 18 datasets (prompt attacks plus benign sources) and propose Leave-One-Dataset-Out (LODO) evaluation, where the held-out dataset is never seen during training. Across four LLMs from…

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arXiv (research papers) Yuqi Jia SI

AlignSentinel: Alignment-Aware Detection of Prompt Injection Attacks

Prompt injection attacks insert malicious instructions into an LLM's input to steer it toward an attacker-chosen task instead of the intended one. Existing detection defenses typically classify any input with instruction as malicious, leading to misclassification of benign inputs containing instructions that align with the intended task. In this work, we account for the instruction hierarchy and distinguish among three categories: inputs with misaligned instructions, inputs…

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arXiv (research papers) Akshat Naik SI

OMNI-LEAK: Orchestrator Multi-Agent Network Induced Data Leakage

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more capable, their coordinated use in the form of multi-agent systems is anticipated to emerge as a practical paradigm. Prior work has examined the safety and misuse risks associated with agents. However, much of this has focused on the single-agent case and/or setups missing basic engineering safeguards such as access control, revealing a scarcity of threat modeling in multi-agent systems. We investigate the security…

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arXiv (research papers) Aashish Kolluri SI

Optimizing Agent Planning for Security and Autonomy

Indirect prompt injection attacks threaten AI agents that execute consequential actions, motivating deterministic system-level defenses. Such defenses can provably block unsafe actions by enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies, but currently appear costly: they reduce task completion rates and increase token usage compared to probabilistic defenses. We argue that existing evaluations miss a key benefit of system-level defenses: reduced reliance on human oversight…

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arXiv (research papers) J Alex Corll SI

Peak + Accumulation: A Proxy-Level Scoring Formula for Multi-Turn LLM Attack Detection

Multi-turn prompt injection attacks distribute malicious intent across multiple conversation turns, exploiting the assumption that each turn is evaluated independently. While single-turn detection has been extensively studied, no published formula exists for aggregating per-turn pattern scores into a conversation-level risk score at the proxy layer -- without invoking an LLM. We identify a fundamental flaw in the intuitive weighted-average approach: it converges to the…

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arXiv (research papers) Zhenhua Zou SI

Blind Gods and Broken Screens: Architecting a Secure, Intent-Centric Mobile Agent Operating System

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has shifted mobile computing from App-centric interactions to system-level autonomous agents. Current implementations predominantly rely on a "Screen-as-Interface" paradigm, which inherits structural vulnerabilities and conflicts with the mobile ecosystem's economic foundations. In this paper, we conduct a systematic security analysis of state-of-the-art mobile agents using Doubao Mobile Assistant as a representative case. We…

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Embrace The Red Security

Scary Agent Skills: Hidden Unicode Instructions in Skills ...And How To Catch Them

There is a lot of talk about Skills recently, both in terms of capabilities and security concerns. However, so far I haven’t seen anyone bring up hidden prompt injection. So, I figured to demo a Skills supply chain backdoor that survives human review. Additionally, I also built a basic scanner, and had my agent propose updates to OpenClaw to catch such attacks. Attack Surface Skills introduce common threats, like prompt injection, supply chain attacks, RCE, data…

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arXiv (research papers) Qianli Wang SI

When Skills Lie: Hidden-Comment Injection in LLM Agents

LLM agents often rely on Skills to describe available tools and recommended procedures. We study a hidden-comment prompt injection risk in this documentation layer: when a Markdown Skill is rendered to HTML, HTML comment blocks can become invisible to human reviewers, yet the raw text may still be supplied verbatim to the model. In experiments, we find that DeepSeek-V3.2 and GLM-4.5-Air can be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in a hidden comment appended to an…

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arXiv (research papers) Mohan Rajagopalan SI

Protecting Context and Prompts: Deterministic Security for Non-Deterministic AI

Large Language Model (LLM) applications are vulnerable to prompt injection and context manipulation attacks that traditional security models cannot prevent. We introduce two novel primitives--authenticated prompts and authenticated context--that provide cryptographically verifiable provenance across LLM workflows. Authenticated prompts enable self-contained lineage verification, while authenticated context uses tamper-evident hash chains to ensure integrity of dynamic…

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arXiv (research papers) Peiran Wang SI

The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by…

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arXiv (research papers) Herman Errico SI

Autonomous Action Runtime Management(AARM):A System Specification for Securing AI-Driven Actions at Runtime

As artificial intelligence systems evolve from passive assistants into autonomous agents capable of executing consequential actions, the security boundary shifts from model outputs to tool execution. Traditional security paradigms - log aggregation, perimeter defense, and post-hoc forensics - cannot protect systems where AI-driven actions are irreversible, execute at machine speed, and originate from potentially compromised orchestration layers. This paper introduces…

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arXiv (research papers) Georgios Syros SI

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf. While these agents offer powerful capabilities, their design exposes them to indirect prompt injection attacks embedded in untrusted web content, enabling adversaries to hijack agent behavior and violate user intent. Despite growing awareness of this threat, existing evaluations rely on fixed…

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arXiv (research papers) Yuting Ning SI

When Actions Go Off-Task: Detecting and Correcting Misaligned Actions in Computer-Use Agents

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned…

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